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An abundance of natural resources may serve as a curse or a blessing to 
countries with such wealth. Outcomes often depend on prevailing 
governance structures and the experience that government administrations 
have in managing these assets. Using a structural political economy 
approach, I shed light on the role that foreign state-owned and private-sector 
actors play in resource-rich stable, post-conflict, and fragile states in sub-
Saharan Africa. My findings are derived from data collected through desk-
bound research and an analysis of qualitative data gathered during in-depth 
interviews with local stakeholders in the three case study countries: Ghana, 
Sierra Leone, and Ethiopia. This research strives to explain how foreign 
state-owned and private-sector corporations have contributed to economic 
growth at both the national and local levels in different types of resource-rich 
countries. My dissertation also underscores how these actors have affected 
overall country and regional stability over time.  
 
All three case studies are structured thematically. The role of foreign 
investors in the management and governance of natural resources in sub-
Saharan Africa is addressed through seven themes: (1) legal/regulatory 
frameworks; (2) beneficiation, local content, and value addition; (3) inclusive 
economic transformation, or the lack of it; (4) conflict and security, (5) local 
community development; (6) sustainable energy solutions; and (7) natural 
resource exploitation. Through an exploration of these themes, I investigate 
the unique challenges and opportunities created by these investors in the 
economic development of the region — and conclude that the adoption of 
integrated local content, beneficiation and value addition policies in business 
practices and operations has the potential to generate positive economic 
transformation. My findings also indicate that collaborative governance 
involving state governments, the private sector, and local community 







Background and Context 
 
In recent years, there has been a great deal of evidence suggesting that an abundance 
of natural resources could either be a curse or a blessing depending on the governance 
structures in place in resource-rich countries. From the African countries’ over-reliance 
on a few natural resources and the economic insecurity spurring from their inability to 
diversify production (Wohlmuth, 2008), to the critical role that energy production, mining 
extraction, and land deals have played in the destabilization of political, economic, and 
social structures (Ross, 2013; Demissie, 2017; Bracco, 2018; Matondi, Havnevik and 
Beyenne, 2011; Anne, 2012), the governance of African natural resources will shape 
the future of the continent.  
 
Whether an abundance of natural resources proves to be a curse or blessing depends 
on the nature, extent, and outcome of the effort and experience of an individual country 
in governing and managing such assets. The manner in which Africa’s resources are 
managed and exploited by individual countries is fundamental to their ability to enhance 
both state and human security while fostering inclusive, broad-based economic 
development. Extractive industries are creating new processes of state-making and 
state-building, reshaping political, social, and economic roles and relationships 
(Schubert, Engel, and Macamo, 2018). Analysing and understanding these evolutions 
will be critical in merging the divide between natural and social sciences (Ali, Sturman, 
and Collins, forthcoming). Effective natural resource management is also critical to 
achieving the recently adopted Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) of the United 
Nations.1 Ghana, Namibia, and Botswana are examples of countries where natural 
                                                             
1 On September 25, 2015, world governments meeting at the United Nations adopted 17 Sustainable Development 
Goals (SDGs) aimed at ending extreme poverty and ensuring prosperity for all and protecting the 
environment. The SDGs replace the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs), which were adopted in 2000. Each 





resources have been used for the betterment of the populace by contributing to 
sustained socio-economic development over the past decade, with varying degrees of 
success and under different conditions and challenges (Grant, Compaore, and Mitchell, 
2015). 
 
Africa is fortunate to have some of the most sought-after natural resources in the world. 
These resources  comprise large deposits of a variety of minerals including 60 per cent 
of the world’s diamonds, 40 per cent of the world’s phosphate, 30 per cent of the world’s 
cobalt reserves (SMBC, 2011), proven oil reserves of 130 billion barrels, $1.5 trillion in 
projected gold reserves, 18 per cent of the world’s uranium, and other strategic rare 
minerals, along with an estimated 300 million hectares of potential land for rain-fed 
agriculture (Ahlenius, 2006; United Nations Environment Programme [UNEP], 2006; Al-
Jazeera, 2016; Els, 2016; Dasnois, 2012). The continent also boasts 80 transboundary 
rivers and lake basins, 17 large catchment areas, each exceeding 100,000 square 
kilometres.  
 
Despite these natural resource advantages, many African countries have failed to 
transform their enormous economic potential and wealth into tangible benefits in terms 
of sustainable socio-economic development, human security, and peace. 
Encouragingly, there is evidence to suggest that the continent is home to a small but 
growing number of countries that have begun to harness energy, mineral, and land 
resources to promote sustainable economic growth and broad-based inclusive 
development. Concerns around governance, leadership, structural transformation of the 
extractive nexus, combined with new challenges such as the green economy and 
technological advances, have been explored by researchers and support the 
conclusions of this dissertation (Hanson, D’Alessandro, and Owusu, 2014).   
 
An overview of the current status, key features, and challenges of Africa’s energy, 
mineral, and land resources is presented below as a backdrop to the dissertation’s 
contextual and analytical frameworks.  






Energy Resources Derived From Mining  
 
On the African continent, energy use has risen by 45 per cent since 2000. Despite this 
increase, sub-Saharan Africa in particular remains badly affected by a very weak supply 
of energy, including a severe shortage of electrical infrastructure. The electrical grid 
remains unreliable throughout much of the sub-Saharan region, with mini- and off-grid 
systems accounting for 70 per cent of the electricity provided in rural areas. With more 
than 500 million people in the region expected to lack connection to an electrical grid by 
2040, costly back-up generators fuelled by diesel or gasoline will be needed for the 
foreseeable future (IEA, 2014).   
 
Although such challenges are significant, Africa is poised to improve on both its 
conventional and renewable energy deficit with the continued development of hydro-
electric power, which is steadily gaining in capacity in the Democratic Republic of the 
Congo, Ethiopia, Mozambique, Guinea, and other sub-Saharan countries — although 
only approximately 5% of Africa’s hydro-electric power potential has been exploited 
(Ben Aïssa, 2014, 12). While the potential of renewable energy is high — and contained 
in the sustainable development agenda — its uptake across the continent is currently 
low (Karekezi and Kithyoma, 2002; Deichmann et al., 2011; Tenembaum et al., 2014; 
Ben Aissa et al., 2014). Yet, geothermal energy is expected to become the second-
largest energy source in Ethiopia and Kenya by 2040, and two-thirds of mini- and off-
grid electrical systems in rural sub-Saharan Africa are expected to derive their energy 
from solar photovoltaics, small-scale hydro-electric power, and wind turbines over the 
same period. Moreover, the use of bioenergy, derived from wood and charcoal, is also 
expected to remain a critical domestic energy source for the continent well into the 
future.  
 
Despite significant technical potential for offsetting the use of non-renewable energy 
sources in sub-Saharan Africa, renewables remain a considerably slim component of 




considering that a multitude of studies indicate that “renewable energy consumption 
plays a vital role for increasing economic growth and an energy policy planned to 
increase the share of renewable energy in total energy consumption is very effective in 
reducing greenhouse gas emissions” (Ben Aïssa, 2014, 12; Bhattacharya, 2016). Mini-
grids have been proposed as a means by which to bring renewable energy to rural 
Africa, where small segments of the population across most countries on the continent 
have access to stable and affordable electricity (Eder, 2015). And yet, four in five 
Africans utilise fuelwood and other biomass for cooking, and it is anticipated that a 40 
per cent rise in demand for bioenergy over the course of the next 25 years — not 
unlikely given the continent’s anticipated population growth — would impose a 
significant strain on the continent’s forestry stock. Despite the potential energy 
contributions to be made by these sources, Africa currently constitutes one of the 
world’s most promising regions in terms of hydrocarbon resources (IEA, 2014).  
 
Nearly 30 per cent of the global oil and gas discoveries made within the last five years 
were made in Africa (IEA, 2014). Though Nigeria remains the hub of the continent’s 
hydrocarbon sector, ongoing theft and militant activities in the Niger Delta are deterring 
investment and impacting negatively on production in the sector, thereby reducing the 
competitiveness of the country’s output in the face of emerging producers (PwC,  2016; 
Muvunyi, 2016; Ukiwo, 2009; Ikelegbe, 2013). Though it is believed that African crude 
oil production will decline from over 6 million barrels per day (mb/d) in 2020 to 5.3 mb/d 
by 2040, continental demand for oil products is expected to double and reach 4 mb/d 
over the same period (OPEC, 2017). This suggests that the continent’s net contribution 
to the global oil balance could be curtailed in the coming years. Meanwhile, natural gas 
reserves have the potential to serve as an engine of domestic economic development, 
provided the correct regulation, prices, and infrastructure are put in place. Despite the 
resource’s promising outlook, as much natural gas is flared as is consumed in Africa, 
with an estimated 1 trillion cubic metres having been flared to date. Based on current 
consumption levels, such volumes would be enough to power the whole of sub-Saharan 





According to PwC, Africa has proven natural gas reserves of approximately 502 trillion 
cubic feet, found primarily in Nigeria, Libya, Algeria, Egypt, and parts of East Africa 
including Mozambique and Tanzania (Temkin, 2017). In 2013, six of the top 10 oil and 
gas discoveries were made in Africa, while the continent maintains about 7.5% of the 
world’s proven oil reserves (PwC, 2017, 3). Indeed, PwC concludes that Algeria’s 121.9 
billion barrels of shale gas potential places it third globally. As the International 
Monetary Fund (IMF) already underlined in 2004, this increase, combined with an 
improved regulatory environment, would bolster government revenues and economic 
expansion (IMF, 2004). Kammen et al. (2013) illustrated the critical link between 
hydrocarbon resource-rich countries and the increased access to electricity in a context 
of effective governance. Notably, a poor and inadequate supply of domestic electricity is 
regarded as one of the most pressing obstacles to the growth of African enterprises, 
especially if the continent seeks to drive such an economic boom with sustainable 
energy projects, including nuclear (IEA, 2014; Kessides, 2014).  
 
Indeed, Andersen and Dalgaard suggest that significant economic impact has been lost 
from 1995 due to a lack of reliable electrical infrastructure, including physical 
infrastructure, which economic analysis by Deloitte argues will inhibit projected annual 
economic growth across the continent over the next decade (Pottas, 2013; Andersen 
and Dalgaard, 2013). In addition, global markets for hydrocarbons have been 
increasingly volatile over the last decade, dropping below US$30 a barrel in 2016 from 
US$125 in 2008 before averaging at US$70 a barrel the following year (Krauss, 2017). 
If this trend continues, coupled with more fervent international trends toward economic 
‘greenification,’ African countries may not be able to uniformly benefit from the 
hydrocarbon sector for major contributions to their domestic economies (Nkomo, 2017).  
 
For a long time, the oil and gas sector were considered one of the main destabilizing 
factors in African resource-rich countries like Nigeria, Equatorial Guinea or Gabon, 
having favoured the rise of anti-democratic regimes. However, foreign-owned actors 
working within a strong and appropriate governance framework can, and should be, 







Mining has been a critical economic activity for the continent, especially in sub-Saharan 
Africa, since the colonial era, when large volumes of minerals began being mined and 
processed for international markets (Dumett, 1999; Cleveland, 2015; Mark-Thiesen, 
2018). Africa’s mineral economy has grown significantly since the first South African 
diamond rush in 1869 and is widely regarded as a strategic producer of precious raw 
materials. Today, mining is responsible for the largest contribution to the GDP of many 
African countries and the continent as a whole produces more than 60 mineral products, 
including several of the world’s most lucrative and strategic minerals, such as gold, 
platinum, and diamonds (Besada, 2006; AfDB, 2012). Although still under-explored and 
under-exploited, the continent is estimated to hold 30 per cent of the world’s total 
mineral reserves, including 40 per cent of its gold deposits (Besada, 2006).   
 
More recently, the continent experienced a dramatic transformation of its mining sector. 
Many African governments have established investor-friendly policies and relaxed their 
control over the sector. Going back to 1986, Ghana became one of the first countries in 
sub-Saharan Africa to reform its mining regulations and provide a regulatory system 
that, through the passage of the Minerals and Mining Law, allowed foreign ownership 
within its gold mining sector (Berry, 1994). Today, despite the drawback spurred by 
stricter mining codes (the 2018 DRC mining code significantly increased taxes on 
strategic minerals), more than 40 African states have amended their mining legislation 
to attract greater foreign direct investment (FDI) as a way of developing their mineral 
resources (Besada, 2013; Harvey, 2014). These new national-level statutes have 
facilitated the privatisation and deregulation of the sector, enhanced the incentive 
framework in which mining companies operate, and redefined the obligations and rights 
of foreign and local investors. The incentives provided for more liberal immigration laws 
for expatriates and reduced taxation levels, while introducing import tax exemptions for 
equipment used by mining companies. Together, these changes resulted in a boom in 





In addition, there is a growing acknowledgement that mining companies can bring 
economic benefits to Africa through skills and technology transfer, greater innovation, 
more affordable financing, and higher-quality products and services (George, 2015; 
Heymann, 2014). Against this backdrop, there has been an increased attention in public 
policy debates on the value of investment from foreign public and private actors in the 
African mining sector, which led to the development of new forms of governance, 
including Pan-Africanist mining regulatory proposals (Nhemachena and Warikandwa, 
2017). There has also been a concomitant growth in awareness surrounding the role 
played by foreign investment actors in commodity-driven economic planning. The view, 
however, that foreign majority-owned mining corporations have generally benefitted 
host countries and local mining communities in Africa in terms of revenue and 
infrastructure development is not shared by all (Chuhan-Pole et al., 2017).  
 
Critics contend that foreign mining interests have a direct bearing on political stability 
and social cohesion, which they argue is due to the socio-economic and environmental 
disruptions caused by mining operations, especially in countries like Nigeria (Smith, 
2011; Amunwa and Minio, 2011, 8; Courson, 2009; Vidal, 2015) or the Democratic 
Republic of Congo (Nest, 2011; Global Witness, 2018). Under pressure from advocacy 
groups, protest movements and international organisations, some multinational 
companies operating in the extractive sector have become more aware of the need for 
positive community relations as well as a social licence to operate among local 
stakeholders. Discussions on corporate social responsibility (CSR) have emphasised 
that mining industries abroad should adopt ethical business practices, while many 
Western countries have implemented legislation or created forums to ensure that 
businesses incorporated within their jurisdiction adhere to acceptable standards of 
labour rights, environmental protection, and expectations of their contribution to socio-
economic development in host countries (Yakovleva, 2016; Essah and Andrews, 2016; 
Viveros, 2014; Babi et al., 2016; Besada, 2013). Whether these injunctions by corporate 




development will be investigated further as part of this dissertation’s case study 
chapters.  
 
Over the past decade, various global and regional initiatives have emerged, including 
the UN Global Compact, the Global Reporting Initiative, the Organisation for Economic 
Co-operation and Development’s (OECD) Guidelines for Multinational Enterprises and 
the Guidelines on Minerals in High Risk Areas, the Principles for Responsible 
Investment, the Natural Resources Charter, and the Africa Mining Vision (AMV). Each 
of these voluntary regulations focuses to various degrees on ensuring good corporate 
behaviour and accountability (Gugerthy and Prakash, 2010). There is general 
consensus among civil society organisations (CSOs) and governments that CSR, more 
broadly defined, needs to be about more than merely complying with government 
regulations and laws.  
 
The African mining sector has been plagued with irregularities and endemic corruption, 
leading many experts to support the resource curse theory. This dissertation will support 
an innovative approach that considers foreign-owned mining actors as important 
partners to sustain broad-based economic development, particularly in post-conflict 




The publication of an alarming report issued by the international social movement 
GRAIN (2008a) brought public and international attention to a new topic — international 
investments in, and acquisitions of land by, foreign investors, primarily but not 
exclusively in Africa. It is important to point out from the onset that there are both 
negative consequences and tangible benefits deriving from the increased investments 
in land resources in Africa by international investors (Lisk, 2013).  
 
These developments in foreign land acquisition underline the significance of land as a 




when some of these countries are still trying to come to terms with a land crisis linked to 
their colonial legacy and characterised by structural inequality, land tenure insecurity, 
communal impoverishment, and environmental stress. Makki and Geisler even 
controversially referred to land investments by outside interests, mainly foreign, as 
“recurring ways in which states use cosmographies of power and terra nullius narratives 
to remake places identified as empty, underutilized or underproductive” (Makki and 
Geisler, 2011).  
 
Since the end of colonialism in much of Africa and the demise of apartheid in South 
Africa in 1994, land reforms have been at the core of southern African societies’ 
aspirations toward democratisation and socio-economic reconfiguration. While the 
International Food Policy Research Institute (IFPRI) claims that land acquisitions could 
have the potential “to inject much needed investment into agriculture and rural areas in 
poor developing countries” (von Braun and Meinzen-Dick, 2009, 1), it also warns about 
the potential negative repercussions for the rural poor in recipient countries. This is 
termed the Developmental Stimulus from Land Grabbing phenomenon, whereby 
researchers have been striving to understand the developmental impact of large-scale 
land acquisitions in African states, particularly by foreign private-sector actors. An 
extensive academic literature has focused on the negative consequences of large-scale 
land acquisitions (LSLAs), ranging from land-grab-induced displacement (Thomson, 
2014) to the increased gender-based imbalance in household activities (Fonjong and 
Fokum, 2015). 
 
However, some studies have also explored the potential beneficial impact these 
transnational investments might have on human rights and economic development 
through agro-industrialisation (Wisborg, 2013; Lisk, 2013). Ethiopia is at the centre of 
this land-grabbing or land-sale development trend/stimulus, depending on one’s 
perspective. According to figures from the Ethiopian government, close to 40 different 
countries have bought or leased prime agricultural land in the country, some for less 
than $250 USD per week (Vidal, 2011). The Government of Ethiopia argues that it 




industrialisation, especially as more than 80% of the country relies on agriculture for 
subsistence (Schiffman, 2013). India, for example, has acquired 600,000 hectares of 
agricultural land in Ethiopia, followed closely by firms from Saudi Arabia (Anwar, 2016). 
Ethiopia has earmarked some 11.5 million hectares of agricultural land for lease or sale 
to foreign multinationals (Chandran and Gardner, 2017). Land acquisitions in Africa, 
especially Ethiopia, have been driven by the increasing scarcity of land and water 
resources, as well as export restrictions (e.g., export taxes and export bans) imposed by 
major global food producers during times of high food prices, which resulted in a 
“growing distrust in the functioning of regional and global markets” (IFPRI, 2009).  
 
Land deals have become a national security strategy for countries facing forms of 
environmental scarcity or preparing for future energy shortages. At the same time, 
burgeoning agricultural commodity prices in 2007–8 increasingly attracted private 
companies (agrifood businesses, bio-energy corporations, investment funds, and so on) 
and public-private partnerships to invest in land acquisitions as the world headed into 
financial crisis. The impact of sharp increases in international prices pushed major 
exporting countries to introduce tariffs or even bans, destabilizing the global markets. To 
insulate themselves from the price of an unstable market, wealthy food-importing 
countries have begun to heavily invest in overseas lands (Cotula, 2013).  
 
The massive scale of investments and the acquisition of land at a time of a triple global 
crisis (in the form of food, energy, and financial uncertainty), together with the prevailing 
problem of land tenure insecurity in most ‘recipient’ countries, calls for greater scrutiny 
of how and why these investments and land deals are occurring. It is also important to 
examine their local, regional, and global repercussions on social, economic, and 
political structures. In the southern African region alone, deals have proliferated at an 
unprecedented rate. Assessments of the potential impacts of these investments differ 
greatly but experiences in case study countries, including Ethiopia, illustrate the 
destabilizing role of land deals on national political structures and the need for robust, 





As illustrated previously, land deals provide a strong example of a foreign-owned 
company’s interference in national governance systems regarding natural resources. 
This dissertation will indeed support a new research paradigm to understand how land-
related investments by foreign actors can and should support long-term development 
and stability in African countries.  
 
While appearing subjective, the exploration of the positive or negative roles of foreign-
owned enterprises focuses on issues regarding the creation of a sustainable 
environment in terms of social, economic, political, and environmental concerns. 
Positive impacts of foreign-owned economic actors centre on, and are not limited to, the 
inclusion of local communities in the investment project, the implementation of 
appropriate efforts of redistribution of created wealth at the state and local levels, the 
integration of CSR practices and the on-the-ground translation of these internal policies. 
On the other hand, the destabilisation of socio-economic systems and the creation of 
enclave economies, where financial and political benefits from extractive activities in 
resource-rich countries have filtered to political and economic elites at the expense of 
widespread distribution of benefits to larger segments of the population, constitute 





In line with this objective, the dissertation will touch upon several sub-themes to provide 
a better understanding of the role of foreign-owned enterprise in governing and 
managing natural resources in Africa: 
• The roles played by foreign state-owned and privately-owned sector actors, 
collectively referred as foreign economic actors in extractive industries; 
• The efforts made by foreign actors to implement policies and practices that 
demonstrate CSR and foster inclusive mineral development agreements 




• The role of natural resources extraction in peace and security contexts, as 
evidenced by a comparison between stable, post-conflict, and conflict-threatened 
resource-rich African states; and 
• The evaluation of instances in which intervention by foreign actors did not result 
in an improvement in capacity-building and natural resources governance, but 
rather hampered development and contributed to financial mismanagement, 
environmental degradation, poor labour standards, loss of livelihoods, and 
increased conflict with local communities. 
 
Through each of the selected country case studies, three core research questions will 
form the basis of investigation and argument, defining what answers are being sought 
through interviews, desk research, and the like:  
 
1. How does the evolving role of foreign-owned enterprises, including state-owned, 
closely held and listed companies, affect peace, stability, and economic 
development in the African context? 
2. What determines whether these actors play a positive or negative role in 
achieving peace, stability, and economic development?  
3. In what areas of policy changes and reform could recommendations be made so 
as to promote positive, impactful, and sustainable development outcomes? 
 
Responses to these questions will contribute to existing knowledge about the role of 
foreign-owned enterprises in fostering stability or instability and prosperity or poverty in 
natural resource-rich African countries with different political situations: Ghana 
(politically stable); Sierra Leone (post-conflict); and Ethiopia (conflict-threatened).  
 
Three Political States 
• A politically stable country is understood as holding the characteristics of good 
governance and strong institutions, regular economic growth, and robust 




• A post-conflict country is perceived as having divided societies, in the process of 
economic reconstruction and peace-building but not (as yet) having strong 
governance or institutional legitimacy (Wolff, 2011; Roberts, 2008).  
• A conflict-threatened country displays good economic performance and has 
strong state institutions based on the developmental state model, but 
nevertheless has existing undercurrents of ethnic or social tension that threaten 
peace and political and social stability, linked largely to resource-sharing. 
Deficiencies in governance, economy, and nationhood constitute the key defining 
characteristics of a conflict-threatened country (Brock et al., 2012). 
 
These classifications stem from existing research and policy definitions on each 
country. On Ethiopia, in 2017, the Fund for Peace classified the country as one that has 
experienced a significant decline in stability, due primarily to ongoing anti-government 
protests (Fragile States Index, 2017). For Sierra Leone, most scholars agree the 
country remains in post-conflict, conducting peace-building for the purposes of 
reconstruction and development (Neethling, 2007; Quinn, 2016; Bertone, 2014; 
Jinguishi, 2015). Ghana, despite surface-level turbulence, is regarded as a stable 
country (Knoope and Chauzal, 2016; Cooke, 2016).  
 
The results will also contribute to knowledge about the impact of foreign enterprises on 
development, experiences, lessons learned, and, ultimately, lead to policy 
recommendations for promoting positive developmental outcomes. In addition, key 
variables will be isolated to help create a unique broader framework for analysis. By 
using this Political Economy of Natural Resource Governance (PENRG) framework to 
assess the outcomes and influences of foreign-owned enterprises on governance 
structures in three case countries, the intent is to create an improved analytical tool for 
conceptualising the impact of natural resources governance on peace, stability, and 
economic development in Africa.  
 
Based on gaps in the literature on political economy and the impact of foreign-owned 




Ethiopia, and Sierra Leone, the argument is made that, in consideration of governance 
design, foreign-owned private-sector activities vis-à-vis natural resources have ushered 
in unprecedented economic growth in stable Ghana. Those areas where foreign 
investments failed to bring about improvements are evaluated, shedding light on 
instances where such investments may have hampered development and fuelled 
conflict — as in the case of post-conflict Sierra Leone — and raising the question as to 
why private-sector natural resources investment has served as a source of continued 
instability and low-level conflict in Ethiopia. Ultimately, the different outcomes of these 
investments hinge on the robust nature of these countries’ governance structures, as 
per the tenets of the PENRG framework.  
 
Existing literature on natural resource governance identifies that continuing gaps in 
knowledge include whether private actors involved in the natural resource sector 
contribute to peace, stability, and prosperity (particularly in terms of governance quality 
and development outcomes) and the role of foreign-owned enterprises in post-conflict 
recovery contexts. Using the case studies, the argument is made that the role that 
foreign-owned enterprises should play in stable countries is sustainable development; in 
post-conflict countries, they should support economic reconstruction as well as state- 
and peace-building; and in conflict-threatened states, they should enhance state-
building and broad-based economic development. To state it bluntly, the overarching 
consideration by the private sector is economic — the raison d’étre of their existence. 
The UN recently estimated that the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) constitute 
a $12 trillion-dollar economic opportunity for the private sector, as their achievement will 
require a massive global undertaking that includes their participation (Vali, 2017). 
Similarly, much has been written on the economic costs of conflict, a motivating factor in 
the private sector’s involvement in building and maintaining peace and stability. While 
the private sector is only one of many actors, its influence over public policy is central to 
favour peace and stabilization (Khan and Ahmed, 2014). That said, the private sector 
has thus far been readily side-lined in these conversations, with governments and the 
non-profit sector viewing these actors as part of the problem rather than a vehicle for 




publication of several volumes on the untapped potential of business in peace-building 
(Sandole and Staroste, 2014, 25). More recently, corporations are being viewed as a 
magic bullet for the issues and challenges faced by a non-profit sector, which has thus 
far been unable to act as an effective and permanent antidote for endemic development 
challenges; the private sector seemingly faces the same intractable issues as other 
actors who have come before it, but without the structural mandate to “do good” 
(McEwan, 2017, 48).  
 
This is in contrast to research that suggests private-sector actors may have a highly 
political role in conflict and post-conflict settings, despite little interest, capacity, or 
legitimacy regarding their ability to participate in these conversations (Ford, 2015, 151). 
Of course, the necessity for them to voluntarily engage in CSR practices continues to be 
debated in policy and academia, for there is no clause that mandates companies to act 
in ways that benefit anyone else besides their shareholders. This integrative-oriented 
theory, based on a holistic and collaborative approach that associates the economic, 
political, social, and environmental needs of communities with corporate business 
practices, appears promote peace and stability (Issifu, 2016). But, putting aside for one 
moment the overwhelming agreement at the international level and among development 
practitioners that CSR is quintessential to conducting business in the modern era, 
foreign-owned enterprises create environments conducive to their long-term enrichment 
by investing in peace, stability, and economic growth. In 2009, Brauer and Tepper 
Marlin calculated that the cessation of violence would generate a “peace dividend of 
approximately 13,1% of the 2007 gross world product (Brauer and Marlin, 2009). This 
analysis has since been shared by an increasing number of studies and illustrates the 
macroeconomic benefit of peace and stabilization for profit-driven organizations (Prandi 
and Lozano, 2010). Indeed, these objectives are summarized throughout this work as 
the dependent variables of peace, stability, and economic development. By doing so, 
foreign-owned enterprises create the environment for reliable and skilled workforces 
and predictable political institutions while minimizing risk. Therefore, while not mandated 
to perform these functions in each of the three different political contexts, considering 




practices and policies that promote a stabilized and peaceful environment. The success 
of foreign-owned enterprises in doing so hinges on strong governance at both the local 
and national levels. This involves putting in place structures that hold foreign actors 
accountable and that help realize outcomes of their investments and activities. In the 
chapters that follow, each of these roles and impacts by foreign-owned enterprises will 
be discussed and examined in turn. 
 
In order to explore the impact of foreign-owned corporate investments in Africa, the 
concepts of peace, stability, and economic development should be clearly defined. 
While peace may seem to be the absence of war, in this dissertation it is defined as the 
freedom from disturbances at the social, economic, political, and environmental levels. 
As Royce (2009) states, peace is a “two-dimensional construct with both objective and 
subjective measures that must be studied within specific micro to macro contexts.” In 
this context, the present research tackles this multidimensionality of the concept of 
peace as we will analyze local, national and global objective and subjective measures to 
integrate peace in the governance of natural resources. In terms of stability in a political 
context, Ake (1975) reminds us that political stability is profoundly linked to the concept 
of obedience to the law, and depends on the capacity of individuals to obey the social, 
political, and economic regulations in place to support or undermine the system’s 
stratification. In the realm of natural resources governance, stability is defined as the 
ability of foreign-owned enterprises to support obedience to the law by individuals, but 
also to the economic and social institutions in the countries where they operate. Finally, 
a key concept — and probably the most controversial — is economic development. 
While past economists defined economic development in parallel to materiality and 
material progress, current approaches use more indicators, placing the notion of poverty 
and poverty reduction as a top indicator. While economic development is still measured 
by macroeconomic indicators, such as GDP per capita growth, trade levels, and level of 
FDIs, the addition of socio-economic aspects is crucial. With respect to the governance 
of African natural resources, economic development is tightly linked to both the 
macroeconomic indicators of exports and production and with population well-being.  




While typologies in addition to politically stable, post-conflict, and conflict-threatened are 
described in the case studies that form this dissertation — particularly the multiplicity of 
post-conflict environments — a broad approach was adopted to produce context-
adaptable solutions (Brown et. al., 2011). Well-structured empirical research is 
undertaken to test the central premise concerning the nature of resource governance 
with respect to each type. The findings from my analysis  will help to inform the literature 
on the governance of natural resources, political economy, and investigations on the 
impact of foreign enterprise on development, as well as policy recommendations 
regarding the role of foreign investors and foreign-owned companies in the 
enhancement, or otherwise, of natural resource governance and the contribution of 
such entities to the overall development process. 
 
Due to the malleable definitions surrounding foreign-owned companies, this research is 
characterized by a multiplicity of actors. The increasing interconnectedness of 
economies and economic actors blurs the lines around the origin of capital flows and 
investments and makes the distinction between local and foreign-owned companies 
somewhat complex. As investments are performed in critical strategic areas, during a 
period of unstable global markets, state-owned enterprises emerge as significant 
players in land deals and in projects involving the extraction of mineral-rich deposits and 
energy development. Among others, China’s Eximbank, Qatar’s Zad Holding Company, 
or the United Arab Emirates’ Dubai World, provide strong examples of major public 
investors in Africa’s natural resources portfolio. 
 
Surprisingly, sovereign wealth fund (SWF) investments in energy, mining, or land 
projects remain sporadic (Cotula et al., 2009). An acknowledgement of the role of 
public-owned entities in direct investments should not override the overwhelming 
participation of privately owned or listed companies in such investments. While 
supported by state/country initiatives, including government-to-government investment 
treaties, loans, and guarantees, private companies constitute the bulk of investments in 





This research presents not only an opportunity to advance new knowledge in literature 
on the diversity of roles attributed to foreign-owned enterprises operating in resource-
rich countries with different (political) contexts via a proposed new theoretical framework 
defined as the political economy of natural resource governance (PENRG), but also 
constitutes an innovative contribution to investigating the impacts of foreign-owned 
enterprises on peace, stability, and economic development — thus providing a basis for 
generating new policy recommendations for the private sector and state governance in 
resource-rich African countries. Similar to an International Political Economy framework 
as it relates to national development and transformation policies and outcomes, the 
natural resource governance framework will be interpreted and incorporated into an 
analysis of governance-related factors that impact development and transformation 
(e.g., policy choice and decision-making process, institutional mechanisms for 
transparency and accountability, public financial management, opportunities for 
inclusive growth and equality). Through the concept of PENRG, the role of foreign-
owned, private-sector companies in terms of their contribution to economic growth, 
peace, and stability at both the national and local levels is analysed.  
 
 At the national level, the analysis will conceptualise the key actors’ roles in a number of 
specific conditions and environments, all of which current literature tells us can impact 
the effectiveness of natural resource governance, overall stability, and prosperity of 
development — including taxes, government revenues, employment creation, and the 
implementation of laws. At the local level, where extractive and production activities 
take place, the analysis will conceptualise roles in terms of employment generation, 
revenues shared with local communities via the renegotiation of contracts, and 
community development agreements that ensure CSR activities produce more tangible 
results. By considering how these actors can help strengthen industries linked to the 
natural resource sector via value addition, beneficiation, and local content, the hope is 
that new insights will be formed and guidelines for policy recommendations based on 





Over the last 10 years, policies and practices adopted by foreign-owned enterprises that 
have invested in resource-rich African states have been insufficiently reviewed and 
evaluated — especially in environments characterised by weak governance. In his 1995 
article, Rosenau adopts a very broad definition of global governance. Despite being a 
somewhat different concept, his approach is of particular interest in defining 
governance. He states that governance encompasses "systems of rule at all levels of 
human activity from the family to the international organization in which the pursuit of 
goals through the exercise of control has transnational repercussion” (Rosenau, 1995). 
Applied to natural resources, this definition appears attractive due to its broad approach. 
Extractive activities should be understood to affect the whole community and every 
sector. In this sense, governance of natural recourses is constituted by a system of rule 
at all its levels through which the exercise of control has repercussions. There is a lack 
of literature chronicling the progression of these foreign actors’ contributions to natural 
resource management and sustainable broad-based economic development in 
resource-rich African countries. Scant attention has been given to problems that have 
emerged as a result of poor corporate practices and their impacts on sustainable peace 
in only post-conflict and conflict-threatened states. The need for an increased 
awareness of these trends is critical in light of activities by foreign-owned companies: 
for example, 230 Australian mining companies are involved in over 600 projects in 42 
African countries, representing more than $45 billion in investments (Edwards et al., 
2014).  
 
For the future of Africa and its countries’ natural resources governance, it is crucial to 
have in-depth knowledge of the impact of such massive investments on economic, 
social, and political structures. As such, each case study is organised along the lines of 
three research questions: what are the impacts of foreign-owned companies on natural 
resource governance? what are the causes of these impacts? which regulatory and 
policy sectors should be explored to provide positive outcomes?  
 
Extensive field research in the three countries, complemented by desk research, was 




and thus better address perceived deficiencies in the literature on African natural 
resource governance. A particular goal of this research was to obtain a more balanced 
perspective on foreign-owned enterprises currently operating in Africa’s natural 
resource sector, and the role that they are, can, and should be playing in supporting 
stability and prosperity in conflict-threatened, post-conflict, and stable countries. In so 
doing, the historical contributions of foreign actors to improving political governance, 
economic stewardship, and capacity building in natural resources management in Africa 
are examined in each chapter.  
 
Three Countries, a New Framework 
 
Prior to the three case-study chapters, this research begins with two framework 
chapters that present, explore, and clarify key issues of concepts and methods pertinent 
to the research as well as literature topics covering the resource curse, the evolving role 
of foreign investors, and the private sector in sustainable growth paradigms. In addition, 
there will be a robust acknowledgement of the project’s proposed PENRG framework, a 
further expansion of the dissertation’s three primary research questions, and an outline 
as to how the investigation was undertaken to obtain relevant empirical evidence and 
advance the analysis. 
 
In all three case studies, the challenges and opportunities created by the expanding role 
of foreign-owned enterprises are viewed through a new theoretical framework. In 
particular, the growing presence of traditional and emerging state-owned and private-
sector actors in the management of natural resources in Ghana, Sierra Leone, and 
Ethiopia as they relate to stability, peace and security, and broad-based economic 
development (prosperity) is analysed. Thematically guided histories for each case 








Ghana Case Study 
 
Since the 1980s, Ghana’s economic growth has been increasingly tied to the mining 
sector, which is largely dominated by gold. Ghana’s lucrative natural resources, stable 
political landscape, and increasingly diverse economy have seen it emerge as the 
second-largest economy in West Africa (after Nigeria). With its established democratic 
system, prudent natural resource management, steadily declining national poverty 
rates, and consistent economic growth — culminating in middle-income status in 2011 
— Ghana has traditionally been regarded as a model for development in sub-Saharan 
Africa (Chamlee-Wright, 1997; Killick, 2010). Despite various efforts and improvements, 
the country has nevertheless confronted several challenges in recent years that have 
prevented its mining fiscal system from functioning more effectively (Amponsah-Tawiah 
and Dartey-Baah, 2011; Standing and Hilson, 2013, Ayee et al., 2011). They include 
gaps in the monitoring and verification of capital expenditures, loss of carry-over 
provisions, and transfer pricing mechanisms. Ghana’s extractive sector is consequently 
highly susceptible to illicit financial flows (IFFs) (Africa Center for Energy Policy, 2015).  
 
The extractive sector has the potential to play a significant role in Ghana’s future 
economic development and transformation, social progress, and poverty reduction, as 
well as greater environmental protection. For this to occur, the forthcoming 40-year 
National Development Plan has to give the sector the attention it deserves, putting it at 
the core of Ghana’s future and long-term development strategy and establishing the 
infrastructure needed for its responsible development. This includes a well-planned and 
-financed industrialisation process for the transformation of mining and mineral 
resources, which cannot happen if mining resources and transformation are not 
considered tightly linked to, and necessary for, agricultural development, given that 
agriculture is a key economic sector (Owusu-Ansah and Smardon, 2015). This case 
study also underlines the connections between gold and cocoa (Snapir et. al., 2017) as 
well as downstream linkages between oil and construction, and between gold mining 
and other sectors of the economy (Tenkorang and Osei-Kufuor, 2013). The intention is 




governance, do not exist in isolation from the rest of a country’s economic system. 
Along this interconnected chain, foreign-owned investment actors, together with the 
Ghanaian government, may be key drivers of transformational change. 
 
Sierra Leone Case Study 
 
Sierra Leone is undergoing post-conflict reconstruction and state building following 
brutal civil wars fuelled by resource predation. Reconstruction efforts, particularly in the 
extractive sector, have focused heavily on private-sector growth (Del Castillo, 2008; 
Andersen, 2010). In Sierra Leone, diamond extraction by a variety of foreign-owned 
enterprises, via legal and illegal means, played a crucial role in its destabilisation and 
provided a primary means of finance to armed rebel groups leading up to and during the 
civil conflict (Jakobi and Wolf, 2013). Recent efforts to resuscitate the economic 
livelihoods of communities devastated by conflict have placed great emphasis on ‘good 
governance’ in small-scale diamond-mining communities. Nevertheless, resurrecting 
viable and transparent diamond and gold mining industries in the country has been 
problematic, as the ‘peace dividend’ continues to elude many communities due to a lack 
of foreign investment and persistent corruption within political institutions that hamper 
reconstruction and peace-building efforts (Beevers, 2015). 
 
But despite considerable achievements in recent years, Sierra Leone’s post-conflict 
environment continues to impact the level of investment and the degree to which it can 
diversify its economy (Marda and Bangura, 2010). Indeed, the country’s long-term 
stability and the consolidation of its democracy require that it move away from resource 
extraction as the dominant source of revenue. The after-effects of the conflict include a 
severe shortage of skilled workers and managers, rampant corruption, a lack of 
infrastructure (roads, telecommunications, water and energy supplies), cumbersome 
customs procedures, a weak judiciary, the absence of an effective land-titling system 
outside the western area around the capital, Freetown, and a limited banking system 




development and ease of doing business deter much-needed foreign investment in the 
extractive and other key sectors. 
 
Ethiopia Case Study 
 
For Ethiopia, natural resource governance with respect to land constitutes a particularly 
crucial dimension of its development. Agriculture has long been the central axis of its 
economy, and commercial agriculture and large-scale investments have been 
considered critical to the development of this sector. One of the main challenges 
presented by commercialised agriculture is that instead of creating employment, it 
replaces labour-intensive farming techniques with machinery and other technology that 
can degrade the surrounding environment (Khairo et al., 2005).  
 
Although foreign investments in Ethiopia’s agricultural sector have culminated in 
improved infrastructure, large-scale agricultural investments are particularly problematic 
when one considers that Ethiopia and the East Africa region are disproportionately 
affected by hunger and other food security concerns. Though such investments have 
the potential to offer much in the way of knowledge and technology transfer, there is 
also evidence to suggest that land acquisitions in Ethiopia have displaced smallholder 
agriculturalists and pastoralists from their ancestral lands without providing them with 
compensatory employment opportunities (Moreda, 2015).  
 
On the other hand, the dissertation seeks to investigate whether the adoption of 
alternative governance models may constitute a workable solution. This case study 
demonstrates that governance models that prioritise, via foreign-owned enterprises, the 
production of labour-intensive crops, meaningful consultations with local communities, 
and due respect for local knowledge of agricultural production processes may spur 
possible administrative changes that could facilitate inclusive and sustainable growth 
(Adenew, 2004). In addition, fostering participatory industrial crop production allocation 
frameworks and lending greater support to domestic firms producing agricultural inputs 




evaluation of the legislation that has recentralised land administration functions, as well 
as a reconsideration of the Ethiopian government’s general approach to pastoral and 
shifting cultivator groups, could also benefit the citizens (Little et al., 2010). Ethiopia’s 
agricultural sector nevertheless offers development opportunities for well-regulated 
foreign actors and constitutes a complex linkage between foreign investment and 
Ethiopia’s inter-ethnic fragility. 
 
This research should shed light on the role that foreign state-owned and private-sector 
actors have historically played in the governance and management of natural resources 
in these three distinct countries. It also addresses the political conditions that are unique 
to each, and how they shape the environment for foreign-owned enterprises operating 
in the natural resource sector. By addressing the role of foreign actors and the local 
political conditions that affect them, this research endeavours to identify patterns and 
relationships evolving in the face of new investment flows from traditional and emerging 
investors, and how African governments and communities have responded to the social 
impacts of such investment. 
 
By focusing on the factors that influence whether foreign actors contribute to or alleviate 
instability, conflict, and prosperity, this research aims to contribute to broader debates 
and academic discourses on the role of foreign actors within the natural resource sector 
by providing guidelines for an improved analytical framework that can be used to 
interpret and clarify concepts about natural resource governance, sustainable 
development, and violent conflict in Africa. A second goal is to help enhance discussion 
surrounding on-the-ground experiences and lessons learned — those of host 
governments, foreign actors, local communities, and international organisations — that 
could be relevant to developing policy that promotes development outcomes in the 












The management of natural resources is now an important debate in the political 
economy of national and international development both in policy and academic circles. 
In particular, the discussions that characterise this debate have far-reaching strategy 
and policy implications for the ability to attain sustainable development in developing 
countries. Indeed, one area of emerging consensus is the critical importance of 
governance — defined here as “the deficiency or effectiveness of public and private 
sector institutions” — as the key to understanding the prevalence or absence of violent 
conflict (peace and security), as well as economic development pertaining to natural 
resources in Africa (Alao, 2007; Collier, 2007, Acemoglu, Robinson, and Johnson, 
2002). Weak, corrupt, or undemocratic governments may be unable or unwilling to 
invest resource revenues in sustainable economic development, or to provide the 
necessary regulatory environments for responsible and accountable business practices 
(Ballentine, 2006). Host governments of resource-rich countries, local communities in 
extractive areas, and foreign-owned enterprises can all play a crucial part in influencing 
and determining strategies and policies and the nature of institutions governing how 
resources are managed, as well as whether resource wealth contributes to sustainable 
economic development in the Global South.  
 
In Africa, the effective management of the continent’s abundant natural resources could 
be the key to poverty alleviation and lasting prosperity. However, recent history 
suggests that poor resource management often results in the chaotic and wasteful 
deployment of human capital, the depletion of the resources on which societies’ 
economic livelihoods are based, and, in extreme cases, violence and political instability 
at both the national and regional levels (Ross, 2013; Buckles, 1999; USAID, 2006; 
UNDP, 2011). Indeed, natural resource wealth alone is not sufficient to contribute to the 
peace, security, and economic development of resource-rich countries (Torvik, 2009).  




grounded in effective governance, which encompasses both the government’s ability to 
utilise resource revenues effectively and the policies and practices of other actors such 
as businesses and NGOs. In this sense, questions surrounding the governance of 
natural resources become critical to ensuring that resource wealth contributes to the 
development of resource-rich countries, rather than precipitating cycles of violence and 
sustaining widespread poverty. 
 
The increasing frequency of dialogue and roundtable discussions taking place between 
various stakeholders in the extractive industries — captured and reflected in part by this 
research — illustrates the growing concern in the global community, including even 
among international business organizations and multilateral institutions, that a 
reconciliation between sustainable economic development and business objectives 
must occur by encouraging a more responsible exploitation of natural resources 
(UNECA, 2016). Key concerns from a governance perspective relate to the absence of 
clear regulations and mining codes; insufficient adherence to the rule of law; an 
absence of fiscal, monetary, and budgetary discipline; the presence of few pro-poor 
public-private partnerships; poor skills and limited resources in government 
departments; muted encouragement of open dialogue between government and civil 
society; and little, if any, transparency and accountability. The culmination of all these 
deficiencies call for an improved and visible governance system in Africa’s natural 
resources sector, so as to ultimately promote peace, security, and economic 
development.  
 
From the perspective of African stakeholders — including those national leaders, 
domestic investors, and development practitioners interviewed during the fieldwork 
undertaken to support this research project — effective natural resource governance is 
increasingly regarded as the key determinant of the continent’s economic growth and 
investment opportunities, especially if official aid volumes continue to decline (IDEA, 
2017; Rodríguez-Pose and Cols, 2017, 67; Salah Ovadia, 2017). African leaders have 
come to recognise that the manner in which the continent’s resources are managed and 




to sustainable economic and social development, and enhance peace and security 
(Fabricus, 2017). This is evidenced by the outspoken support by African leaders for the 
African Mining Vision, including the African Union’s Addis Ababa Declaration. Given the 
changing global order brought about by the rise of emerging economies, such as China 
and India, and their increased trade with and investment in Africa, an improved 
understanding of natural resource governance on the continent, the direct impact it has 
on peace, security, and economic development, and the way in governance is likely to 
evolve is of greater importance than ever.  
 
The literature thus far denotes a range of perspectives on the impact that governance of 
natural resources has on peace, security, and economic development. It has been 
argued that foreign investors are to some extent contributing to the transfer of skills, 
knowledge, and technology to host countries through their operations (York, 2012; 
Evans, 2014; Zhou, 2017, 328; World Finance, n.d.; Turok, 2013), although the 
literature is filled with examples of these so-called outputs of beneficiation failing to 
appear in any meaningful, tangible, or sustainable way. Foreign investments in 
extractives can also facilitate innovation, more affordable financing, and higher-quality 
products and services. In contrast, research findings indicate that resource-rich 
economies in Africa have suffered lower economic growth due to the phenomenon 
known as ‘Dutch disease,’ which refers to the economic challenges associated with the 
rapid growth in the exports of raw commodities. This lower growth has given rise to an 
increase in the value of a country’s currency and has had an impact on the decline of 
other sectors of the economy (van der Ploeg and Poelhekke, 2016, 206).  
 
This is in contrast to the resource curse, a paradox in which countries endowed with 
abundant natural resources tend to achieve fewer development metrics than other 
countries at a level that is statistically significant. For example, based on evidence from 
41 countries between 1970 and 2006, Frynas, Wood, and Hinks argue that non-
resource exports are seen to decrease by an average of 75 cents while imports rise an 
additional 25 cents (2017, 235). Others, including Behzadan et al. (2017), suggest that 




Literature, however, it not uniformly supportive of the resource curse hypothesis, with 
some proposing that it is a “statistical artefact created by either endogeneity or omitted 
variable bias;” that research tends to falsely equate comparative advantage in resource 
products as abundance; or that many fail to wholly recognize the inherently imperfect 
nature of development (Ross, 2015; Wright and Czelusta, 2004; Frankel, 2010). 
 
There is also undisputed evidence that corruption is endemic in many of Africa’s 
resource-rich countries (Lawson-Remeand and Greenstein, 2012), where there is 
already a high degree of income inequality (AfDB, 2007) and low poverty reduction 
rates (Ite, 2005). Indeed, research shows that corruption has particular and visible 
impacts on per capita GDP growth, while lowering efficiency in the allocation of public 
goods, discouraging foreign direct investment, and restricting general economic 
production (Baliamoune-Lutz and Ndikumana, 2009; KPMG, 2016; Lučić et al., 2016; 
Hodge et al., 2011). Consequently, public policy debates on the governance of Africa’s 
natural resources are now central to discourse and dialogue at the continental and 
regional levels on financing sustainable economic and social development, as well as 
promoting peace and security.  
 
Much of the existing scholarly literature on natural resources management and 
governance focuses on foreign investors in particular, and conflict risks in general, 
however, less is known about the role of economic actors in the extractive sector in 
post-conflict and conflict-threatened countries (Woodward, 2010). This is a lingering 
puzzle: in specific political contexts, how do foreign-owned enterprises, operating in 
those areas, impact peace, security, and economic development, especially in countries 
with differential primary resource commodities? Bush and Opp (1999) highlight the 
somewhat paradoxical fact that conflict can serve as a catalyst for positive economic 
and social development. The potential for conflict to galvanise cooperation and peaceful 
development has been noted particularly with respect to water resources (United 
Nations, 2009). What has occurred in Sierra Leone since the end of the civil war in 2002 





The experience of armed conflict may generate strong incentives for the political elite to 
secure the consent of the governed and create representative and effective governing 
institutions to extract resources more efficiently — although whether this has occurred 
and what role foreign-owned enterprises play in this regard have yet to be determined 
(Tilly, 1975). Billon, for example, suggests that the abundance of natural resources may 
encourage parties in an armed conflict to sustain it rather than sow for peace, for the 
former is far more profitable that the latter. Peace, he argues, removes key sources of 
revenue for all parties, including international, intervening actors, who lose immediate 
access to natural resources when a functioning local government is created during post-
conflict reconstruction (2001, 578). In Angola, for example, oil revenues made it 
possible for conflicting parties to build loyalty through rent dispersal and control, 
preventing meaningful governance reform while perpetuating economic inequality 
(Billon, 2001). Indeed, political commentators such as Blattman and Miguel (2010) have 
observed that the connection between foreign investors/national and international 
private sector organizations and institutional transformation in the context of natural 
resource governance are not clear. In the chapters that follow, this research project 
hopes to shed light on the relationship between these variables through case studies on 
Sierra Leone, Ghana, and Ethiopia. 
 
If foreign-owned enterprises — both state- and privately owned — are to support 
sustainable economic development, peace, and security in stable, post-conflict, and 
conflict-threatened countries, then an inclusive approach to the governance of natural 
resources is required. Ideally, in stable countries, foreign-owned enterprise revenues 
should help to bolster economic growth and sustainable human and physical 
development, CSR practices, and capacity building. In post-conflict countries, foreign-
owned enterprises could contribute to post-conflict reconstruction, economic 
transformation and development, and governance enhancement. Finally, in conflict-
threatened countries, foreign-owned enterprises could contribute to a conflict 
containment strategy through judicious involvement in land transactions and 
investments. Based on existing literature, greater accountability and CSR, the re-




and diversified economic development are ideal objectives for all stakeholders 
(Peschka, 2011). However, given the wide range of challenges and the complexity of 
underlying issues in diverse political environments, an improved analytical framework is 
needed to further understand the changing interactions between foreign investment 
actors, natural resource governance, and political stability and instability in Africa. The 
PENRG framework could provide researchers with a new tool to analyse how foreign-
owned enterprises affect sustainable economic growth and poverty alleviation, peace, 
and stability in stable, post-conflict, and conflict-threatened countries in sub-Saharan 
Africa. 
 
This line of enquiry is crucial to Africa’s development considering the continent’s 
ongoing need for foreign capital and technology transfer (Agola, 2016), the increasing 
significance of FDI in the natural resources sector (Bokpin et al., 2015), and the effects 





Governance structures in sub-Saharan African countries are institutions and policies — 
both national and local — that determine the interaction between companies, the 
country, and its citizens. Examples of elements of governance structures include the 
means to translate resources into tangible benefits for citizens, national ownership of 
resources, the enactment of fiscal rules on the use of revenues, and the existence of 
strong public institutions, including oversight bodies and the justice system.  
 
In terms of this research study, companies are foreign-owned enterprises, which refer to 
an aggregate grouping of foreign investment actors. Such enterprises may be wholly or 
partly state-owned, -controlled, or -sponsored; or privately owned companies, listed or 





In Ghana, the industry is hydrocarbon; in Sierra Leone, mining; and in Ethiopia, 
agriculture (World Bank, 2017; Kopf, 2017; The Commonwealth, 2017). Ghana currently 
has four major hydrocarbon fields, with total proven reserves of 2,312.4 billion cubic feet 
of natural gas and 883.4 million barrels of oil, which, as of 2018, are being explored and 
exploited under 17 petroleum agreements (Ghana Petroleum Register, 2018). 
Diamonds are well known for their role in driving civil conflict, and Sierra Leone has 
some 7700 square miles of active diamond fields alone, covering nearly 25 per cent of 
the country’s total surface area, along with other mineral resources such as gold, 
bauxite, rutile, ilmenite, and iron ore (MMMR, n.d.).  
 
Foreign involvement in the natural resource sector in Africa is a direct consequence of 
the continent’s lack of capital and technology needed to develop such infrastructure 
projects supported by government policies such as openness to trade and tax 
incentives. The accumulation of capital and technology in fast-growing emerging 
economies over the past three decades, taking into consideration strategic and national 
interest, explains the recent phenomenon of South-originating FDI in Africa’s natural 
resource sector. For example, China’s massive investments in securing cobalt supplies 
from the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC), is only the latest of the South-South 
FDI in strategic acquisitions (Reuters, 2018).   
 
The way in which citizens, civil society groups, and the international community view 
foreign-owned enterprises largely depends on how local and national governments in 
resource-rich countries manage their relations with the private sector. For example, 
governance systems determine whether private-sector actors are viewed with praise in 
the case of Ghana; as pivotal players in peace-building and reconstruction efforts in the 
case of Sierra Leone; or with general suspicion and as a destabilising factor in the case 
of Ethiopia. Corporations’ reputations also depend on how integrated they are within the 
governance structures set up by these countries to manage resource rents and 
investments. These structures operate within the broader framework and commitments 
that governments will have agreed to as part of their national visions and economic 




2009 Addis Ababa Summit.2 An additional factor that determines how foreign-owned 
enterprises are perceived by host populations is the structure of their own governance 
frameworks.  
 
Foreign actors have the potential to bring about transformational changes in the 
economies and social fabrics of conflict-affected and post-conflict states. They could 
also serve as the engine for growth in stable, resource-rich democracies in Africa. 
However, this can only be achieved with strong, coherent, and strategic national and 
local governance structures that clearly define the role of the private sector. These 
structures must not only take their interests into account, but also spell out their 
responsibilities to all stakeholders, including mining communities.  
 
Theoretical Framework for Country Case Studies 
 
According to Hout (2015, 88–9), traditional structural political economy: 
… understands development as a permanent process of institutional 
restructuring, with the aim of achieving resource redistribution. This 
process, which requires particular elites to give up certain privileges in 
favour of the poor, involves conflict ... [and specifically] the political 
struggles that result from the expected opposition of (parts of) the elite that 
do not wish to give up their privileges.  
 
The structural political economy approach to analysing natural resource governance is 
narrow in focus, dealing strictly with governance reform and the politics of structural 
reform, particularly the restructuring of existing institutions and governance 
arrangements (Hout, 2015). In this light, each case study begins by outlining the 
                                                             
2 AMV was adopted by heads of state at a 2009 African Union (AU) summit and is linked to the Mining Policy 
Framework (MPF) tabled to the United Nations Commission on Sustainable Development (UNCSD) in 2011 by the 
48-member Intergovernmental Forum on Mining, Minerals, Metals and Sustainable Development (IGF) (United 
Nations Economic Commission for Africa [UNECA], 2011; Besada and Shaw, 2014). The AMV and its associated 
Action Plan form the most complete framework for collaborative governance on a continent with 54 national 





country’s political economy, which includes a historical overview and the relationships 
between governance structures and economic, social, and development outcomes. The 
case studies deal with laws, regulations, and policies, and in the absence of such with 
other governance structures, such as the desire to transform resources into tangible 
benefits for citizens. National and local governments, political and economic elites, other 
authorities, foreign state-owned and private-sector actors, and local communities are 
considered key actors in governance and structural reform activities. 
 
Governance structures are inherently tied to the type of country (post-conflict, etc.); they 
inform state capability, the methods whereby they guide foreign investor/foreign state-
owned and private-sector actors, and how these actors affect peace and stability, and 
economic development outcomes. My theoretical approach is used to assess country 
narratives, conditions, and relevant outcomes to support the core argument that the role 
of foreign state-owned and private-sector actors in natural resource management in 
sub-Saharan Africa depends on the various strengths, weaknesses, and levels of 
governance structures, which differ in stable, post-conflict, and conflict-threatened 
states.  
 
In his highly influential work Concept Misformation in Comparative Politics, Sartori 
(1970) stresses that researchers must correctly define concepts in order to know exactly 
what their theory will test. In turn, he argues that conceptual precision helps researchers 
choose the right methods to test their theory (Collier and Gerring, 2009). This research 
applies the theory of structural political economy to the analysis of foreign-owned 
enterprises’ roles, state stability or instability, and the governance structures of the 
country. Through a modified PENRG approach, the research investigates how the 
contribution of foreign-owned enterprises to state stability or instability, peace, and 
economic development is derived from the outcome of their investments. These 
investments are not only shaped by governance structures, but also interact with 
governance structures to produce outcomes. Traditional thinking in existing literature 




investments in natural resources could lead to state instability (Cabrales and Hauk, 
2011). Alternatively, foreign investment could lead to increased state stability.   
 
Two related notions or terminologies of importance to this research are instability and 
conflict, which need clarification: they refer to competition and rivalry over the control, 
distribution, and consumption of natural resources. Instability and conflict are therefore 
understood as existing within a spectrum: they can range from confusion and frustration 
among members of a community over specific development actions, to violent clashes 
between armed groups over resource ownership. Instability and conflict also connote 
widespread social unrest that threatens the political stability and security conditions of 
entire countries. Foreign investments in natural resources could increase instability and 
conflict by contributing to corruption, creating socio-economic inequalities, providing 
funding for arms, providing arms directly to warlords and militias, disrupting 
environmental and social systems, as well as contributing to Dutch disease. Instability 
and conflict can also refer to land grabs, poor labour standards, environmental 
degradation, the importation of foreign workers, and a lack of accountability in 
government budgets, resulting in tension between civil society groups, private actors, 
and governments.3  
 
With regard to governance structures, Table 1 presents political and economic 
examples found in this research. 
 
Table 1: Governance structures at the private, public, and regional/global levels 
                                                             
3 As dependent variables, these are translated as “peace” and “stability” for the purposes of this 
dissertation. State stability in this context refers to political and social stability and economic growth. 
Level Structure 
Private Revenue-sharing agreements; wealth-sharing agreements; 
production-sharing agreements; exploration and mining licenses; oil-
sharing agreements; policies on selective treatment, cost-recovery 
measures and quality-control mechanisms; training programmes; 




joint ventures with government and other companies; mining 
community development agreements (CDAs); community 
development funds (CDFs); projects including community outreach; 
CSR practices reflecting an actor’s role as a socio-economic 
development and security partner (beyond merely adhering to 
government laws and regulations); ethical business practices; 
initiatives to promote forward and backward linkages; economic 
diversification and beneficiation; funds such as community 
development funds. 
Public (local) Local governments, departments, and agencies; commissions; 
committees; institutional frameworks and mechanisms; incentives, 
policies, and strategies, programmes and plans; community 
development programmes; projects; public relations; forums to 
ensure that companies adhere to human rights standards, 
environmental protection and broad-based socio-economic 
development; the principles of free, prior, and informed consent 
(FPIC); technical assistance arrangements; channels to engage with 
civil society and local communities; conflict resolution strategies that 
foster mutual trust among workers and develop social capital within 
communities; the funding of social projects and economic activities 




National and local governments, ministries, and departments; 
agencies and tax authorities; the judiciary; special courts; 
commissions; committees; legislation and laws; regulations and 
regulatory mechanisms; revenue- and production-sharing 
agreements; joint ventures and public-private partnerships; resource 
allocation mechanisms; monitoring and evaluation arrangements; 
institutional frameworks and mechanisms; transparency and 
accountability mechanisms; incentives; policies; strategies; 





This research also draws on Cox’s critical approach to international political economy 
(Cox, 1981). Cox strives for a holistic approach by questioning the nature of institutions, 
social relations, and power dynamics by examining their origins and distinguishing 
future characteristics. In brief, he is concerned with broad, cross-cutting themes as 
opposed to more micro-level, specific details. As part of the soon-to-be-introduced 
PENRG framework, this work employs Cox’s critical approach to outline the relationship 
between foreign and private-sector actors and their effects on stability and instability in 
three different African countries. It also informs how this research project examines the 
roles of foreign-owned enterprises, state stability or instability, and whether a country’s 
governance structure  along with the involvement of foreign actors contribute to either 
stability or instability in resource-rich African countries. 
 
Importantly, Cox (1981) distinguishes between problem-solving theory and critical 
theory. He states that problem-solving theory “takes the world as it finds it, with the 
prevailing social and power relationships and the institutions into which they are 
organised, as the given framework for action. The general aim of problem-solving is to 
infrastructure development, and poverty alleviation); community 
development programmes; projects; contracts; investments; 
standards; best practices; mining and CSR codes; public relations; 
forums to ensure that companies adhere to human rights standards, 
environmental protection and broad-based socio-economic 
development; the principles of FPIC; technical assistance 
arrangements; peace agreements and ceasefires. 
Regional/global Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative (EITI); United Nations 
Global Compact (UNGC); Global Reporting Initiative (GRI); OECD 
Guidelines for Multinational Enterprises; commodity-specific OECD 
Guidances; Principles for Responsible Investment (PRI); the Natural 
Resource Charter; AMV; Publish What You Pay; certification 
schemes such as the Kimberley Process Certification Scheme 




make these relationships and institutions work smoothly by dealing effectively with 
particular sources of trouble” (Cox, 1981, 128–9). While problem-solving theory is 
analytical, critical theory is holistic. Therefore, Cox (1981, 129) contends that critical 
theory:  
… does not take institutions and social and power relations for granted but 
calls them into question by concerning itself with their origins and how and 
whether they might be in the process of changing. ... Critical theory is 
directed to the social and political complex as a whole rather than to the 
separate parts. 
 
Cox (1981, 130) also suggests that where problem-solving theory might be seen as 
conservative, critical theory might be seen as utopian. However, he argues that this 
interpretation misunderstands the objective of critical theory:  
[The] aims [of critical theory] are just as practical as those of problem-
solving theory, but it approaches practice from a perspective which 
transcends that of the existing order, which problem-solving theory takes 
as its starting point. Critical theory allows for a normative choice in favour 
of a social and political order different from the prevailing order, but it limits 
the range of choice to alternative orders which are feasible 
transformations of the existing world. 
 
This research project aims to identify the possible alternatives for state governance 
structures that guide potential impact on peace, stability, and economic development by 
foreign-owned enterprises, employing Cox’s critical theory. Accordingly, the case 
studies explore the impact of foreign-owned companies on peace, stability, and 
economic growth in relevant sectors, the emergence of new sectors, and the 
experiences and lessons learned that could be relevant to policies for promoting 
positive developmental outcomes. Benefiting from the absence of restricting factors of 
the critical theory approach, the three cases also contribute to the development of an 
improved analytical framework, introduced at the end of this chapter, for conceptualising 






Literature Review  
 
This section will survey relevant issues pertaining to the governance and management 
of natural resources, particularly in the African context, in the academic literature. Its 
aim is to highlight the key intellectual debates with which this research project will 
engage. Through an examination of relevant issues pertaining to the governance and 
management of natural resources in the academic literature, specifically in the three 
countries used as case studies, the literature review coalesced key debates within a 
single framework to allow for more effective policy analysis.  
 
A True Resource Curse? 
 
Conflict over the control, distribution, and consumption of natural resources is 
ubiquitous. However, the nature of that conflict is determined by the social, political, and 
economic contexts in which people interact (Ayling and Kelly, 1999). These conflicts 
range from confusion and frustration among members of a community over specific 
development actions, to violent clashes between armed groups over resource 
ownership, to widespread social unrest that threatens the political stability and security 
environments of entire countries. Foreign investors and private-sector actors — 
including ranchers, large-scale landowners, and private corporations in industries such 
as forestry, mining, hydropower, and agribusiness — are becoming increasingly 
influential in resource management decisions. Consequently, they are important actors 
with regard to maintaining or encouraging peace and security in developing countries 
(Buckles, 1999). This dynamic is being driven by the globalisation of multinational 
enterprises, the fiscal policies of financial institutions, the actions of developing 
countries’ governments, and the increased demand for resources among emerging 





Burgeoning literature on the ‘resource curse’ and the ‘paradox of plenty’ has established 
strong linkages between resource abundance and corruption, authoritarianism, 
economic decline, inequality, and violent conflict (Karl, 1997; Sachs and Warner, 1997; 
Ross, 2012). Resource abundance in particular provides both finances and motives for 
armed conflict, while rent-seeking and patronising behaviour further erodes political 
institutions and economic well-being (De Soysa, 2002; Collier and Hoeffler, 2004; Ross, 
2004). Moreover, a wealth of resources may relieve governments of tax collection 
pressures, reduce fiscal discipline, and hinder the diversification of other sectors of the 
economy — in other words, engender the ‘Dutch disease’ (Gupta et al., 2009). This 
said, we are reminded, however, that not all agree with the resource curse concept, and 
indicate its existence is tied to other, unknown factors and statistical anomalies (Ross, 
2012; Ross, 2015).  
 
As illustrations of how a wealth of natural resources can lead to protracted conflict, 
Sierra Leone and Liberia are good examples. Both conflicts were inextricably tied to the 
diamond trade in those countries, which enabled the growth of rent-seeking, one-party 
states that failed to promote economic development. Instead, the diamond trade 
presented incentives and opportunities for rebel movements to organise armed 
insurgencies (Keen, 2005; Miguel and Bellows, 2006). Nevertheless, the specific 
conditions under which the resource curse contributes to instability and conflict remain 
poorly understood, with countries such as Equatorial Guinea and Gabon maintaining a 
precarious stability despite enduring nepotistic and authoritarian governments 
(Humphreys, 2005; Basedau and Lacher, 2006). 
 
It is widely believed that on average, the economies of resource-rich countries tend to 
grow less rapidly than resource-scarce countries, a phenomenon explained by the 
‘resource curse’ theory. Sachs and Warner (1995) were among the first scholars to 
examine the intricate relationship between economic growth and natural resource 
endowment. They concluded that when differences in macroeconomic policies and 
initial income levels were accounted and adjusted for, resource-rich developing 




should not be the case, as abundant natural resources could play a positive role in 
promoting economic development. Natural resource endowment has the potential to 
provide an economy with a boost via initial and continued investment; skills transfer; 
infrastructure development; employment generation; revenue for both central and local 
governments; and social development by the implementation of CSR projects (Sachs 
and Warner, 1999; Murphy, Shleifer, and Vishny, 2000).   
 
Various explanations have been put forth over the years as to why natural resources 
have not facilitated economic growth in many developing states over the past decades. 
One such explanation revolves around governance as core for both promoting 
sustainable and equitable growth and preventing increased likelihood of conflict and 
disagreement among relevant stakeholders, including mining community leaders, the 
general public, policy-makers, foreign investors, and private-sector actors (Burnside and 
Dollar, 2000; Easterly, Levine, and Roodman, 2004; Glaeser et al., 2004). It is further 
argued that in the absence of governance structures, these stakeholders waste 
resource revenues while exhausting natural resource deposits to the detriment of future 
generations and potential economic development. 
 
Scholars within the natural resource governance field have argued that increased and 
continued government control over the extractive industry, high and often skewed 
dependence on the extractives sector, and continued neglect of other primary sectors 
such as agriculture have all resulted in diminished revenue and increased 
unemployment. These reasons account for why natural resources may inhibit broad-
based economic growth and poverty alleviation in poor, resource-rich countries, 
particularly those in Africa (Shahnawaz and Nugent, 2004). Given these countries’ 
inordinate dependence on natural resources for government revenue, there appears to 
be a diminished reliance on tax revenue, which has contributed to less accountability 
within the sector. This is particularly the case with regard to the distribution and 





In terms of fiscal management, resource revenue in poor resource-rich countries that 
suffer from poor governance could negatively affect developmental goals. For instance, 
this situation is often evident when substantial aid flows are misused. Corrupt regimes, 
many of which are driven to remain in power by any means, typically resort to lowering 
taxes as a way to gain support from the general public. As an example, oil-producing 
countries often subsidise domestic gasoline prices, even though this is deemed to be 
economically unviable in the long term (Bacon, 2001). 
 
In situations characterised by poor governance — in the extractives sector in particular 
— resource revenues are generally found to be unevenly distributed. In many instances, 
these revenue streams are squandered while the economy continues to stagnate. In 
this context, the Dutch disease framework is central to the literature pertaining to 
economic stagnation in resource-rich developing states. Corden and Neary (1982) 
observe that manufacturing and other non-primary resource sectors in resource-rich 
countries endure tremendous difficulties due to domestic currency appreciation. That is, 
as excessive earnings from the extractives sector are captured by the domestic, non-
tradable sector, the national currency appreciates in real terms, affecting the 
competitiveness of non-extractive sectors. Sachs and Warner (1997) contend that, 
particularly in the African context, Dutch disease has affected economic growth as part 
of the wider, negative consequence of an immoderate reliance on the extractive sector. 
 
Terry (1997), Collier and Hoeffler (2000), and Omeje (2013), among other authors in the 
schools of neo-Marxist dependency modelling, environmental scarcity theory, and greed 
versus grievance theory, have argued that there is a positive and evidence correlation 
between conflict and extractive economies (Omeje, 2013). This is primarily due to the 
terminal nature of extractive economies, and the realization thereof by those in positions 
of power, resulting in corruption, graft, ecological conflict, and economic depression 
(Omeje, 2013). Others have coined the term ‘economic imperialism,’ a form of neo-
colonialism designed to export wealth from resource-rich countries to the developed 
West (Veltmeyer, 2013). This narrative is posited as well by Wengraf, who from a 




faced with the pressures of militarism, resource wars, and development “aid” that 
arrives with conditions of perpetual licence to return wealth abroad (2018; Shaw, 2008). 
That said, despite this relationship, which has been supported by Auty and Gelb (1988, 
1993), Sachs and Warner (1995) Ross, (2001, 2003), and UNCTAD (2002), studies 
have equally challenged the notion that extractive economies inevitably lead to 
economic stagnation, decline, and conflict (Davis, 2009). Considerations for the above 
political theory approaches are taken throughout the work, particularly in the 
discussions of foreign-owned, private-sector influence on peace, whether their 
operations contribute to or mitigate conflict in the three case countries, and how 
governance of natural resources structures and systems can curb detrimental 
relationships, activities, and interactions in the resource sector.  
 
Another challenge related to an over-reliance on the natural resource sector for revenue 
lays in the specificity of assets and geography. Assets tend to be stationary and are 
closely tied to mining operations. Any investments in equipment, infrastructure, and 
facilities are generally linked to specific mines and geographic regions within resource-
rich states (Joskow, 1987). The sector furthermore tends to be capital-intensive, 
especially with regard to exploration and extraction activities. The most prominent 
assertion from scholars has been that natural resources development in many resource-
rich countries has resulted in only a few forward and backward linkages, while 
negatively affecting local industries given that they tend to be divorced from the broader 
economy (Sachs and Warner, 1995). 
 
Issues surrounding the historically poor management of natural resource revenues by 
African governments raise questions regarding the opportunities and challenges that 
could stem from integrating new stakeholders into processes of natural resource 
governance. The extractives sector could serve as the basis for long-term economic 
development, provided that governments — supported by the involvement of foreign 
investors and the private sector — implement a long-term vision regarding the 
management of these resources. Examining the types of policies and initiatives that 




support of African governments is a key issue that flows from the existing research. This 
research hopes to add to current knowledge by exploring the role of additional 
stakeholders, namely foreign-owned enterprises, on natural resource management in 
Africa.  
 
Evolving Role of Foreign Investors and the Private Sector in Encouraging Sustainable 
Development, Peace, and Stability in Africa 
 
With increased investment in Africa’s mining sector, spurred on by new and improved 
mining legislation and incentives, African governments and civil society have closely 
examined the socio-economic contributions and the impact of these investments on 
both national economies and local communities. In recent years, a great deal of 
accumulated evidence has suggested than an abundance of natural resources could be 
more of a curse than a blessing (Auty, 1993). For instance, Gelb found that resource-
rich economies suffered from lower economic growth (Gelb, 1988) — a finding that has 
been confirmed by Sachs and Warner (1995). 
 
Linkages between foreign investors and the private sector and violent conflict have also 
been the topic of recent investigations (Besada, 2009; Hameed et al., 2013; Bannon et 
al., 2003). Foreign investors and other private-sector involvement could increase conflict 
by contributing to corruption; creating socio-economic inequalities, providing funding for 
arms, or providing arms directly to warlords and militias; disrupting environmental 
systems; and contributing to Dutch disease. For example, multinational firms operating 
in the DRC were directly implicated in violent massacres and fiscal improprieties with 
local authorities (Ballentine, 2006). On the other hand, foreign investors and private-
sector actors are central agents of global trade and investment, which are crucial for the 
sustainable growth of African economies (Collier, 2007). They also play a critical role in 
post-conflict recovery (Woodward, 2010), an area of research with the potential to shed 
greater light on the specific conditions under which private actors involved in the natural 
resource sector may contribute to peace, stability, and prosperity, and what form this 





While the literature has tended to highlight the potential outcomes arising from foreign 
investor engagement within the natural resource sector, less is known about the 
mechanisms that determine the specific effects that arise from such interactions. 
Indeed, literature remains focused on a number of key areas and themes, exposing 
gaps in knowledge. Few efforts have been made in the past to engage in a thorough 
investigation of how governance structures work in the context of natural resource 
management, the bolstering of extractive economies, and the guiding of private-sector 
actors so as to leverage them as assets for translating resource wealth into sustainable 
economic growth, peace, and stability. Research inevitably tends to focus on what 
governments should do as opposed to what actual causal relationship exists between 
the structures of resource governance and outcomes facilitated by private-sector actors. 
Providing policy recommendations of what these actors ought to do regarding the 
objectives of peace, economic growth, and stability is, however, a fundamental starting 
point to the discussion of how governance structures should be developed so as to 
augment the potential achievement of these goals.  
 
A New Framework for Natural Resource Governance Analysis 
 
To remedy this gap in knowledge, the proceeding case studies were selected so as to 
offer new research under the lens of the Political Economy of Natural Resource 
Governance framework (see Figure 1) into how governance institutions and actors 
engage with foreign owned, private-sector actors in practice, and the extent to which 
they contribute to the above objectives,  and  how natural resource governance and 
foreign investment actors interact in a dynamic way — feeding into the other.   
 
This framework helps to classify and present knowledge on natural resource 
governance and foreign investment actors according to clearly defined country 
conditions (e.g., politically stable, post-conflict), thus helping to discern how such 
conditions  can determine the scope of foreign state-owned and private-sector activities. 




influences economic, social, and development outcomes and how these outcomes and 
the influence of foreign investment actors affect institutional reshaping of governance 
structures. The analytical framework builds on the structural political economy approach 
outlined by Hout (2015), who employs his structural approach to the policies of 
development aid donors by applying the sociological agent-structure problem.4 Most 
importantly, the framework provides “an underpinning prism for the construction of 
explanations” (Stanley, 2012).  
 
 
Figure 1. Political economy of natural resource governance (PENRG) 
 
 
Agency is the capacity of actors to make their own choices and act independently. 
Structures are the factors of influence that determine or limit an agent in making 
decisions, which, in sociology include social class, religion, gender, ethnicity, and 
customs. The complementarity of agency and structure (a cyclical rather than a linear 
process) must be emphasised: structures influence actions, but agents can similarly 
                                                             
4 For a seminal application of the agent-structure problem in the field of political science, see Wendt (1987). 





Institutional RestructuringScope for Action





influence structures. Different theories exist about the nature of the relationship between 
agency and structure. Berger and Luckmann (1966) posit that the relationship is 
dialectical — a continuous loop where structures form the actors who in turn create the 
structures. Giddens (1979) supports this theory that structures both enable and 
constrain agents. The debate about the agent-structure relationship changes according 
to its application in particular cases, and applying it to the structural political economy 
appears productive, with the complementarity of agency and structure evidenced in the 
three case studies and denoted by the cycle in Figure 1.  
 
The analytical framework builds on the structural political economy approach but 
changes its starting point from “the identification of sets of elites in relation to the 
national structure of power” (Hout, 2015, 89) to the existing governance arrangements, 
emphasising the complementarity of governance structures, the actors that they govern, 
and the cyclical nature of governance. This approach provides a firm ontological 
grounding for analysis that still enables discussion of elite-level politics but focuses on 
institutional restructuring in governance reform. The framework acknowledges the large-
scale theoretical work done within the fields of functionalism and historical 
institutionalism but distinguishes itself as a contribution to mid-range analytical 
framework building. 
 
The PENRG captures the influence of governance structures on creating the scope for 
action, which in turn can lead to institutional restructuring in investments of foreign 
state-owned and private-sector actors. The analytical framework considers it an 
outcome if the restructuring occurs. These actors are the means by which economic, 
social, and development outcomes occur. As such, these outcomes are able to 
influence institutional restructuring, which can occur to accommodate outcomes into 
governance arrangement, further enable foreign investment actors, or guide these 
actors differently. Such institutional restructuring leads to a changed scope for action — 
and the cycle repeats itself. Importantly, change can be incremental or characterised by 





The objective of presenting this analytical framework is to orient thinking and 
discussions that can take place at any level of governance and in any type of state, in 
order to develop solutions. The PENG framework differs significantly from collecting and 
presenting best practices, though it enables the latter to be undertaken. It identifies 
junctures and entry points for variables to affect either the foreign investment actors or 
the structures that govern them. It can be used to generate both questions and 
conclusions and, importantly, track changing linkages between natural resource 
governance and management, foreign state-owned and private-sector actors, and levels 
of stability, peace, and prosperity. It can help any observer understand the role of 
foreign investment actors and how that role can be enabled or constrained through 
institutional restructuring. Indeed, the tenets of PENG will be key in investigating 
how governance structures (both at the resource sector and state levels ) influence the 
nature and outcome of the involvement of foreign-owned companies and 
investors operating in the extractive and land resource sectors and contributing to 










Chapter 3. Methodological Framework 
By comparing the involvement of foreign-owned companies in the hydrocarbon, mining, 
and land sectors in three different types of political states — stable (Ghana), post-
conflict (Sierra Leone), and conflict-threatened (Ethiopia) — the analysis seeks to 
extrapolate the general trends and relationships that characterise Africa’s new politics of 
natural resource governance and the actors that work to define its parameters and 
characteristics. Specifically, how governance structures (both resource and state) 
influence the nature and outcome of the involvement of foreign-owned companies and 
investors operating in the extractive and land resource sectors in the wider development 
process, and thus contribute to the economic growth, peace and political stability, and 




Methodological techniques used in field research conducted between February and 
April 2014 and between June and September 2015 included interviews, the collection of 
oral histories, and an analysis of government and foreign investors’ documentation. Also 
undertaken was a review of secondary source materials and a historical analysis and 
personal observation of foreign investors’ role and activities in the extractive and land 
sectors. The latter included the application of CSR mandates and internal policies 
aimed at promoting inclusive and local-level participatory development models.  
 
This research relies on case studies, within- and cross-case analysis, as well as in-
depth interviews and triangulation, conducted under the guise of its proposed theoretical 
framework, the Political Economy of Natural Resource Governance.  
 
Extensive interviews as well as focus groups’ were held in each country to identify 
relevant socio-economic variables, as well as current challenges and opportunities 




industries. In order to allow for open and free discussion, the names and specific 
positions of those selected for interviews have not been divulged.   
 
Peace and stability, and economic growth were each operationalized through a number 
of concrete variables. On the former, evidence of adherence to the rule of law by 
government and private-sector entities, the absence of inter-state and intra-state 
violence and conflict especially driven by natural resource extraction and exploitation, 
cooperative interaction among societal groups and between the latter and private-sector 
actors, and the harmonization of contract clauses with social values as defined by 
peace and reconciliation agreements, legal frameworks for protection resource rights, 
and free, prior and informed consent. For economic growth, variables and indicators 
include: 
• resource contribution to small and medium-sized enterprise (SME) creation and 
income levels;  
• annual rate of positive change for GDP levels;  
• annual rate of change in per capita income levels;  
• significant private investment;  
• distribution;  
• creation and maintenance of a middle class;  
• growth in access to social services, including education and health care; and  
• rates of foreign direct investment.  
 
Additional material was collected via policy-oriented research and dialogue with relevant 
stakeholders in the three selected countries.  
 
Desk research was conducted to triangulate information. Experiences and lessons 
learned that could be relevant to policy to promote positive developmental outcomes in 
each country were selected from interviews and supported by existing literature on the 
topic. Key variables, isolated by the research, were incorporated into the new 
framework for conceptualising and analysing natural resource governance, sustainable 





Case Study Selection 
 
The three countries were selected for case studies based on their representation of 
three categories: stable, post-conflict, and conflict-threatened resource-rich states.5 The 
Seawright and Gerring discussion (2008) also helped to inform the selection process: as 
the researcher’s objective is to construct or verify general causal theories about the 
social world on the basis of a few case studies, case selection aims to generate a 
sample that is representative of the population while exhibiting useful variation on the 
dimensions of theoretical interest — in this case, the stability classification of each 
country.  Selecting diverse cases (the ‘diverse case’ method of case selection) allows 
investigating the variance along the relevant dimensions researched. Seawright and 
Gerring (2008, 297, 301) contend that “[d]iverse cases are likely to be representative in 
the minimal sense of representing the full variation of the population. ... [T]he diverse 
case method probably has stronger claims to representativeness than any other small N 
sample (including the typical case).” The different categories, the representativeness of 
the cases selected, as well as practical considerations for this research (such as my 
familiarity with each country, including their languages) are further detailed below.  
 
Ghana: Case Study 1 
 
Since the 1980s, Ghana’s economic growth has been increasingly tied to the mining 
sector, which is largely dominated by gold. The country is the second-largest gold 
producer in Africa and the eighth-largest globally, accounting for over 95 per cent of the 
country’s total mineral revenue (MC, 2010). Ghana’s real GDP increased by 15 per cent 
in 2011 when it began producing oil commercially, up from an average of 6.5 per cent in 
the 2000s (ICMM, 2015).  
 
                                                             




Ghana’s lucrative natural resources, stable political landscape, and increasingly diverse 
economy have seen it emerge as the second-largest economy in West Africa (after 
Nigeria). The country attained middle-income status in 2011, suggesting that its 
economic growth has had positive social impacts. Ghana’s unemployment rate declined 
steadily from 10.4 per cent in 2000 to just 2.4 per cent in 2017 (WB, 2016b). Moreover, 
its poverty headcount ratio (at national poverty lines) declined from 31.9 per cent in 
2005 to 24.2 per cent in 2012 (WB, 2016c). As an indication of the social value of 
Ghana’s mining sector, Toigo (2015) notes that new extractives revenues in Ghana 
could potentially fill the majority of the funding gap in its education sector. Ghana’s 
natural resources wealth, stable political environment, and expanding economy could 
potentially encourage further change and have an enduringly positive and direct effect 
on capacity-building in various sectors of its economy. 
 
Ghana is also one of only a few African countries — though this group is rapidly growing 
— with a local content policy for the hydrocarbons industry. Petroleum regulations in the 
country, in the form of local content policies, were created to catalyse inter-sectoral 
linkages and facilitate the use of Ghanaian human and material capital, local expertise, 
goods and services, and financing (Ablo, 2015). In addition, Ghana’s local content 
policies seek to: develop local capacities through training, education, and skills transfer; 
achieve minimum levels of employment; increase the competitiveness of local 
businesses; create a petroleum industry that drives the country’s sustainable 
development; and provide a degree of control over natural resource endowments on 
behalf of the Ghanaian people (Ablo, 2015). Accra is placing great emphasis on 
ensuring that local content, beneficiation, and value addition are adhered to from the 
start as the country develops its nascent hydrocarbons sector. The Ghanaian 
government established the Local Content Committee (LCC) to oversee, coordinate, 
and manage the overall implementation process. A minimum of 5 per cent equity for 
local petroleum licenses, permits, and contract operators — and at least 10 per cent 
equity for local providers of supplies and services — is supposed to ensure local 





The government has chosen this strategy to maximise value-addition using local 
expertise, goods, and services to create jobs and skills to be kept in the country. But, 
despite these good intentions, the local content policies in Ghana appear to be weaker 
than similar provisions in other countries, such as Nigeria, for it fails to prevent locals 
from acting as fronts for multinational corporations, “to stop companies sub-contracting 
services from foreign companies, does not require local companies in joint ventures to 
own any of the capital equipment, and does not address the issue of local companies 
importing goods manufactured abroad (Ovadia, 2016). Indeed, there are concerns that 
at the rate that local involvement in hydrocarbon extraction is currently required under 
local content policies, the trickle-down impact on average Ghanaians will take decades 
to manifest (Ovadia, 2016).  
 
The extractive sector may play a significant role in the implementation of the post-2015 
development agenda in Ghana’s context, pushing economic transformation, social 
development and poverty reduction, as well as greater environmental protection. For 
this to occur, the 40-Year National Development Plan for Ghana has to give the sector 
the attention it deserves, putting it at the core of Ghana’s future and long-term 
development strategy, and establishing the infrastructure needed for its development                                 
(Abubakari et al., 2018). This includes a well-planned and well-financed industrialisation 
process for the in-country transformation of mining and mineral resources. This 
nevertheless cannot happen, as shown in this chapter, if mining resources and 
transformation are not considered tightly linked to agricultural development (agriculture 
being a key economic sector), downstream linkages between oil and construction, as 
well as between gold mining and other sectors of the economy. Along this 
interconnected chain, foreign investment actors, together with the Ghanaian 
government, will be key drivers of transformational change. 
 
Case Study 2: Sierra Leone 
 
Sierra Leone is undergoing post-conflict reconstruction and state building following 




particularly in the extractive sector, have focused heavily on private-sector growth (Del 
Castillo, 2008; Andersen, 2010). In Sierra Leone, diamond extraction by a variety of 
private-sector actors, via legal and illegal means, played a crucial role in the 
destabilisation of the country and provided a primary source of funding for armed rebel 
groups in the leading-up period and during the civil conflict. Recent efforts to resuscitate 
the economic livelihoods of communities devastated by the war have placed great 
emphasis on ‘good governance’ in small-scale diamond-mining communities. Examples 
include certification schemes, such as the KPCS, and CSR initiatives, such as the EITI 
(Maconachie, 2009). Nevertheless, resurrecting viable and transparent diamond and 
gold mining industries in the country has been problematic, as the ‘peace dividend’ 
continues to elude many communities due to a lack of foreign investment and persistent 
corruption within political institutions that hampers reconstruction and peace-building 
efforts. 
 
As part of its post-conflict economic recovery processes and to allow substantial 
progress in attracting FDI, Freetown needs to reduce business constraints and 
bottlenecks to investment. Any unnecessary legal, bureaucratic, or financial constraints 
on the transfer of capital do not bode well for the business community’s success. A 
more engaged private sector will help foster economic recovery, support the 
establishment of peace and stability, and prevent the country from slipping back into 
conflict. Aware of this, the government established a national privatisation program 
aiming to sell many state-owned enterprises, which could provide greater opportunities 
to spur the development of the private extractive sector in particular (Government of 
Sierra Leone, 2002). This process represents a cornerstone in the Sierra Leonean 
government’s overall strategy for national development. It promises to reduce public 
expenditure while stimulating the economy and providing jobs for the unemployed. 
 
Although these steps are vital to encourage positive change, it is important to note that 
foreign natural resource investment does not guarantee that progress will be made in 
establishing equitable and mutually beneficial mineral community development 




will flow from such investments, particularly in the short to medium term. In the worst 
instance, investments could reinforce the reign of autocratic regimes or enrich mining 
companies at the expense of local communities and host countries, resulting in 
heightened corruption and nepotism. In the case of Sierra Leone, the government has 
arguably benefited least in the country’s post-conflict reconstruction efforts. Domestic 
revenue collection reached a record high of 15.3 per cent of GDP following the end of 
the conflict in 2003 but has since dropped to 12 per cent due to a decrease in excise 
revenue and import duties (IMF, 2011).   
 
Despite making progress in implementing mechanisms and regulatory institutions to 
help manage the country’s extractive industry (this includes the creation of a Uniform 
Tax code in 2000 and the National Revenue Authority in 2002, which brought together 
all revenue collection departments), resource revenue failed to reach the expected 
levels. Although corruption within Sierra Leone’s National Revenue Authority has been 
largely to blame for this, a limited tax base, stagnating resource revenue, and a 
reduction in tariffs initiated by the private sector have also been detrimental. 
 
Case Study 3: Ethiopia 
 
For Ethiopia, natural resource governance constitutes a crucial dimension of its 
development. The country serves as an excellent case study for this reason. Agriculture 
has long been the central axis of the Ethiopian economy: the Government of Ethiopia 
effectively owns all of the country’s land (Government of Ethiopia, 1975). As of 2010, 
more than 80 per cent of Ethiopians lived in rural areas, while approximately 85 per cent 
of total employment was concentrated in the agricultural sector (Bues and Theesfeld, 
2012). Agriculture currently accounts for approximately 45 per cent of the country’s 
GDP, 90 per cent of its exports, and 85 per cent of its foreign currency earnings (Bues 
and Theesfeld, 2012). For these reasons, much of Ethiopia’s political history has been 





Though ultimately subject to decisions of public-sector officials in Addis Ababa, the 
administration of land was decentralised in the mid-1990s and embedded in the new 
constitution, which was ushered in with the establishment of the Federal Democratic 
Republic of Ethiopia in 1995. The new constitution ensured that regional governments, 
formed along ethnic lines, would have a greater influence in land governance. In 
addition to enshrining an ethno-federalist model of governance and upholding an 
individual usufruct tenure system, the new constitution also explicitly acknowledged the 
land and property rights of pastoralists and women (Hagmann and Mulugeta, 2008; 
Wanyeko, 2003). Though the Ethiopian government has attempted to reduce land 
tenure insecurity through the introduction of a land certification programme and 
complementary agricultural development policies in support of smallholder producers 
since 2003, the country has witnessed limited gains in agricultural growth, poverty 
reduction, and food security. Muted progress in these areas has been exacerbated by a 
lack of public funding and capital accumulation in the private sector. The economic 
arguments in favour of smallholder agriculture as the engine for Ethiopia’s economic 
growth were thus increasingly questioned (Gebreselassie, 2006). Eventually, senior 
Ethiopian policy-makers became convinced that the government should take a broader 
approach to economic development. 
 
In an attempt to kick-start the country’s agricultural sector as an engine of growth, the 
new government began to expand its focus and placed an emphasis on developing 
large-scale commercial agriculture, trade, and foreign investment. The previously touted 
Agricultural Development Led Industrialization (ADLI) strategy became a component of 
the broader push to attract investment to usher in large-scale, mechanised, commercial 
agricultural output via Ethiopia’s Growth and Transformation Plan (2010-2015) and 
Growth and Transformation Plan II (2015–2020) (Ethiopian Ministry of Finance and 
Economic Development, 2010; Development Assistance Group Ethiopia (DAG), 2016). 
 
The revamped development strategy has offered generous investment incentives to 
foreign actors, including broad tax exemptions on imported capital goods and 




over the course of the last decade. Foreign investments now constitute nearly three-
quarters of all land sought for large-scale agricultural production (Baumgartner, 2012). 
The Ethiopian Investment Agency (EIA) maintains that three-and-a-half million hectares 
of land were subject to large-scale lease investments from 1996 to 2008 (Interview, Dr. 
Aklilu Mariam, Director, Information and Investment, Ethiopia Investment Agency, 17 
April 2014).  
 
In keeping with its revived commitment to the Comprehensive Africa Agriculture 
Development Programme (CAADP), which seeks to enhance efforts on the part of 
African governments to pursue pro-poor, agriculture-led growth during the 2005–10 
period, the Ethiopian government drafted the Plan for Accelerated and Sustained 
Development to End Poverty (PASDEP). The plan underscored the importance of 
commercial agriculture and the critical role of large-scale investment to the development 
of Ethiopia’s agricultural sector. Addis Ababa has argued that increased support for 
large-scale farming projects would ultimately have a positive, knock-on effect for the 
country’s smallholder cultivators due to greater prospective employment opportunities, 
the improvement of rural infrastructure, new sources of knowledge-transfer, and 
lucrative opportunities for African agriculturalists looking to invest in other industries. 
Nevertheless, the commercialisation of agriculture land results in its share of 
challenges, including the government’s failure to uphold the constitutional right of 
pastoralists and shifting cultivators not to be displaced from their land. Addis Ababa has 
yet to attain stable and inclusive growth, especially benefitting the country’s small 
landholding producers. All of these developments threaten one of the Horn of Africa’s 
core states with growing political instability at a time when it already perform poorly on 
the Fund for Peace’s Fragile States Index. 
 
It is recognised that discrete classification systems do not properly capture the nuances, 
fluid nature, and multi-dimensional complexities of the concepts of fragility, conflict, or 
instability. The World Bank’s Fragile, Conflict and Violence Group has released the 
Harmonized List of Fragile Situations on an annual basis since 2011, which was 




Stress List (LICUS) between 2006 and 2009. Since 2005, the OECD has produced its 
own reports on country fragility that examine financial resource flows and general 
macroeconomic, political, and social trends in conflict-threatened countries. Ghana has 
not appeared on the World Bank’s Harmonized List of Fragile Situations for over 10 
years and is therefore considered a stable country for the purposes of this research 
project. The most recent version of the Uppsala Conflict Data Program at the 
department of Peace and Conflict Research (UCDP/PRIO) Armed Conflict Dataset 
describes post-conflict countries as those in which violent clashes ceased within the last 
15 years (Gleditsch et al., 2002). With this definition in mind, Sierra Leone is considered 
a post-conflict country. The OECD’s (2015) States of Fragility 2015 report considers 
Ethiopia to be one of the most fragile states in the world due to its prospects for 
violence, the absence of credible rule of law, ineffective institutions, and limited adaptive 
capacity in the face of shocks.  
 
Selection parameters also included a number of other important variables. The 
countries have predominantly English-speaking populations — a situation that presents 
practical advantages such as the speed of research and ease of interpretation of 
interview and archival data. In addition, each country is renowned for a particular natural 
resource: oil and other energy-related resources, and to some extent minerals (Ghana); 
minerals, more specifically diamonds (Sierra Leone); and agriculture (Ethiopia). The 
relative importance of natural resources exploitation within the national economies in 
each of these countries in terms of GDP was also a consideration. Ghana, for its part, 
obtains over 25 per cent of its annual GDP from the industry sector, which includes oil 
and gas (Dontoh and Janse Van Vuuren, 2017). For Ethiopia, agriculture (land) employs 
the vast majority of the country’s population and accounts for 36.2 per cent of its total 
GDP as of 2016 (Global Finance, 2017). While the Sierra Leonese diamonds’ share in 
the country’s exportation decreased from 15 to 10 per cent, the mining sector as a 






By These three cases provide variation across levels of instability and stability, types 
and levels of natural resources, and the role played by private, and especially foreign, 
actors. By comparing the roles of actors in different natural resource sectors, the 
research isolated key variables and contributed to a broader framework for 
conceptualising natural resources governance and stability in Africa. 
 
Case Study Methodology 
 
In each case study, research techniques included limited process tracing, typological 
theorising, and triangulation of sources. Due to its emphasis on the implications of case 
study findings for theory, and more specifically policy-relevant theory, this research 
follows the procedure for using case studies put forth by George and Bennett (2005). 
They outline how to design case study research that will produce results that could be 
useful to policy-makers, which is one of the aims of this research project. In addition, 
this exploration of the impact of foreign-owned economic actors on natural resource 
governance uses within-case analysis to reduce the inferential errors that could arise 
from using only comparative methods.  
 
George and Bennett (2005) also provide a detailed discussion of process tracing — 
understood in this context as attempting to track the links between possible causes and 
observed outcomes — which is applied throughout this research project. With regard to 
process tracing within cases, the method involves examining histories, documents, 
interview transcripts, and other sources to confirm causal processes that a theory 
hypothesises, while identifying variables and hypotheses based on sequences of 
events. This method helps to understand institutional decision-making by enabling the 
analysis of the thought processes involved in specific decision-making strategies, which 
is particularly useful when assessing elite-level politics. Process tracing, using the 
information generated from field research, was applied in every case study to generate 
the results outlined in the conclusion. As George and Bennett (2005) explain, 




more effective policy-making. In this context, this theorisation provides the backbone of 
the present research, allowing for a comparative analysis of the three countries profiled.  
 
Bennett and Elman (2006b) elaborate that both process tracing and typological 
theorising help clarify forms of complexity, such as path dependency and multiple 
interaction effects. Path dependence refers to the situation in which current decisions 
are constrained by history, in the sense that they depend on past decisions and related 
trajectories. Bennett and Elman (2006a) indicate that process tracing and systematic 
case comparisons can assist in appraising path-dependent explanations by 
systematically considering causal possibility, contingency, closure of alternatives, and 
constraints to the current path. The strength of case studies in appraising path 
dependence, they assert, is their suitability to provide a detailed, holistic analysis of 
sequences, to investigate rare events, to facilitate the search with regard to omitted 
variables, and to map interaction effects within one or a few cases. 
 
Case studies in this research will inevitably and importantly involve the triangulation of 
multiple sources to derive findings. Triangulation is used to examine the consistency of 
information across social groups and organisations with different viewpoints. Both 
synthesis of data and information as well as inductive reasoning are used to come to 
conclusions. Triangulation is critical for increasing the authenticity and trustworthiness 
of findings, not to mention improving the comprehensiveness of narratives. The 
objective is to draw cases together in a single framework, with the triangulation of 
sources within cases, enabling the researcher to draw conclusions that can be used for 
cross-case comparisons. 
 
This research primarily uses within-case methods, although its concluding chapter 
predominantly adopts cross-case approaches. The latter method is used to discuss 
illustrative experiences and lessons learned which could be relevant to policy-making 
that promotes positive achievement of the project’s selected dependent variables — 
peace, stability, and economic growth — and thereby contributes to the improved 




(2007), who discusses the strengths of within-case and cross-case methodology in the 
field of comparative politics.6 Qualitative researchers, he explains, employ both within-
case and cross-case methods of theory testing. Within-case techniques are particularly 
useful for identifying intervening mechanisms and testing multiple observable 
implications of theories. Cross-case methods, on the other hand, are useful for 
assessing hypotheses about necessary and applicable causes. As mentioned, each 
case study is structured thematically according to seven topics: legal/regulatory 
frameworks, beneficiation and value addition, inclusive economic transformation or lack 
of it, conflict and security, local community development, sustainable energy solutions, 
and private sector contribution to natural resource governance and management. The 
conclusion brings together the results according to themes in order to identify variables 




With regard to the concept of structure, Klotz and Lynch (2007) outline three 
complementary strategies, which are applied in the present research. The first of these, 
micro-history, involves the use of historiographies to address evidentiary errors 
appearing in macro-level histories. It concentrates upon a single individual and 
community and attempts, through study and analysis, to reach an understanding of 
wider issues at stake. For instance, a historiography is used in the Ghana case study to 
describe the plight of fishermen in coastal communities in relation to the oil industry. 
Generally speaking, historiographic methodology is not antagonistically opposed to the 
derivation of generalization from its use, with Sreedharan describing it as an 
“unavoidable interpretative device” (2007, 87). Because the work deployed research 
methodologies to obtain micro-histories, it acknowledges several endemic pitfalls that 
are considered throughout, when proposing wider hypotheses derived from its research. 
Generalizations should be considered as providing rough edges or guides for future 
                                                             
6 The present research was inspired by a volume edited by Mahoney and Rueschemeyer (2003). The study 
describes the research accomplishments and future agendas of comparative historical research and its explanatory 




study, rather than the final word on a particular matter (Sreedharan, 2007, 89). As such, 
the project proposes that in the case of Ghana, generalizations are of a limited nature, 
defined by the preface of “in certain circumstances, the observed result can be 
achieved” (Sreedharan, 2007, 92). Therefore, while the work does make 
generalizations, in accordance with the best practices of history literature, it does so in 
recognition of the limitations of their breadth of application beyond certain communities, 
regions, and countries.  
 
Accounts of African stakeholders and other insiders provide both a picture and 
interpretation of on-the-ground situations that sometimes complement, but often stand 
apart from, official statistics. This is partially a problem of government sourcing, as well 
as academic study of Africa at large. Jerven, for example, argues that economists 
consistently misrepresent the economic growth statistics of the continent by 
emphasizing poverty patterns of the 1970s and 1980s while largely ignoring the 
substantial growth of the 1950s and 1960s (2015). Economists and statisticians are also 
regularly reliant on what Jerven calls Poor Numbers, off-the-shelf datasets that are not 
robustly and rigorously investigated for quality and content (2015). This research brings 
together stakeholders at various levels to generate new findings about the role of 
foreign-owned economic actors in affecting country stability. This was relevant in Sierra 
Leone where, for example, interviews highlighted a stark divide in perceptions between 
community leaders (‘chiefs’) and youth group leaders regarding the impact of mining in 
the communities. Both groups relied on their own anecdotal evidence, with community 
leaders being perceived as siding with foreign investors. Ethiopia provided another 
example of this, whereby official statistics of recent and sustained high growth paint a 
picture of economic success that can easily mask the vulnerabilities apparent once one 














This research project’s research design is primarily qualitative. The use of extensive 
field research allowed for and enhanced personal contact with key stakeholders from 
different backgrounds and interests. In many cases, the collection of data and 
information, and the subsequent manipulation and publication of statistics, especially via 
official channels, can be political, especially on the African continent. This means that 
issues, such as conflict, instability and corruption, and economic growth can remain 
obscured. Moreover, the role of the foreign state-owned and private-sector actors in the 
natural resource sector is often guarded and simplified, with only some statistics 
relevant for analysis. This research project intends to balance perspectives on the 
foreign sector actors’ influence on Africa’s governance at large and natural resources 
governance in particular, via an extensive survey of African stakeholders’ perspectives. 
 
Semi-structured interviews allow a picture to emerge rather than imposing it from the 
outside via the (mis)interpretation of statistics, such as macroeconomic statistics that 
often obscure conditions of poverty and inequality. An ethnographic understanding is 
possible by using various data sources. Interviews enabled the collection of targeted 
data and information by asking specific but open-ended questions (Leech, 2002). This 
interview style allows the person or people being interviewed to answer without being 
limited to pre-defined choices. This flexibility is a key difference between qualitative and 
quantitative approaches. 
 
The field research was driven by the following overarching enquiries: What role did 
foreign-owned enterprises played historically in the governance and management of 
natural resources in these three states and how have they affected peace, stability, and 
economic development in select areas?; What, including the political conditions unique 




achieving peace, stability and economic growth?; How are these patterns and 
relationships evolving in the face of new investment flows and how are governments 
and local communities reacting to these changes?; and What concrete policy 
recommendations should be made so as to promote positive, impactful, successful, and 
meaningful development outcomes, dependant on country context? These questions 
framed the responses from interviewees in the field, so as to illicit information on the 
impact of foreign-owned enterprise on dependent variables of peace, stability, and 
economic growth.  
 
As a qualitative ethnographic-oriented research, the third question receives special 
attention in the three case studies: it concerns experiences and lessons learned by 
host governments, foreign state-owned and private-sector actors, affected 
communities, and international organisations that could be relevant to designing 
policies to promote positive developmental outcomes. his is a crucial question as it 
relates to core on-the-ground challenges that should be addressed by policies and 
initiatives backed by governments, corporate actors, and non-governmental 
organisations (NGOs), at both the domestic and international levels, in order to 
promote peace, stability, and economic growth in conflict-threatened, post-conflict, 
and stable resource-rich African countries that must govern and distribute finite 
natural resources.  
 
Challenges and difficulties that were encountered during field research included 
practical and logistical problems, as well as cultural limitations. Major issues in 
undertaking the various case studies were related to accessing the investment records 
and data of foreign state-owned and private-sector actors, as well as securing 
permission from the various authorities. Entrenched cultural obstacles, especially in 
local communities, to economic growth included isolation, self-sufficiency and cultural 
constructions of gender. The information still lacking includes details on interaction 







Institutes and Interviews 
 
I travelled to Ethiopia, Sierra Leone, and Ghana between February and April 2014 to 
conduct field research and interview relevant stakeholders at governmental, private and 
non-profit organisations. Subsequent exchanges with these stakeholders took place 
from January until September 2015. Additional field research was carried out in Ghana 




Mining, and more recently the hydrocarbon industry, has undoubtedly made a 
substantial contribution to Ghana's macroeconomic growth and stability over the past 
three decades, bringing the country to middle-income status. However, due to 
questionable business practices by foreign-owned enterprise and a lack of proper 
oversight by government, the natural resources economy has not resulted in improved 
living conditions for the majority of mining communities across the country. 
 
Over two separate visits in March and April 2014 and August and September 2015, I 
met with leaders and/or staff members of the following organisations: Office of the 
President; World Bank; Ministry of Trade and Industry; Ministry of Lands and Natural 
Resources; Ministry of Energy; Petroleum Commission; Ghana Investment Promotion 
Centre (GIPC); Ghana Chamber of Mines; Kofi Annan International Peacekeeping 
Training Centre (KAIPTC); African Center for Economic Transformation (ACET); 
Kumasi Institute for Technology, Energy and the Environment; IMANI Centre for Policy 
and Education; Natural Resource Governance Institute (NRGI); United Nations 
University Institute for Natural Resources in Africa (UNU/INRA); Ghana Information 
Services; European Union Delegation to Ghana; AngloGold Ashanti; Tullow Oil; 
Strategic Outlooks; Georgette Barnes Limited; Ghana Center for Democratic 
Development (GCDD); Ministry of Energy and Petroleum; Third World Network (TWN); 




geography, economics, and Institute of Statistical, Social and Economic Research, 
University of Ghana.  
 
I also spent two weeks in rural parts of western Ghana in the mining communities of 
Busua, Takoradi, and Tarkwa, where I conducted focus group discussions, interviews, 
and surveys of small-scale miners and villagers. In total, I conducted 27 interviews in 
Ghana, held primarily with fishing community members affected by offshore oil and gas 




Over a period of one month in February and March 2014, I met with leaders or staff 
members of the following institutions/organisations: departments of economics, political 
science, and gender issues, University of Sierra Leone; Heifer International; Ministry of 
Trade and Industry; Sierra Leone Investment Promotion Agency; Centre for 
Development and Security Analysis (CDSA); National Mineral Agency (NMA); Sierra 
Leone Transformation Think Tank; German Agency for International Cooperation (GIZ); 
social and economic development departments, UNDP; African Development Bank 
(AfDB); World Bank; mineral sands company Sierra Rutile; Network Movement for 
Justice and Development (NMJD); Ministry of Finance and Economic Development; 
IBIS in Sierra Leone; Office of the Vice-President of the Development Assistance 
Coordination Office; Integrated Geo-Information and Environmental Management 
Services; CEMMATS Group; Chairperson’s Office of the Sierra Leone People’s Party; 
London Mining; and Office of the President of the National Commission for Privatisation. 
 
I also spent two weeks in mining communities in rural parts of northern and eastern 
Sierra Leone, where I conducted interviews, focus group discussions, and surveys. 
Furthermore, information was procured from secondary sources such as white papers, 
policy briefs, government documents, and private company reports. My time in Sierra 
Leone ended with field visits and interviews in Koidu Town, in the diamond-rich Kono 




for their gold and iron ore deposits, and where violence between mining communities, 
mining companies, and the police had escalated in recent years. In Lunsar, a group-
based research discussion was held with community leaders. 
 
In Koidu Town, a total of 15 questionnaires were completed in a survey of mining 
communities. The questionnaires covered basic perceptions of the impact of mining in 
the community; positive and/or negative effects on the subject’s livelihood and family; 
and the subject’s relationship to, and support received from, local institutions in 
addressing mining-related grievances. These institutions included the local council, the 
local chief, community programmes, civil society and donors, and government. The 





In Ethiopia, natural resource investments primarily involve land acquisition. The country 
has some known gold deposits, and recent new discoveries of oil have raised 
expectations, but commercial drilling is many years away (Manek, 2018). Recent 
investments and interest shown by Turkish companies in the apparel and textile 
industries (The Ethiopian Herald, 2018b) Arabs in the tourism, renewable energies, and 
agriculture sectors (The Ethiopian Herald, 2018a), and Indian companies in land 
acquisition (The African Exponent, 2016) are important sources of revenue for the 
government, which is keen to attract foreign direct investment for infrastructure projects. 
 
I conducted a large number of interviews with staff members at government institutions: 
Ministry of Agriculture and its Agricultural Investment Land Administration Agency; 
Ministry of Foreign Affairs, which oversees many of the government’s investment 
projects linked to foreign-owned entities; Ministry of Mines; Ethiopian Investment 
Agency; and Addis Ababa Chamber of Commerce. Additionally, I spoke to individuals, 
including leading academics at various research bodies, think tanks, and universities 




and partnerships: School of Natural Resources Management and Environmental 
Sciences, Haramaya University; University for Peace (UPEACE); Institute for Security 
Studies (ISS); Department of Political Science, University of Addis Ababa; Forum for 
Social Studies (FSS); and Center for International Forestry Research (CIFR). These 
institutions and their researchers provided insights into recent developments and 
challenges facing local farmers, local governments, and the national government in 
Addis Ababa. I also sought the opinion on the outlook for the natural resource sector 
from the representatives of several donor agencies: United Nations Economic 
Commission for Africa (UNECA); African Union (AU); United Nations Development 
Program (UNDP); International Monetary Fund (IMF); European Union (EU) delegation; 
Frankfurt Zoological Society; World Bank; African Minerals Development Centre 
(AMDC); and embassies of Canada, Australia, and Qatar. In total, I conducted 23 
interviews in Ethiopia. 
 
The main challenge in Ethiopia was accessing foreign state-owned and private-sector 
actors’ investment records and data relating to land investments. To obtain a list of 
contacts with whom to speak at companies operating in the field, the procedure required 
special permission from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs prior to making my submission to 
the Agricultural Investment Land Administration Agency at the Ministry of Agriculture. I 
also needed to obtain special permission and official letters to interview contacts at the 
companies and undertake field visits to their sites of operation, many of which were 
situated hundreds of kilometres from the capital. I managed to receive the necessary 
documentation for the interviews and field visits, but time spent in this bureaucratic 
process affected the rest of the investigation.  
 
After returning to Ethiopia in January 2015, the letter of permission from the Ministry of 
Foreign Affairs was considered invalid, which prohibited me from conducting field 
interviews with communities where land investments took place. As an alternative, I 
consulted members of two local research and advocacy institutions, namely the Forum 
for Social Studies and the CIFR, both of which had conducted field interviews with 





Challenges aside, the above methodology was helpful in developing the PENRG 
concept, isolating its key variables and defining the parameters of its framework. 
Equally, it has driven a novel contribution on how governance structures influence the 
nature and outcome of the involvement of foreign-owned companies and 
investors operating in the extractive and land resource sectors in the wider development 
process, and specifically through contribution to economic growth, peace and political 
stability, and sustainable development. It is important to recall that these three country 
case studies, representing three distinct types of governance structures — politically 
stable, post-conflict, and conflict-threatened — two from the extractive sector within the 
same sub-region and similar political system, and the third from another sub-region and 
focusing on land resource, provide a broad spectrum of opportunity to investigate the 


























With its stable political system and lucrative natural resources, Ghana managed to 
become one of the strongest economies in Africa until the recent financial instability 
crisis, although a change of government in 2000 has restored some degree of financial 
stability. About 28 per cent of the 25 million citizens — mostly those living in rural areas 
— still live below the international extreme poverty line of $1.25 per day (UNICEF, 
2013a). It was ranked 139/188 on the UNDP’s 2016 Human Development Index 
(UNDP, 2016; UNDP, 2015a). The West African country attained middle-income status 
in 2011, with economic growth spurring positive social progress in terms of education 
and health care. However, despite a significant reduction in overall income poverty, 
challenges remain, including gender inequality, high unemployment, environmental 
mishaps, fiscal administration bottlenecks, and disparities between the endowed South 
and impoverished North (Osei-Assibey, 2014; Darimani, 2013). Ghana’s dynamic 
extractive sector, currently dominated by oil, has traditionally been based on gold, but 
its economic influence is decreasing.  
 
This chapter analyses how governance structures in Ghana, a politically stable state, 
have influenced the role and contribution of foreign-owned economic actors — 
specifically foreign investors and private extractive companies — in achieving peace, 
stability and economic growth in the country. Particularly, how have Ghana’s natural 
resources governance systems been effective in leveraging the private sector as a 
means of achieving the above from for the mining and natural resource sector?  
Subsequently, owing to the dissertation’s overall objective of investigating 
how governance structures (both at the resource and state levels) influence the nature 
and outcome of the involvement of foreign-owned companies and investors operating 
in the extractive and land resource sectors, this inquiry will be transposed in the wider 
development process and specifically through contribution to economic growth and 




Resource Governance, this chapter aims to provide information on optimising the 
developmental impact of mining and oil extraction by laying out a vision for effective 
natural resource governance based on the Ghanaian case, specifically by leveraging 
the extractive sector for sustainable, pro-poor socio-economic development and broad-
based, inclusive economic transformation. This research considers the transformation of 
the mining sector and emergence of the energy sector, comprised of the oil and gas 
industries, in the broader context of Ghana’s political stability, as well as the 
increasingly important role played by foreign-owned enterprises. 
 
Natural Resource Governance 
 
Since the 1980s and a shift from Marxist rule and independence from Great Britain, 
Ghana’s economic growth has been increasingly tied to the mining sector, largely 
dominated by gold. The country is the second-largest gold producer in Africa after South 
Africa and the eighth largest globally, with this mineral contributing more than 95 per 
cent of the country’s total mineral revenue (MC, 2010). Following the start of 
commercial production of oil in December 2010, Ghana’s real GDP jumped to 15 per 
cent in 2011, up from an average of 6.5 per cent in the 2000s (ICMM, 2015). Despite a 
slowdown in 2013 and 2014, when real GDP decreased to 7.3 and 4 per cent, 
respectively (CIA, 2015), analysts projected a recovery for 2016 and saw a three-year 
high 9 per cent growth in 2017 (Okudzeto et al., 2015; Trading Economics, 2017).7 
Ghana’s overall GDP growth has been accompanied by a change in the structure of the 
economy, with the agricultural sector’s contribution to the GDP decreasing, despite still 
employing more than half of the country’s workforce (FAO, 2015). Agriculture remains a 
key sector of the economy, with cocoa remaining one of the country’s largest exports 
(Tutu, 2011). Notably, rural poverty in Ghana has fallen sharply since 2000, driven in 
part by cocoa cultivation expansion in labour-intensive small farms. This strategy 
enabled Ghana to become the first country to meet Millennium Development Goal 1 on 
reducing extreme poverty rates by half (UNDP, 2015a). 
                                                             





The International Energy Agency (IEA, 2014) states that three actions in the energy 
sector — as long as they are accompanied by favourable governance reforms — could 
bolster the size of the sub-Saharan African economy by 30 per cent within 25 years: the 
investment of an additional $450 billion in the power sector; deeper regional cooperation 
and integration; and improved management of hydrocarbon and other natural resources 
and revenues. Efficient and transparent licensing procedures and a reformed regulatory 
environment across sub-Saharan African countries would encourage the drafting and 
implementation of sound energy policies (Marandu and Kayo, 2004; Kapika and 
Eberhard, 2013). Improved consultation and transparency and accountability measures 
to win stakeholders and public trust would also help Africa gain considerably from the 
development of its hydrocarbon and other energy resources. But how would this ideal 
governance approach be achieved? 
 
Ghana’s Mineral Resources 
 
With Ghana’s internal intermediaries and mediators helping to maintain political stability, 
the country is generally considered to have a relatively attractive business environment. 
In 2018, it was ranked 12th in Africa and 120th globally by the World Bank. Much of that 
political stability derives from the country’s growing economy. Ghana’s mining sector 
contributed 10 per cent of Ghana’s GDP (EITI, 2012) in 2013. The sector also 
accounted for 47 per cent of total exports in 2010 and employed about 15,000 people in 
the Large-Scale Mining (LSM) industry; furthermore, over 500,000 people are engaged 
in legal and illegal small-scale gold, diamond, sand mining, and quarrying — referred to 
as Artisanal and Small-scale Mining (ASM) (NRGI, n.d.). Only 2 per cent of all formal 
jobs in Ghana represent direct formal employment in large-scale mines, with most of 
these workers on short-term contracts with limited labour rights (Darimani, 2013).  
 
AngloGold Ashanti, created in 2004 after the merger of AngloGold and Ashanti 
Goldfields Corporation, is currently owned by the world’s third largest mining company, 




underground operation of Obuasi. With environmental permits received in June 2018, 
the mining giant is set to start construction and production. According to the Ghanaian 
government and company officials, an estimated $2.2 billion in state revenue will be 
received from this new exploitation, while local content is expected to reach $2.4 billion 
(Interview with Mr. Mark Morcombe, Senior Vice President, AngloGold Ashanti Ghana, 
September 4, 2015). On the other side, the oil sector is dominated by relatively small 
foreign-owned companies. With revenues of $1.7 billion in 2017Tullow Oil operates in 
16 countries, including in Ghana since 2006. It extracted the first oil in 2016 from its two 
licences and producing fields and is developing the Jubilee Field in Ghana.   
 
 Other mineral resources, including diamonds and bauxite (IMANI Ghana, 2010), 
account for a sizeable part of the country’s exports. Chromite, asbestos, andalusite, 
barite, mica, nepheline, syenite, cassiterite, columbite, monazite, beryl, spodumene, 
molybdenite, alluvial ilmenite, and rutile are also mined in the country. Given that there 
are no specific, comprehensive governance structures covering these other mineral 
resources, an analysis of the potential impact these could have on foreign-owned 
enterprises’ contributions to peace, stability, and economic growth is limited to specific 
areas of the mining and energy sectors.  
 
Ghana’s legal and regulatory framework deserves special consideration, since the 
country has achieved stability and developed a substantial number of instruments for 
natural resources governance, including some that support the achievement of the 
aforementioned outcomes. Guidelines for policy implementation, specifically to 
implement the country’s laws and regulations, are relatively extensive when compared 
to the frameworks of other countries on the continent. The legal and regulatory 
framework for the mining and energy sectors, as well as natural resource governance 
more generally, includes: Internal Revenue Act, 2000 (Act 592) as amended and 
associated regulations; Minerals and Mining Act, 2006 (Act 703) as amended; Minerals 
(Royalties) Amendment Act, 2010 (Act 794); Petroleum Commission Act, 2011; 
Petroleum Revenue Management Act, 2011 (Act 893) as amended; Minerals and 




Regulations, 2012 (LI 2174); Minerals and Mining (Compensation and Resettlement) 
Regulations, 2012 (LI 2175); Minerals and Mining (Licensing) Regulations, 2012 (LI 
2176); Minerals and Mining (Explosives) Regulations, 2012 (LI 2177); Minerals and 
Mining (Health, Safety & Technical) Regulations, 2012 (LI 2182); Ghana Investment 
Promotion Centre (GIPC) Act, 2013 (Act 865); Petroleum Regulations, 2013 (LI 2204); 
Companies Amendment Act, 2016; and Petroleum (Exploration and Production) Act, 
2016. The extensive legal basis for natural resource governance in Ghana, as well as 
associated policy guidelines for their implementation and operationalization, provide the 
immediate and anchor conditions for the country to determine the limits of foreign-
owned private-sector activities.  
 
The Minerals Commission is responsible for regulating and managing mineral resources 
as well as coordinating mining policies. However, as it stands, Ghana’s extractive sector 
is highly susceptible to illicit financial flows, which amounted to $1.7 billion in 2013 
(ACEP, 2015a). Because of this the country was ranked 93/145 among developing 
countries in 2013 (ACEP, 2015a), due to corruption, illegal exploitation, tax evasion by 
mining companies through various illegal deals (like transfer pricing), and resource 
smuggling. Lack of enforcement depreciates the capacity of a governance system to 
leverage foreign-owned private-sector actors as a facilitating force for peace, stability, 
and economic growth   
 
To begin to remedy some of these legislative and governance issues,  Ghana became a 
signatory of the Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative (EITI) — achieving 
compliant status in 2010 — thus establishing accountability and transparency in the 
local mining industry. According to the 2013 Resource Governance Index, Ghana 
ranked 15/58, the highest-ranked African country and one of only a few African 
countries to be featured in the Index. Because the government does not publish 
comprehensive information on key aspects of the mining industry, the most critical area 
for Ghana’s governance of natural resources remains reporting and publicly available 




interest in supporting the work done by NGOs on transparency issues in oil and gas 
(interview with Dr. Yao Graham, Third World Network, 4 March 2014). 
 
Second, under the provisions of the Petroleum Revenue Management Act (PRMA) of 
2011, Ghana’s Public Interest and Accountability Committee is designed to enhance 
public participation of citizens’ groups in the management of resource (including 
hydrocarbons) revenue, serving as a platform for public debate on how petroleum 
revenues should be spent. Its 13 members are drawn from organised professional 
bodies, think tanks, advocacy groups, and traditional institutions (Government of 
Ghana, 2011). The Committee monitors and evaluates government, foreign enterprises, 
and other institutions’ compliance with the law, provides an independent assessment of 
petroleum production and payment of corporate taxes, and publishes its findings in 
semi-annual and annual reports. In its 2012 and 2014 annual reports, for example, the 
committee underlined that oil revenue provided the government with considerable fiscal 
relief, thereby emphasising that there is an urgent need for Accra to create a better 
budget to focus spending and improve the socio-economic development of the country 
as a whole (Raji, 2016). Unfortunately, in July 2014, crude oil prices began to drop from 
US$115 per barrel, eventually freefalling by January of the following year by 55% (IFS, 
2015). According to the Institute for Fiscal Studies (IFS), Ghana’s real GDP growth 
dropped from a projected 4.0 to 3.5 per cent for 2015; budget contributions from oil 
extraction fell by 58 per cent; government capital expenditure dropped from 26 to 17 per 
cent; and the government pulled from stocks to help reduce budgetary shortfalls (IFS, 
2015).  
 
Despite economic challenges, modern Ghana is a hallmark of political stability and 
democratic power transfer in Africa. PricewaterhouseCoopers (PwC) argues that 
Ghana’s stable democratic institutions since 1992 erect it as a model for other 
countries, with democracy becoming deeply rooted in the fabric of the country (PwC, 
2015a; PwC, 2015b). Deloitte adds that Ghana’s political stability is further consolidated 
by a strong, independent media, active public dialogue, and guaranteed political rights, 




(Deloitte, 2017). However, Ghana’s political stability and the comfort afforded by 
regularized legislative regimes have not necessarily been translated to management of 
the natural resources sector.   
 
Role of Foreign-Owned Private Sector in Promoting Positive Change in Ghana’s 
Mining Sector 
 
The institutional milieu in Ghana is what dictates whether foreign-owned private-sector 
enterprises can play a positive or negative role in the country. Since the 1980s, Ghana 
has created a ‘good investment environment’ as a preliminary step toward establishing 
sustainable economic growth.  
 
The Mining Fiscal Regime 
 
The mining fiscal regime, which has been designed to capture resource rents from 
operating private foreign-owned enterprises and to promote FDIs, has remained fairly 
stable since the mid-1980s. As a result of this effort, the contribution of the mining 
sector to foreign exchange earnings has increased from 14 per cent at the beginning of 
the 1990s to an average of 41 per cent since the mid-1990s (ACET, 2015). According to 
the Ghana Revenue Authority and the Minerals Commission, the sector provided about 
19 per cent of government direct tax revenues in 2013 and is one of the largest 
contributing sectors to government revenues, only second to the oil industry ICMM, 
2015, 23). Moreover, purchases of local supplies by the mining sector were worth over 
$1.2 billion in 2012 (Aubynn, 2013).8 In terms of job creation, the sector employed 
around 21,000 people in the 1990s (Bank of Ghana, 2003), down to 15,000 in 2013 
(ICMM, 2015), only 2 per cent of which are expatriates, with indirect and induced job 
creation measuring six times the number of direct employees (each of these employees 
typically supports 8 to 10 family members). According to the ICMM’s report on Ghana’s 
mining industry’s impact on employment, “over the period 2010–22, the sample of 
                                                             
8 For a recent analysis of how money is spent by gold mining companies and how it is split between stakeholders, 




mining companies is estimated to support between 83,000 and 148,000 jobs, equivalent 
to an average of 111,000 jobs annually. In 2013, about 1.3 per cent of the Ghanaian 
labour force was supported by the sample of mining companies, a figure that is 
projected to decline to 0.6 per cent of the labour force in 2022” (ICMM, 2015).  
 
Even if the mining sector is governed properly with sustainable, pro-poor policies, and 
regulatory instruments addressing challenges of revenue capitation and investment 
attraction, one of the pitfalls is that investment incentives have changed over time 
(Amponsah-Tawiah and Dartey-Baah, 2011), thereby failing to maximise the potential to 
benefit local Ghanaians. For example, even as many incentives during the 1990s had 
the objective of boosting investment in the gold industry, they did not include additional 
policies on national or local participation. Understandably, governance structures will 
often include policy for incentivizing FDIs and foreign private-sector investment in a 
designated sector. But, when this policy lacks transference protocols to appropriately 
distribute rents and revenues at a local level, the structures are not working to 
encourage broad, multi-level economic growth. Indeed, as a politically stable country, 
Ghana should be transitioning away from simply the enticement of FDIs toward 
leveraging the sector for widespread economic sustainability, requiring an unabridged 
position on taxation and royalty collection akin to its middle-income economic status. 
Poor policy planning for mineral resource governance can contribute to class disparity, 
animosity, and antagonism between communities and companies — and ultimately 
instability.  
 
Governance structures contribute to sustainable economic growth in politically stable 
countries when they include effective dispersal from national-level coffers to 
communities. Mandated operationalization of community investment, as such, would 
entail a series of organizational steps needed to launch relevant and locally conducive 
community development projects based on community needs and in consultation with 
community leaders by private-sector actors. Currently, the vast majority of mineral-
related investment is tied to the gold industry, indicating that there is an 




down to communities, especially those adjacent or associated with mine sites. It 
suggests that gaps in conditions of state governance institutions for natural resources 
can prohibit sustainable economic development, even in a politically stable country.  
 
While there is a burgeoning literature on how to stimulate sustainable development in 
the mining sector (Hilson and Murck, 2000; Janneh and Ping, 2011; Boakye, Dessus, 
Foday, and Oppong, 2012), a major challenge facing the Ghanaian government — and 
a lesson espoused by the Political Economy of Natural Resource Governance   
framework — is the means by which one can change perceptions within mining 
communities themselves of how the private sector, especially foreign-owned 
corporations, can contribute to sustainable development. Akabzaa, Seyire, and Afriyie 
(2007) examine the effects of mining activities in the Ashanti Goldfields Company’s 
(AGC) Obuasi mine in Obuasi, the capital of Adansi West District, and surrounding 
communities, which constitute a major centre of mining activities in Ghana and sub-
Saharan Africa as a whole. Since 2004, AGC merged with AngloGold to create 
AngloGold Ashanti, part of Anglo American Group, a London and Johannesburg-based 
multinational mining company and the second-largest gold producer in the world 
(AngloGold Ashanti, 2017). In 2017, AngloGold Ltd. extracted 3.76 million ounces of 
gold mainly from its facilities on the African continent, the United States, and Brazil, and 
is part of a US$26.24-billion group in revenue with operations in iron ore, diamonds, and 
base metals (Anglo American, 2017). The Obuasi mine is an exemplary case study of 
unsustainable development: 
“There is no consensus on the true economic impact of mining by AGC on the local 
population. Industry backers use increased mine production and gross export value of 
mine products. However, increased negative environmental and social impacts on local 
communities and evasive foreign earnings from the sector as a result of the generous 
incentives to companies make the actual economic impact of the sector debatable.” 
(Akabzaa, Seyire, and Afriyie, 2007, 82) 
 
The social impacts were manifested in increases of the cost of living in communities due 




brutalities by private security agents against illegal artisanal gold miners, increases in 
mining-related respiratory diseases such as silico-tuberculosis, increased demographic 
pressure and shortages of foodstuffs due to workers leaving the agricultural sector for 
the mining sector, the prevalence of prostitution by members of the communities, and 
displacement of populations due to pollution. The environmental impacts included land 
and vegetation degradation, offsite migration of pollutants, and surface and 
underground water pollution caused by open-pit operations. What makes the Obuasi 
case unique is that the conflict between the police and the illegal artisanal miners is not 
about grievances over land expropriation by locals, but is rather an economically 
motivated conflict in which the miners are non-natives seeking control of gold resources 
and have formed an informal association that has been key to their survival (Okoh, 
2014; Akabzaa and Darimani, 2001).  
 
This example also highlights the persistent gap in the governance of natural resource 
systems in Ghana: the inability to influence, through policy and legislative mechanisms, 
private-sector actions and foreign-owned enterprises so as to remedy these issues. 
Indeed, Ghana should seek foreign direct investment (FDI) into its matured mineral 
resources sector by leveraging the strength of its government and governance systems, 
respectively; stability and risk aversion matter deeply to private-sector actors, especially 
when broaching the often-believed (although not correctly in many cases) to be frontier 
spaces of the African continent.  
 
The issue of illegal artisanal gold miners is both contentious and ambiguous (Teschner, 
2012). Although the Ghanaian government at one point showed interest in formalising 
and organising the miners, it did not follow through, with the result that they have lost 
control over the informal sector. Police tactics to eliminate ASM often involve violence 
and have largely been ineffective. In fact, artisanal miners provide significant amounts 
of sustained income to local communities, bridging the gap left by deficiencies in the 
governance system, with the result that attempts to clamp down on them could lead to 
community abjection (Bush, 2009). One observer argued that the only way forward is to 




negative impacts while enhancing the positive effects in an economy with such a high 
unemployment rate (interview, Department of Geography, University of Ghana, and 25 
February 2014). Over the past decade, some transitory artisanal miners have forged 
strong bonds with host communities by sending pre-negotiation teams and arranging 
mutually beneficial agreements with local actors, indicating that there have been 
attempts to formalise their activities and contribute to community development (Nyame 
and Grant, 2014).  
 
Interviews identified that some artisanal miners have been panning for gold in 
abandoned mines, which points to the need for more formalisation (interview with Prof. 
Abeeku Essuman-Johnson, Department of Political Science, University of Ghana, 28 
February 2014). One observer suggested that improved relationships between small- 
and large-scale miners can only be achieved if the understaffed Minerals Commission is 
provided with assistance from other government institutions and international agencies 
such as the World Bank (Hilson, 2002). When touring the Western Region bordering 
Cote d’Ivoire, Ghana’s president mentioned that the government has been seeking 
World Bank support to register artisanal miners and support mining technics dispersion, 
after which they will have additional opportunities to cover mining holes and plant trees 
to recover and reclaim the land (interview with Prof. Abeeku Essuman-Johnson, 
Department of Political Science, University of Ghana, 28 February 2014). To date, only 
a US$300,000 project has been approved in June 2018 to provide technical assistance 
to the extractive industries (World Bank, 2018).  
 
ASM and illegal artisanal mining may be a by-product of jobs failing to materialize from 
private-sector investment in the natural resource sector. As Osei-Tutu (2012) observed, 
in Ghana’s Western Region, regarded as the bread basket of the country, farming and 
fishing have suffered due to lost access to land and sea following the establishment of 
oil rigs, pipelines, and storage facilities, as well as fishing restrictions. In an ironic twist, 
while it is illegal for fishermen to travel within a one-mile radius of rigs, the rigs’ power 






Another significant challenge is youth unemployment (interview with Dr. Kwesi Aning, 
Kofi Annan International Peacekeeping Centre, 24 February 2014; interview with Dr. 
Elias Ayuk, UN University Institute for Natural Resources in Africa, 24 February 2014). 
Youth, who had hoped to secure some level of employment on the rigs, have become 
angry, frustrated, and resentful at the lack of opportunities and the fact that companies 
have hired expatriates or experienced Ghanaians from other regions. The Western 
Region’s literacy and university enrolment levels are relatively low, which has translated 
to lower skills rate and fewer opportunities. Moreover, employed youth such as 
carpenters, welders, and masons have been disappointed by the lack of development 
projects such as the building of schools, hospitals, and roads. Since oil and gas were 
discovered offshore, products thus far have been transported by air and companies 
have not needed to build any infrastructure in communities. The rigs by their very 
presence serve as a visible reminder of the challenges associated with using 
governance as a vehicle to achieve peace, stability, and, in the case of Ghana, 
sustainable economic growth — where foreign-owned private-sector actors have been 
able to bypass the governance structure.  
 
Indeed, at a macro level of analysis, local beneficiation and value addition in the natural 
resources sector should be primarily discussed within the context of the political 
economy of resource generation and transfer. In Ghana, value addition produced by 
mining companies’ expenditures has a great impact on both government and household 
income levels. The construction sector, local trade, manufacturing, and utilities receive 
most of the supplier expenditures (ICMM, 2015). There are also opportunities outside of 
gold and oil. The Ghanaian government recently introduced the National Export 
Strategy for the Non-Traditional Sector (Government of Ghana, Ministry of Trade and 
Industry, 2016), which deals with processed items and horticulture, among other things. 
The strategy aggressively promotes manufacturing, processing, and semi-processing, 






The Ghana Investment Promotion Centre, a government agency established in 2013, is 
an important governance vehicle for promoting investments that should lead to 
resource-based industrialisation and expansion of the country’s trade portfolio (Republic 
of Ghana, 2013). Meanwhile, the Free Zone Act of 1995 seeks to promote economic 
development and job creation through a variety of incentives, which include an 
exemption from payment of duties and levies on all imports for production and export 
from free zones and an exemption from payment of income tax on profits for 10 years, 
after which it is only 8 per cent rather than the normal 25 per cent. To further promote 
investment and boost economic prospects, the government is considering creating an 
enabling environment through special incentives for investors looking at the productive 
sector, particularly in regard to energy, adding value to extracted minerals, large-scale 
agricultural production, and manufacturing (interview with Mr Wisdom Togobo, Ghana 
Ministry of Energy, 3 March 2014).  
 
Other priority areas include building economic infrastructure to support investment: 
power supply, water access, telecommunications and transportation, reducing 
clearance times at ports, and streamlining the fiscal regime to reduce challenges 
associated with, among other things, taxes and interest rates (interview with Mr. 
Wisdom Togobo, Ghana Ministry of Energy, 3 March 2014). The Ghana Investment 
Promotion Centre has also established a land bank that encourages landowners to 
send their titles to the land bank, which are then made available to investors, including 
local investors. It also recognises and awards the companies with the best corporate 
social responsibility (CSR) practices through the Ghana Club 100 in order to encourage 
further competition and improve products and services.  
 
Appropriate governance of foreign-owned enterprises’ investments  would involve 
moving beyond the accrual of natural resource revenues and lacklustre attempts to 
stimulate sustainable economic growth and continued stability, to maximising national 
value creation through local content, beneficiation, and value addition based on the 
revitalization of successful institutions like the Ghana Investment Promotion Center and 




political issues. It is critical that the government does not serve the interests of foreign-
owned enterprises alone, whether that be through intentional dismissal or ignorance of 
necessary implementation governance reforms or outright preferential treatment. Such 
actions have the potential to give rise to social instability, unrest, or violence targeted at 
both the private sector and the government — consequences that could hinder 
sustainable economic growth and continuing peace. 
 
Emergence of the Hydrocarbon Sector 
 
While the mining sector has the potential to contribute to Ghana’s future, the emerging 
hydrocarbon sector is set to shape the country through economic transformation, 
provided it is governed appropriately so as to influence positive contributions by foreign-
owned enterprises. Ghana’s oil reserves, the bulk of which are in the Jubilee oil field, 
are estimated to range between 800 million and 1.8 billion barrels, and production, 
which began in 2010, is expected to continue for 20 years (NRGI, n.d.).9 The Ghanaian 
Government is currently drilling and producing oil under the terms of  the Petroleum 
(Exploration and Production) Act, 2016, which creates a scope of action designed to 
encourage increased private participation and investment through an open, competitive 
public tendering process for the allocation of petroleum rights; clarify ground rules for 
operators; and provide for “safe, secure, sustainable, and efficient petroleum activities in 
the country” (Ghana Justice, 2016). The 1984 version of the Act originally established 
the Ghana National Petroleum Corporation, a state-owned enterprise that began 
operations in 1985 and which has, in the past, broadly regulated the oil and gas 
industries. The Corporation is now involved in exploration, development, and 
production, and looks to form joint ventures that leverage domestic and foreign 
investments, with the objective to provide a reliable supply of petroleum products and 
reduce the country’s dependence on crude oil imports through the development of the 
country’s own oil and gas resources.10 
 
                                                             
9 For an overview of Ghana’s oil discoveries, see Asamoah (2012). 




There are various contemporary discourses on how to manage Ghana’s hydrocarbon 
resources to stimulate economic transformation and sustainable growth. Suggestions 
include altering governance structures and laws, boosting participation in the oil industry 
and creating oil and gas funds, implementing various investment strategies, focusing on 
upstream oil and gas strategies, and ensuring spatial development (Chitor, 2012; 
Asamoah, 2013a; Aryeetey, Osei, and Quartey, 2014; Asante and Owasa, 2014; 
Boatemah and Owusa, 2014; Laryea, 2014).11 This section, however, focuses on 
governance, given the fact that the revenues from the oil and gas industries have 
already surpassed total mining receipts: they almost doubled from $444 million in 2011 
to $846 million in 2013, as oil companies started paying corporate income taxes (EITI, 
2012). The most recent data from the Bank of Ghana indicate that the country has 
generated approximately $3.285 billion in oil revenues five years into commercial 
production, with the Annual Budget Funding Amount receiving $1.4 billion. This figure 
represents 43 per cent of the oil revenues received, with the Petroleum Revenue 
Management Act of 2011 having set 70 per cent as the maximum. Yet, better 
transparency and accountability continue to be cross-cutting natural resource 
governance issues in Ghana that undergird all efforts toward economic transformation 
through partial participation in the sector by foreign-owned enterprises. 
 
The Jubilee field is the starting point for an analysis of Ghana’s governance of its 
hydrocarbon resources, and its similarities and differences to other natural resources. It 
is operated by the British-based company Tullow Oil, which owns 35%, along with 
Kosmos, Anadarko, the Ghana National Petroleum Corporation (GNPC), and Petro SA 
(interview with Mr. Fidelix Datson, Security Team Leader, Tullow Ghana, February 25, 
2014). GNPC has praised the Jubilee field’s development, but an independent review 
by the IMANI Center for Policy & Education (2012b) shows that field development has 
been considerably scaled down to less than half of the projected capacity in order to 
                                                             
11 For the history of Ghana’s National Energy Board, established in the mid-1980s to undertake energy planning and 
policy development and disbanded by the government in 1991, and for a discussion on the importance of developing 
comprehensive national energy plans and institutionalising the formulation and coordination of energy sector 




fast-track the path to first oil, which has exaggerated the success rate of activities whilst 
undermining project resilience” (interview with Mr. Fidelix Datson, Security Team 
Leader, Tullow Ghana, February 25, 2014). Despite this, companies operating in 
hydrocarbon resource extraction have simultaneously engaged in various CSR projects, 
with non-recoverable costs pulled from operational budgets (Tullow Oil, 2012; Platform, 
2012; interview with Mr. Fidelix Datson, Security Team Leader, Tullow Ghana, February 
25, 2014). External independent monitoring of the Jubilee project, which included a site 
visit in April 2013, found that there have been many successful social components to 
the project over the years, including grievance management that has been strengthened 
over time through training and communication facilities, with the top grievances being 
the Safety Zone’s restriction radius around the oil rigs, the gradual decrease of fish 
stocks, and the lack of employment opportunities (Motherwell, 2010; Tullow Oil, 2013; 
interview with Mr. Fidelix Datson, Security Team Leader, Tullow Ghana, February 25, 
2014).  
 
Despite this positive evidence that foreign-owned enterprises have contributed to 
community development in the area, there are no guarantees that resource wealth will 
be effectively used to create sustainable growth. This points to a failure in governance 
systems to establish a scope of action for the private sector that enables restructuring 
for the purpose of achieving sustainable growth.  
 
In response to this challenge, the Petroleum Revenue Management Act 2011 
established the Petroleum Holding Fund and Ghana Petroleum Funds, which include 
the Ghana Heritage Fund and Ghana Stabilisation Fund. These funds are meant to 
address intergenerational conflict in the use of oil and gas resources, specifically by 
investing natural resource revenue into safe assets for the benefit of all Ghanaians 
(Oshionebo, 2018). However, it could be argued that investing in natural resource 
revenue now rather than keeping it in liquid financial assets would benefit current and 
future generations, especially since immediate investment would attract more capital. 
Amending the Act to use the Ghana Petroleum Funds as leverage to establish an 




University of Ghana, 25 February 2014). According to a three-year review of petroleum 
revenues from 2011 to 2013, the budget allocated to the health sector over the period 
was limited, while the food and agriculture subsector budget was more important, with a 
number of projects targeting smallholder farmers. The significance of petroleum 
revenues being channelled to the education sector shows that the government is indeed 
willing to use revenues from the extractive sector for social development. Still, the 
review identified inefficiencies in the appropriation of petroleum revenues and criticised 
the choice of priority sectors and projects (ACEP, 2015b). 
 
Beyond generational funds, different fiscal arrangements could derive more economic 
growth as well as stability and peace outcome benefits from oil and gas resources 
(Ayensu, 2013; Van Gyampo, 2016). Specifically, production-sharing agreements as 
part of governance regimes would result in significant societal and economic 
transformation within 15 years, with socio-economic effects that could give Ghana the 
ability to meet all domestic requirements for oil and gas during the production life of the 
Jubilee fields, export the surplus, and invest the gains in the Heritage Fund. Assuming a 
price of $60 per barrel over the next 15 years, Ghana would earn $2.56 billion per year 
instead of $800 million per year projected by the Ministry of Finance under its existing 
royalty tax system, which could then be reinvested into much-needed infrastructure, 
such as access to drinking water in every community, development of all-weather roads, 
educational facilities, affordable rental accommodation, and expanded health facilities. 
The government could then afford to reduce the level of taxes on all commodities 
including petroleum products, the multiplier effects of which would be large and lead to 
a much-improved standard of living for Ghanaians (Kwawukume, 2012). 
 
Natural gas is another important part of Ghana’s discovered hydrocarbon resources. 
The Ghana National Gas Company (Ghana Gas) is central to industry operations, while 
the Chinese company Sinopec is engaged in a construction phase, although there has 
been some controversy surrounding project delays (Citifmonline, 2013; IMANI Center 
for Policy & Education, 2013a; Business & Financial Times [B&FT], 2014). Providing 




Petroleum Services is part of Sinopec Group, the world’s largest oil, gas, and 
petrochemical conglomerate, generating $344 billion in operating income, with a profit of 
over $12 billion, in 2017 (Sinopec, 2018). The government is looking to increase the use 
of gas and the reliability of the fossil fuel by building gas plants in Ghana to supplement 
the gas that is delivered from Nigeria and inviting foreign-owned enterprises to enter the 
field through public-private partnership agreements (interview with Dr. Yao Graham, 
Third World Network, 4 March 2014).  
 
It appears that the troubling trends in the oil industry, which impact sustainable 
economic growth, are also evident in the gas industry. Despite initial high expectations, 
community members from existing project areas have reported issues with the level of 
awareness and access to information, compensation payments, environmental 
pollution, and number of employment opportunities, with limited reprieve available 
through existing governance mechanisms (Sakyi et al., 2012). Ishmael Edjekumhene, 
Executive Director of the Kumasi Institute of Technology and Environment (KITE), 
recommends paying more attention to the environmental impact assessment (EIA) 
process for future projects, being more realistic about the expected benefits of projects, 
paying outstanding capitalisation to the Ghana National Gas Company to enable it to 
pay outstanding community compensation, and establishing a special programme to 
cater to the needs of small- and medium-sized enterprises to enable them to take 
advantage of what is happening in their communities (KITE, 2014). Other observers 
have noted challenges faced by Ghana Gas, with projects falling behind schedule and 
shifting deadlines. These are major problems, since the number of gas fields — and 
thus the potential for gas extraction — is large and the delays are resulting in missed 
opportunities for increased investment and sustainable economic growth (interview with 
Dr. Yao Graham, Third World Network, 4 March 2014). 
 
Comprehensive laws, regulations, and policies have been a prominent feature in 
Ghana’s efforts to regulate and manage hydrocarbon resources. However, 
government’s focus on oil and gas at the expense of other sectors, including agriculture, 




severely over recent years. In fact, the Ghanaian government largely continues to see 
both the mining and energy sectors as persistent sources of revenue (interview with Dr. 
Franklin Cudjoe, IMANI Center for Policy & Education, 4 March 2014). As a result, to 
quote Dr. Graham: Ghana is facing an “intellectual Dutch disease.”  Moreover, the 
national government’s ability to positively influence economic and social outputs from 
foreign-owned enterprises participating in these sectors has been limited. 
  
Research Results: A Case of Progress with Challenges 
 
Effective natural resource governance can present the opportunity for lasting political 
stability in terms of poverty alleviation, improvements to human capacities and physical 
infrastructure, and sustainable pro-poor socio-economic development if conducted 
appropriately and in collaboration with all relevant groups. Private sector-led 
engagement in resource extraction could further stimulate positive change. Indeed, the 
ideal role of the private sector in natural resource governance in a stable country such 
as Ghana is to support efforts to establish sustainable economic development and 
political stability. Its ability to do so, however, hinges on effective governance at both the 
national and local levels that works to encourage and influence this type of outcome.  
 
However, according to interviews conducted for this research, there has been little 
meaningful improvement to the sustainable development of mining communities by 
national structures, as the Ghanaian government has so far failed to induce most 
foreign mining companies to contribute to improving living standards in the communities 
where they operate. Efforts to do so by some companies have been made mostly out of 
self-interest (interview, Kofi Annan International Peacekeeping Centre, 24 February 
2014). While some boards and chief executive officers feel morally and ethically bound 
to provide tangential and direct benefits to local communities, whether through direct 
funded projects and opportunities or via value addition, it would not be such a stretch to 
assume that social consciousness is considered by most to be yet another means to 
achieve financial salience (Galant and Cadez, 2017; Pan et al., 2014: Asmeri, Alvionita, 





Host nations must work to establish a policy and legislative system by which to require 
value addition, economic sustainability, adherence to environmental standards, and 
beneficiation at all levels of society. In the case of Ghana, while the country has made 
strides in the regulation and governance of natural resource sectors in this regard,  the 
traditional implementation gap continues to plague the country’s ability to leverage 
those resources, and the private-sector actors exploiting them, for long-term sustainable 
economic growth development.  
 
Impact on Regulation and Governance 
 
According to recent World Bank indicators, Ghana “continues to show good 
performance on democratic governance, arising from a strong multi-party-political 
system, growing media pluralism and strong civil society activism” (Osei-Assibey, 2014, 
522). It could be said that the country’s relative political, social, and economic stability 
could be linked in some respect to natural resources extraction. After all, the mining 
sector contributes somewhat to employment and the mining and energy sectors 
contribute to government revenue through royalties and taxes as well as improved living 
standards of Ghanaians (Aryee, 2001). In 2005, Ali and Yelpaala determined that the 
deregulation of the Ghanaian diamond industry and the increased extractive practices 
from foreign and locally owned companies would “lead to a relatively reduced 
environmental burden in Akwatia [diamond-producing area in Ghana] and more revenue 
for the GCD to invest in the human development needs of communities in the town.” 
Furthermore, while government policy that has helped to drive improvements in income 
levels and standards of living for some mining communities, it has also resulted in 
negative environmental impacts (Darimani, 2013). Notably, democracy appears to 
increase political space for the autonomy of organised private capital, its access to the 
government, and policy influence (Kraus, 2002). 
 
The issue of participation — integral to effective governance — is one with which Ghana 




owned enterprises, and communities. Considering that changes have occurred over 
time in Ghana, the institutional and administrative environment may improve in the short 
term. The Ghanaian government pays attention to civil society and is willing to respond 
in certain cases, given how these can sometimes affect public perception. As an 
example, a public dispute over the China Development Bank’s strict credit requirements 
proved how the Ghanaian government responds to high-profile situations (VibeGhana, 
2012).  
 
Ghana has a long and strong tradition of civil society participation in policy formulation, 
including in the extractive sector. For example, the Ghana Civil Society Platform on Oil 
and Gas, comprising 120 organised groups, individuals, and professional bodies 
(Hanson, D’Alessandro, and Owusu, 2014), tried to mitigate negative socio-economic 
and environmental impacts and advocated for the increased participation of local 
communities and stakeholders in oil management and governance. A second example: 
in collaboration with government institutions, the African Centre for Energy Policy 
launched the online platform OurOilMoney (http://www/ouroilmoney.org) in 2015. 
OurOilMoney was designed to improve transparency and accountability of oil 
management through the participation of relevant stakeholders. Given that it provides 
open access to the most updated information and data on oil exploitation, revenues, 
and projects, together with mobile-based access integrated with WhatsApp and other 
social media, OurOilMoney is a powerful tool for mobilising public support for advocacy 
initiatives — and has the potential to leverage Ghana’s policy efforts for environmental 
protection related to the extractive sector.  
 
For the mining sector to play a greater role in facilitating poverty reduction, social 
development, economic transformation, and environmental protection, the 40-Year 
National Development Plan must include the implementation of regulatory systems that 
address corruption and infrastructure issues and facilitate integration among the natural 





For instance, while the Petroleum Revenue Management Act of 2011 set in place some 
of the most extensive accountability and transparency rules seen thus far on the 
continent in this sector, as well as a regulation to prioritise local jobs in oil and gas 
projects (Okpanachi and Andrews, 2012), these rules have yet to include full contract 
disclosure or apply equally to Ghana’s mining sector. The Act should be considered as 
an innovative legal instrument for hydrocarbon resource taxation as it outlines clear 
mechanisms for collecting and distributing petroleum revenue. (Conversely, the 
country’s mining sector, a traditional mineral sector that inherits and progressively 
improves previously existing regulations, is less innovative than the more recently 
created petroleum industry. Indeed, the latter’s regulations have built on the most up-to-
date international rules on oil and gas.) 
 
That said, Ghana’s burgeoning hydrocarbon extraction industry faces similar 
implementation challenges, and the focus on consumption instead of investments is a 
major concern. Exemplifying this trend, one interviewee and an IMANI member who 
was invited to join a government committee resigned after realising that monies were 
being channelled into consumption-related areas instead of critical investment areas, as 
outlined in the Act (interview with Dr. Franklin Cudjoe, IMANI Center for Policy & 
Education, 3 March 2014).  
 
Since 2010, the Ghanaian government has been cooperating with developed countries 
in the area of natural resource management to improve various aspects of governance, 
including transparency and accountability (Asamoah, 2012; Twerefou, 2014). Drawing 
on the experience of Norway’s Oil for Development programme and its principles of 
good governance, Ghana is striving to ensure economically, socially, and 
environmentally responsible management of its petroleum resources. Twinning 
arrangements between public-sector institutions in Ghana and their sister institutions in 
Norway have promoted continuity, sustainability, and a holistic approach with emphasis 
on the principles of transparency, accountability, and anti-corruption (EITI, 2012). 




good governance and accountability, is successfully gathering funds from donors, 
specifically the Netherlands, United States, and United Kingdom.  
 
In recent years, the Ghanaian government has made significant progress in terms of 
policy-making, contributing to a political economy that is anchored in laws and 
regulations and focused on wealth creation. Nonetheless, Ghana’s economy has 
suffered the consequences of loose fiscal policy, high budgets and debts, and current 
account deficits, suggesting that natural resources governance could be improved if it 
hopes to establish a meaningful scope of action for facilitating restructuring. In addition, 
the issue of elite-level politics may be the hardest to address, but the most critical 
problematic going forward. There is considerable pressure inside administrations (self-
imposed and from colleagues) to obtain a share of natural resource revenues, 
something which has consequences for political decision-making that could undermine 
the establishment of a culture of good governance (interview with Dr. Yao Graham, 
Third World Network, 4 March 2014).  
 
Although a large part of the budget funded by natural resource revenues is allocated to 
capital expenditure projects — specifically infrastructure, agriculture, and capacity-
building projects — these initiatives have not produced all the expected outcomes. A 
smaller part of the budget is saved for future generations in the short-term Ghana 
Stabilisation Fund, which cushions the impact of a shortfall in oil prices, and in the 
longer-term Ghana Heritage Fund, which can only be accessed beginning in 2025 and 
is modelled on a similar Norwegian fund. Both funds form part of the Petroleum Account 
at the Bank of Ghana. Data from June 2016 indicate that, five years into the commercial 
production of oil, the Ghana Stabilisation Fund has so far received approximately $618 
million, representing 19 per cent of oil revenue, but currently stands at about $191 
million due to a prolonged period of low oil prices and lowering of the cap on the fund. 
The Ghana Heritage Fund has received approximately $256 million over the same 
period, representing about 8 per cent of oil revenue, and currently has a balance of 
$268 million (Abbey, 2016). These figures together are modest compared to Botswana’s 




2016). The economic challenges that Ghana faces are related to gaps in governance 
implementation, of which both public and private actors in the mining and energy 
sectors are guilty. 
 
Impact on Community Development 
 
The role of the private sector in promoting sustainable economic growth and continuing 
political stability is not only to incorporate sustainable economic development principles 
into their mainstream operations, but also to “chaperone the activities of all their 
associated companies — suppliers, joint ventures, foundations, and others — to make 
sure that they fall in line with a benign sustainability agenda” (Asamoah, 2012, 55). 
Conducting efforts in a sustainable manner means that economic operations must meet 
environmental and social sustainability requirements and norms, specifically those 
related to health, safety, environmental, social, and ethical responsibilities. In addition to 
the three pillars of sustainability (economic, social, and environmental), a governance 
dimension should become the fourth pillar — supporting the others and maintaining a 
balance between them, particularly by ensuring that correct trade-offs are made in 
business decisions (Asamoah, 2012). Even if this is done, however, the private sector’s 
successful participation in this endeavour still hinges on effective governance at both 
the national and local levels, at which formal governance structures and informal 
governance arrangements overlap.  
 
Ghana’s experience with investment has primarily been with individual private extractive 
companies, not governments (interview with Mr. Christopher Agyekumhene, Kumasi 
Institute of Technology and Environment, 27 February 2014). In many cases, 
companies simply compensate communities for their land, especially when crops and 
property are involved. Under their overall legislation and governance structures, the 
government expects companies to engage in CSR activities by providing choice 
amenities to communities, but companies insist that it is not their responsibility to 
develop communities, especially when they pay taxes to the government (interview with 




28 February 2014). Even so, in 2012, companies voluntarily contributed $26 million to 
community sustainable development projects, such as trust funds, and economic 
development and community empowerment programmes, with spill-over effects in 
transportation, hospitality, and other sectors (Aubynn, 2013). For instance, sponsored 
by the Global Fund, the private extractive company AngloGold is now involved in 
malaria control efforts in one district (interview, villagers from the mining area of Tarkwa, 
6 March 2014 & interview with Mr. Mark Morcombe, Senior Vice President, AngloGold 
Ashanti Ghana, 4 September 2015).  
 
Given that certain communities have yet to seen any social projects by mining and oil 
companies operating in their region, the argument can be made that Ghana’s 
governance system is characterized by inconsistent application in all parts of the 
country (interview, villagers from the mining area of Tarkwa, 7 March 2014). Moreover, 
the environmental consequences of some projects should be underlined, as well as the 
possible responses developed by the communities. One observer regarded the Wassa 
Association of Communities Affected by Mining to be the “best answer” to the failures of 
the government on mining-related issues given that it is single-handedly taking on the 
government on behalf of certain communities, such as those whose water sources have 
been polluted by mining activities (interview with Dr. Abeeku Essuman-Johnson, 
Department of Political Science, University of Ghana, 28 February 2014). 
 
As it stands, only a handful of companies have built programs, through public relations 
and such, to conduct business in harmony with adjacent communities, but only because 
it supports their own interests — they are not compelled by the government to do so 
(interview with Dr. Kwesi Aning, Kofi Annan International Peacekeeping Centre, 24 
February 2014). This also points to a deep chasm in Ghana’s governance system, and 
its scope of action, which continues to motivate or compel foreign-owned enterprises 
from contributing to sustainable economic growth and stability. As a result, the 
standards of living in mining communities with large-scale extractive activities have only 
improved modestly If Ghana expects to use its mineral wealth to facilitate broad-based 




responsibility is included in governance regimes and subsequent compliance by private-
sector actors, thereby closing the policy and legislative implementation gap and creating 
a robust scope of action that will lead to meaningful restructuring (Garvin et al., 2009). 
Further, it must do so through the junctures and entry points of change noted above, 
whereby governance can be strengthened so as to improve effectiveness and impact. 
How to ensure such compliance without facilitating the abandonment of Ghana by those 
same extractive firms, however, is a challenge.  
 
Impact on Local Content Policies 
 
Local content policies aim to leverage the extractive value chains to generate sustained 
and inclusive growth through economic diversification and employment opportunities 
(Bicker, 2014; Kusi-Sarpong et al., 2014). Existing mining regulations establish the local 
content requirements for the mining sector and focus on three main areas: employment 
and promotion of local labour forces; the procurement of locally produced goods and 
services; and additional licensing and reporting requirements. They require mining 
companies to hire a minimum proportion of national staff and the percentage of 
expatriates must be reduced progressively to a maximum of 6 per cent of the 
company’s total workforce in the country. With the aim of promoting local knowledge, 
mining companies must submit a comprehensive five-year plan to the Minerals 
Commission, which details the replacement of expatriates with Ghanaians and outlines 
training programmes. A five-year procurement plan must also be produced, showing 
how preference is given to local materials, products, and service providers. Penalties for 
violating local content provisions are provided. Having said this, however, local content 
could be greater if the Ghanaian government became more involved in the operations of 
mining companies, for example by becoming a shareholder (interview with Mr. 
Sulemanu Koney, Ghana Chamber of Mines, 3 September 2015). 
 
Despite these recent regulations, Ghana’s local content policies largely remain generic, 
preventing the application of an effective scope of action that will help to reshape 




Additionally, the policies have not taken into consideration the views of the private 
sector. Foreign-owned enterprises would likely be more willing participants in 
programming that encourages sustainable growth and stability if they were treated as 
economic partners by the Ghanaian government, rather than simply sources of revenue. 
An entry point or juncture would be to ensure that the roles of stakeholders, including 
the government, private sector, CSOs, and donors, are better outlined in Ghana’s local 
content policies (Esteves, Coyne, and Moreno, 2013). An added issue is to the degree 
of corruption and lack of government oversight. In Ghana, corruption is an endemic 
concern in all aspects of governance, driving up the costs and insecurity of doing 
business in the country (BMI Research, 2015). Ergo, challenges at the policy level must 
be addressed: 
“The challenges are in the adequacy of the measures and in how to go about 
implementation, monitoring, and measuring achievements. On one hand, success 
depends on the procurement decisions of the large mining firms, which dominate the 
Ghanaian industry, on how much local procurement decisions are in the discretion of 
individual firms, and on the capacity of local supply firms. On another hand, success 
depends on the clarity and deliberate directions of government policies as well as on 
complementary government-industry relationships. Successful local content strategy 
must create a framework for learning and adaptation and should involve both 
government and industry.” (ACET, 2015, 42–3) 
 
When it comes to the hydrocarbon sector, government tenders are reserved for local 
companies (interview with Georgette B. Sakyi-Addo, Georgette Barnes Limited, 1 
August 2015) and good governance structures have been introduced. The Petroleum 
Commission Act, the Local Content and Local Participation in Petroleum Activities 
Policy Framework, and Petroleum Regulations (L.I. 2204) facilitate policy 
implementation in the sector and provide a comprehensive legal framework for local 
content. As oil is considered the key resource for short-term economic growth and 
transformation, if well managed, considerable effort has been made to ensure the 
country does not suffer from the supposed ‘resource curse’ (Kopinski, Polus, and 





The African Centre for Energy Policy has lauded Ghana for its hydrocarbon sector 
legislation that will, in its opinion, foster greater transparency in the sector, but faulted it 
for the continued absence of penalties for conflict of interest by public officials (Adam, 
2016). Ghana is one of the few African countries with a local content framework for the 
petroleum industry. The framework targets job creation and value-addition through the 
use of local expertise, goods, services, and businesses to ensure the retention of 
benefits within Ghana over the longer term. Senoo and Armah (2015), however, find 
that the alignment of the legislative content with the intended outcomes, the social, 
economic, and political context, the leadership by the Petroleum Commission (which 
regulates and manages upstream petroleum activities and coordinates associated 
policies), and the level of stakeholder involvement do not support effective 
implementation. 
 
The local content framework found in these legislative arrangements puts the onus on 
the government to take the necessary steps to help ensure value addition is given 
priority by the private-sector actors operating in the country (Arthur and Arthur, 2014). 
While the government oversees the implementation process, a Local Content 
Committee — comprising public- and private-sector stakeholders from government 
ministries, agencies and departments, NGOs, and operators, contractors, and sub-
contractors — coordinates and manage this process. The intent is to ensure a minimum 
of 5 per cent equity for local petroleum licences, permits, and contract operators, and at 
least 10 per cent equity for local providers of supplies and services. This should ensure 
local private-sector participation (Ministry of Energy and Petroleum, 2013). The 
framework also stipulates that within 10 years of the inception of a project, 90 per cent 
of the required services and supplies must be provided by Ghanaian individuals or 
companies and allowance (Asamoah, 2012). The government’s intent is to maximise 
value addition using local expertise, goods, and services, thereby creating jobs and 





According to the local content framework, every stakeholder (contractor, sub-contractor, 
authority, etc.) involved in the oil and gas sector must have an Annual Local Content 
Plan (similar to the five-year plans for the mining sector) for its projects, activities, 
operations, and transactions. Such a document must be updated and reviewed every 
year. The government provides fiscal incentives and rewards to stakeholders who 
exceed the goals laid out in their plan. The framework also encourages and promotes 
the participation of women in the sector, but does not provide further details.  
 
While Kayizzi-Mugerwa and Anyanwu (2015) argue that extractive companies would 
benefit from using local suppliers, six constraints  hamper their ability to be hired: (1) 
unable to produce goods and services at the required quality; (2) lack access to credit;; 
(3) inadequate regulatory and institutional environment; (4) lack appropriate skills; and 
(5) substandard infrastructure. Therefore, governance implementation challenges are 
not limited to the will to do so, but are equally hamstrung by very practical real-world 
challenges.  
 
One of the main goals of the PENG framework is to build skills capacity through 
education, technology transfer, and research and development — thereby helping to 
build institutional and organisational capacity, and competitiveness, of local businesses 
and industries related to the petroleum sector (Ministry of Energy and Petroleum, 2013). 
To support the capacity-building dimension of the policy, the framework suggests the 
establishment of a dedicated Oil and Gas Business Development and Local Content 
Fund, under the Ministry of Energy, which oversees education, training, research, and 
development. The framework also explains how the fund should be financed and 
maintained over time.  
 
While a recent assessment found that Ghanaian local content has moved in the right 
direction in terms of establishing and improving local polices, the absence of precise 
directions for local content policy implementation and operationalization, as well as the 
lack of a sound business environment for policies to be properly implemented, have 




capacity and technological skills remain inadequate to ensure the meaningful 
participation of local companies and lack of financial capacity penalises companies and 
local investment by forcing local companies to take on loans with high interest rates 
averaging 20–30 per cent. As Abor and Quartey underline, Ghanaian SMEs 
development is constrained by “a number of factors, such as lack of access to 
appropriate technology; limited access to international markets, the existence of laws, 
regulations and rules that impede the development of the sector; weak institutional 
capacity, lack of management skills and training, and most importantly finance” (Abor 
and Quartey, 2010). An assessment by the African Capacity Building Foundation 
concluded that local content requirements can have a positive role in driving economic 
transformation if they are aligned with the national development strategy and supported 
by capacity development efforts. Recommended junctures for effecting change include 
incentivising the private sector to help support local content policies through their design 
and implementation, building capacity to encourage local specialised companies to 
merge and apply for jobs in the oil and gas sector, and implementing capacity-building 
initiatives that target financial gaps, human capital deficits, and environmental problems. 
Importantly, the local content framework must enable policies to be adapted to current 
contexts and local and external changes over time.  
 
Technical Training and Education 
 
To help build individual capacity, some scholarships for Ghanaians to study abroad to 
gain specific skills in the oil and gas sector exist, but they are not well targeted. Plus, 
they do not lead to the development of technical schools in Ghana, and locals 
consequently are not a prominent part of service companies in Ghana (interview with 
Mr. Silas Olan'g, Natural Resource Governance Institute, 3 September 2015). Beyond 
academic degrees, external investments of $6 million have been used to develop the 
Jubilee Technical Training Centre at Takoradi Technical University, targeting 
intermediate technical skills (Takordi Technical University, 2016). The Centre is the first 
vocational training polytechnic in West Africa, offering accredited courses in technical 




engineering. In 2014, 16 students were studying at the Centre.12 These initiatives are 
certainly positive, but the number of Ghanaians trained here is too limited to have a real 
impact on increasing local capacities in the sector (Oxford Analytica, 2014). Besides the 
oil and gas sector, Ghana’s tertiary education system produces a high number of 
science, engineering, manufacturing, and construction graduates when compared to 
regional standards. Nevertheless, although these figures match the requirements of the 
labour market, graduate unemployment remained at around 50 per cent in 2015 (BMI 
Research, 2015). 
 
An additional, ongoing weakness in the local content framework is the vagueness of its 
monitoring and evaluation requirements. Arguably, the Ghanaian government has not 
made any effort to hold the private sector accountable because there is no 
comprehensive plan for meeting targets, especially regarding broader objectives of 
sustainable economic growth and stability. This gap creates the danger that local 
communities will become resentful and angry when extractive companies do not fulfil 
promises. The Petroleum Commission’s monitoring reports are not required to be public 
and, as indicated by the Ghana EITI, most information on the Ghanaian extractive 
sector is not directly available to the public. A way to solve this problem would be for 
Ghana to choose to make local content disclosures part of EITI reports. Ghana could 
draw on lessons from EITI’s innovative multi-stakeholder approaches (e.g., the Bayelsa 
Expenditure and Income Transparency Initiative in Nigeria’s Bayelsa state) to develop 
partnerships for local content monitoring and reporting. Ultimately, Ghana sits in the 
middle of the spectrum in terms of local content. In the future, it will be essential to 
ensure local content regulations are adhered to, especially in upstream activities. Also 
important is the promotion of backward linkages in Ghana’s mining and energy sectors, 
specifically the local impact of downstream refining, transport, distribution, marketing 
and sales processes, as well as mid-stream/side-stream sector activities from a holistic 
                                                             
12 All the information related to pedagogical, academic, and technical training activities in which Tullow Oil is involved 
are available at the Tullow Group Scholarship Scheme (see 





perspective. Bloch and Owusu (2012) argue that, rather than being an enclave activity 
as it is widely perceived, gold mining is deeply linked to the Ghanaian economy and 
backward linkages can likely be strengthened through policies and support. 
 
Impact on Beneficiation and Value Addition 
 
Beneficiation and value addition can also help ensure profits from the hydrocarbon and 
mineral sectors are maximised and utilised to benefit the stability and economic growth 
of the country as a whole. Beneficiation refers to any process, such as smelting, that 
helps produce the maximum value from a given raw material, while value addition refers 
to processes, such as special processing, manufacturing, or marketing, that increase 
the value of a product. Together they can stimulate industrialisation, employment 
creation, and economic growth when processes are conducted in-country to maximise 
local economic contributions. According to the Ghana Chamber of Mines, building a 
smelting plant for the West African region would be an asset for Ghana, making it a 
regional hub for copper production. Ghana is therefore considering importing raw 
copper from Zambia to produce copper electric cables (interview with Mr. Sulemanu 
Koney, Ghana Chamber of Mines, 3 September 2015). Similarly, the Precious Minerals 
Marketing Commission, the official authority for gold, diamond and silver, was building a 
large gold refinery in partnership with the Russian company Geo Professional Services 
Limited (interview with Mr. Simon Atebiya, Ghana Ministry of Lands and Natural 
Resources (Mines), 2 September 2015). The company’s managers were later arrested, 
and the company shut down due to illegal use of local mining licences (Ghana News 
Agency, 2017). Today, two gold refineries, Sahara Royal Gold Refinery and Gold Coast 
Gold Refinery, are smelting and refining raw minerals. For Ghana, this has already 
attracted international investors while helping to decrease illegal traffic in gold. Experts 
have noticed that value addition in gold and diamonds offers greater prospects than 
other minerals (Amoako-Tuffour et al., 2015). 
 
Beneficiation and value addition could certainly progress faster in Ghana, but the 




Trade and Industry is not directly involved, limiting the impact of policies (interview with 
Mr. Sulemanu Koney, Ghana Chamber of Mines, 3 September 2015). Consequently, 
efforts to advance private-sector development do not take into consideration 
beneficiation and local content requirements (interview with Mr. Silas Olan'g, Natural 
Resource Governance Institute, 3 September 2015). Nevertheless, Ghana is developing 
a comprehensive program on artisanal mining that addresses local content and 
beneficiation (interview, African Centre for Economic Transformation, 4 September 
2015). The Government recommended that mineral beneficiation should be part of the 
40-year National Development Plan for Ghana, which was launched in 2017. 
Considering the weight and strategic importance of the sector for the country, this is 
crucial but, according to the Ghana Chamber of Mines, its role is not properly 
recognised in the future development strategy (interview with Mr. Sulemanu Koney, 
Ghana Chamber of Mines, 3 September 2015). In fact, the Ghana Industrial Policy and 
the Industrial Sector Support Programme do not focus at all on minerals to optimise 
their potential. This is unfortunate, given that the mining and hydrocarbon sectors are 
not labour-intensive. Stimulating local content and, in turn, resource-based 
industrialisation and economic growth that involves agriculture, manufacturing, services, 
and tourism would  increase employment and, ultimately, result in socio-economic 
benefits such as poverty reduction as well as political stability. 
 
Impact on the Hydrocarbon Sector 
 
Before oil extraction began in 2010, the government held many consultative meetings 
with chiefs and affected community members to seek permission to use their land and 
catchment areas in the sea. At the Western Region House of Chiefs, chiefs requested 
that 10 per cent of natural resource revenues be given to the Western Region, since 
those resources were found in that region. In response, however, the government 
explained that natural resources belong to the state and will be used for the betterment 
of the entire country. A number of education initiatives in the region explained what 
would happen during the production phase, with companies entering the area, 




patrolling the sea. These discussions were held during the presidential elections of 
2008, during which all political parties redrafted their manifestos to link their messages 
to the potential and promise of natural resources, a tactic that generated grand 
expectations about jobs, incomes, and infrastructure across the country. 
 
Since those elections in 2008, government communication initiatives have failed to 
manage people’s unrealistic expectations of the possibilities offered by oil and gas 
(interview with Dr. Kwesi Aning, Kofi Annan International Peacekeeping Centre, 24 
February 2014). Indeed, despite drafting the Right to Information Bill in 2002, the bill 
has not yet been passed into law and stakeholders have repeatedly raised the issue of 
a lack of communication and information flow from the state (interview with Mr. 
Christopher Agyekumhene, Kumasi Institute of Technology and Environment, 27 
February 2014). In addition, the government has failed to raise awareness about the 
continued reliance on oil-driven growth at the expense of maintaining other sectors of 
the economy, such as agriculture. The government’s emphasis on oil-driven prosperity 
has been detrimental to the agricultural sector, with Ghanaians leaving the sector to 
seek jobs in the energy industry (interview with Dr. Elias Ayuk, UN University Institute 
for Natural Resources in Africa, 24 February 2014).  
 
The issue of land requires special attention, with tenure insecurity being a considerable 
problem (Arthur, 2012). People continue to sell their agricultural land for ASM, hoping 
that they will get more money that way. As a consequence, that land cannot be restored 
and reclaimed at a later stage (interview with Dr. Kwesi Aning, UN University Institute 
for Natural Resources in Africa, 24 February 2014). Moreover, young people who had 
been engaged in illegal ASM have been displaced following land disputes that have 
resulted in the establishment of large farms (interview with Dr. Yao Graham, Third 
World Network, 4 March 2014). Local chiefs have argued strongly that the government 
must review its communications on the subject (interview with Elias Ayuk, UN University 
Institute for Natural Resources in Africa, 24 February 2014). Outright land grabs by the 
Ghanaian government have been known to happen, too, with chiefs unaware of whose 




manage it on behalf of communities and investors often simply negotiate directly with 
the community leaders and traditional authorities, and then move straight into initiating 
projects on the ground (interview with Mr. Christopher Agyekumhene, Kumasi Institute 
of Technology and Environment, 27 February 2014). Permits are needed to mine, and 
chiefs are not allowed to give land for mining, but in some cases they have applied for 
these permits to mine themselves (interview with Mr. Sulemanu Koney, Ghana 
Chamber of Mines, 3 September 2015).  
 
In parallel, when the Ghanaian government established its oil and gas sector, it had 
neither the capital nor the expertise to effectively establish value-added and local 
development-facilitating legislative arrangements, limiting its ability to create a scope of 
action from the outset of extraction. As a result, concessions in contracts were generous 
for those who were willing to risk their investments. Moreover, the imperative among 
political elites to succeed in elections, together with structural inequalities between 
investors and the government, resulted in the negotiation of oil licences on terms 
favouring foreign-owned oil companies; longer-term planning decisions were 
deprioritised in favour of shorter-term gains (Mohan and Asante, 2015). Now that Ghana 
is a bona fide oil-producing country, the risk element has been significantly reduced. For 
the time being, few Ghanaian private-sector entities have the risk-taking potential to 
partner with foreign companies in the energy sector, which has resulted in the interim 
solution to promote the Ghana National Petroleum Corporation (GNPC). One observer 
noted that almost half of the funds received between 2011 and 2014, during a critical 
infrastructure building period, has been devoted to capacity building within the GNPC, 
with no details about these investments (interview with Dr. Franklin Cudjoe, IMANI 
Center for Policy & Education, 4 March 2014).  
 
Unfortunately, efforts by donors to improve governance, transparency, and 
accountability of both the Ghanaian government and private-sector actors are being 
duplicated, possibly establishing overlapping scopes of action to usher in restructuring: 
The World Bank, Switzerland, Norway, the United States, and the United Kingdom all 




For example, GIZ, the World Bank, and the United Kingdom provided $38 million to 
build institutional and human capacity in natural resources in Ghana. Unfortunately, 
funders had only put a roadmap in place, rather than a strategic plan, which was 
insufficient to carry out effective capacity-building initiatives. The United States, on the 
other hand, brought in advisers attached to ministries to guide natural resource 
governance. As a result of these initiatives, one observer suggested that Ghanaian 
government institutions have become complacent after being given significant amounts 
of funding from donors (interview with Dr. Allan Lassey, GIZ, 26 August 2015). 
 
Alongside oil and gas, the Ghanaian government has also committed to renewable 
energy development. The Energy Commission Act, 1997 (Act 541) established the 
Energy Commission, which has overseen regulations, management, development, and 
utilisation of energy resources, specifically acting as the technical regulator of Ghana’s 
electricity, natural gas, and renewable energy industries and as an advisor to the 
government on energy matters. Notably, it introduced the Strategic National Energy 
Plan 2006–2020, which outlines Ghana’s plan for sustainable energy production in a 
context of development-oriented policies (Arthur, Baidoo and Antwi, 2011; Gyamfi, 
Modjinou and Djordjevic, 2015). The Renewable Energy Act, 2011 (Act 832) established 
the country’s renewable energy regime, which includes obligatory schemes and 
provisions such as feeding tariffs. The regime seeks to create an enabling environment 
for investors through fiscal frameworks, and this has resulted in an oversubscription of 
interest in solar initiatives. Renewable energy, particularly solar options such as 
subsidised solar lanterns, offers the best decentralised approaches to electricity 
generation for communities that cannot currently be reached by grid extension. Ghana 
has already committed itself to the development and integration of renewable energy 
into its energy mix, with renewables currently accounting for more than 70 per cent of 
the mix through the use of biomass, mainly from wood fuels, and approximately 70 per 
cent of electricity generated by hydropower. Hydroelectricity is a priority option going 
forward, since it has additional benefits such as supporting river transport, fishing, 
agriculture, and irrigation. However, from a micro-economic perspective, the adoption of 




and the inability of end users to pay such fees, which has led to the introduction of grant 
facilities and loan schemes to offset risks for the private sector (interview with Wisdom 




Corporate Social Responsibility and Local Content 
 
Governments have a commitment to their citizens to hold companies and, in particular, 
foreign-owned enterprises accountable to good corporate practices, the latter defined 
through a governance-created scope of action in relation to context and the needs of 
specific countries. Today, oil revenues are not necessarily contributing to poverty 
alleviation and sustainable growth (interview with Dr. Kwesi Aning, UN University 
Institute for Natural Resources in Africa, 24 February 2014). As natural resources do 
have the ability to promote sustainable development, peace, and stability for a broader 
segment of the population through political balance, meaningful collaboration in 
resources governance is key. The resource curse does not need to be the norm. 
Rather, as in Ghana, resource extraction can lead to economic growth and contribute to 
achieving a country’s economic priorities — there are resource blessings. Of course, 
Ghana is by no means a perfect example, as corruption, mismanagement, and poor 
practices have been and continue to be a hindrance. Under a functional and effective 
natural resources governance system that encourages a sense of obligation to exercise 
sustainable economic development, foreign-owned enterprises can effect growth 
through taxes, royalties, and so on. But transforming economies fully and pulling people 
out of poverty can only happen when there is a critical effort to promote secondary 
industries that rely on or feed into the mining/hydrocarbon sectors to generate 
employment opportunities for communities and revenues for the country.  
 
Foreign-owned enterprises have a responsibility to contribute to the national wellbeing 
of resource-rich countries. Indeed, emergent literature argues that private-sector actors, 




facilitating development, often assuming this responsibility from ill-equipped government 
and traditional donors (Black and O’Bright, 2016; Ite, 2016). 
 
In contrast, mining companies and some observers have argued that it is the 
responsibility of the Ghanaian government, not the job of the private extractive sector, to 
invest in and improve the livelihood of communities through sustainable economic 
growth. Arguably, the government should be targeting the revenue from royalties for 
community development, which is currently missing. Royalties going back to 
communities are usually channelled to community leaders, district chiefs, or local chiefs 
who use it for private expenditures and not necessarily for the benefit of their respective 
communities. Mining companies should also have a say in how the government targets 
royalties to increase oversight, linkages, and integration. For instance, the mining sector 
could have a positive and direct effect on building individual human capacity. Indeed, 
research findings by the African Development Bank show that new revenues from the 
extractive sector in Ghana could help fill most of the funding gap in the country’s 
education sector (Toigo, 2015).  
 
Thanks to improved legislation and governance, all Ghanaian mining companies now 
have CSR agreements, outlining community-driven sustainable development projects 
that involve employment, infrastructure, protection of natural resources, and cultural 
heritage. Gold mining companies are involved in public-private partnerships and multi-
stakeholder initiatives that include community representatives, NGOs, traditional 
authorities, political leaders, and youth (ACET, 2015). These arrangements remain 
substantially weak and should not be left to mining companies alone (Andrews, 2016). 
The social and economic activities produced under these agreements should be aligned 
with broad national development plans as much as possible. Hoping to transform the 
CSR landscape, the Ghanaian government is currently preparing a CSR policy that 
challenges, but not compels, companies to respond to these imperatives (Government 
of Ghana, Ministry of Trade and Industry, 2014), but the policy does not have any legal 




CSR will remain important, but it is crucial to move from voluntary to mandatory 
initiatives to make companies more accountable.  
 
Given the generous fiscal and other incentives for the mining sector, the government 
has come under increasing scrutiny to institute sustainable resource management 
policies — the institutionalization of a scope of action. To promote accountable business 
practices at both the national and local levels and to maintain stable relations between 
community members and the private sector, the Ghanaian government must effect 
change. It can do so by signing more advantageous contracts and holding strong 
negotiations that ensure social and human security and compliance with progressive 
environmental laws to protect communities from unforeseen circumstances. The 
government must also demonstrate to communities that Accra will stand up for them 
when either foreign or local corporations break laws. Calls for reforms in this regard 
have come amid unacceptable socio-economic and environmental impacts linked to 
mining companies’ operations, including high poverty rates and loss of land in ASM 
communities (Hilson, 2002). In this vein, some observers have suggested establishing a 
Mining Common Fund to support and develop mining-affected areas, as well as to put in 
place inclusive planning and decision-making structures in addition to the introduction of 
a sound mining policy framework (Boon and Ababio, 2009). 
 
Stakeholders have also discussed the possibility of developing CSR guidelines for 
Ghana as a whole (interview with Mr. Christopher Agyekumhene, Kumasi Institute of 
Technology and Environment, 27 February 2014). One observer argued that the 
government should make a conscious effort to communicate how oil revenues are being 
used to implement development initiatives and to limit Ghana’s borrowing dependency 
(interview with Dr. Abeeku Essuman-Johnson, Department of Political Science, 
University of Ghana, 28 February 2014). The approach would help generate information 
about local content, beneficiation, and value addition potential, provide options for 
sustainable development, and reveal why resources and development activities are not 
producing the expected outcomes. In addition, it would add further pressure, from a 




these outcomes. It is important to identify and address binding constraints on both 
sectors, specifically within their value chains. Importantly, limiting the socio-economic 
and environmental negative impacts requires that all stakeholders embrace 
responsibility for enforcing human rights (Owusu-Koranteng, 2005), gender diversity 
(Osei-Assibey, 2014), and labour and environmental norms and standards. 
 
In light of the fact that private-sector actors are the drivers of economic activity and 
development in developing countries, Asamoah (2012) states that local content policies, 
in conjunction with stronger CSR frameworks for external private-sector actors, 
particularly foreign-owned, typically include the development of local skills, technology 
transfer, employment of local workers, and local manufacturing — with the aim to build 
a skilled labour force that can compete as a supplier base. Local content policies that 
promote capacity building, spur the creation of small- and medium-sized enterprises 
(SME), and promote local products and services do help provide jobs to local 
populations and help keep wealth within a country’s borders. They also generate 
opportunities for regional integration and trade — thus gradually reducing dependence 
on external aid. Barriers to local content development can include lack of infrastructure, 
inefficient business licensing, pre-qualification and certification procedures, shortages of 
skills and strict regulations on labour migration, and low access to credit, all of which 
increases costs for local enterprises. In this vein, the Ghanaian government has 
introduced local content policies for both the mining and energy sectors — but more 
could be done. 
 
Georgette Barnes Limited (GBL) is an example of local content in the Ghanaian mining 
context and more widely in West Africa. GBL is a drilling supply company created in 
Accra in 2009 by its CEO Georgette Barnes Sakyi-Addo and operating in West Africa. 
GBL supplies drilling muds and consumables to the exploration industry. These are 
industry-specific products that cannot be used for other purposes, but such locally 
owned businesses have great value in promoting local content. They lead to more 
beneficiation, with Ghanaians learning procedures and developing skills while 




local content adds considerably to the mining industry in terms of training. It also 
generates employment and income. According to Sakyi-Addo, local content should be 
supported by the private sector, including foreign-owned companies. The government 
needs to empower local mining supply companies like GBL and compel foreign-owned 
mining companies to source their products from them, even at a premium cost, rather 
than directly from the global market.  
 
The poor state of infrastructure — an obstacle to investment in the country — will likely 
be at the core of the Ghanaian government’s Long-Term National Development Plan for 
Ghana (2018–2057) (Abubakari et al., 2018). As part of its strategic drive toward 
industrialisation, the government is looking to ensure that the country’s energy 
requirements are met by 2018 (interview with Minister Ekwow Spio-Garbrah, Ghana 
Ministry of Trade, 2 September 2015). With respect to the management of the Ghana 
Infrastructure Fund’s board, opening up the membership to include the private sector 
would help to increase infrastructure financing, as companies appear unwilling to invest 
when they have no say in project management.  
 
The World Bank has acknowledged in interviews that Ghana’s laws are very positive but 
underlined the lack of implementation. Overall, Ghana’s security and political stability 
provide for a safe environment for investments, but institutional reforms are deeply 
needed. Given this situation, the diversification of commodities would be beneficial 
(interview with Dr. Santiago Herrera, World Bank, 1 September 2015). Improvements 
should also be made by other actors, including international agencies — for instance, 
an improvement by the International Finance Corporation (IFC) to its Environmental, 
Health, and Safety Guidelines to enhance the level of protection in deep-water offshore 
oil and gas exploration (CAO, 2011; IFC, 2015). 
 
Development outcomes largely depend on how national and local government actors in 
resource-rich countries manage their relations with the private sector, especially foreign-
owned enterprises. The private sector has the potential to be the engine of growth in 




imposing strong, coherent, and strategic national and local governance structures that 
clearly define the role of foreign-owned enterprises in facilitating sustainable economic 
growth, peace and stability, and outlining their responsibilities to all stakeholders, 
including mining communities.  
 
Overall, the Ghanaian government has been working to promote peace and social 
cohesion in resource-rich communities by respecting local beliefs, attempting to 
produce clear communication strategies, and creating incentives for the private sector to 
be socially responsible. However, policy implementation gaps remain an issue. Much 
more time should be spent on identifying the gaps in policies and regulations, and 
initiating actions to remedy the problems. A larger issue is the lack of political will 
(interview with Dr. Kwesi Aning, Kofi Annan International Peacekeeping Centre, 24 
February 2014; interview, UN University Institute for Natural Resources in Africa, 24 
February 2014). 
 
In this context, it is also critical to consider implementing new ideas from the bottom up, 
drawing on the expertise of on-the-ground experts in Ghana, specifically regarding 
advocacy, community participation in decision-making, and monitoring frameworks 
(Owusu-Koranteng and Owusu-Koranteng, 2010; Kuyole, 2013; Owusu-Koranteng, 
2013). Importantly, community service organisations (CSOs) lack substantial support, 
specifically in terms of resources and technical knowledge, to effectively participate in 
natural resource governance. One promising avenue is that donors identify credible 
local NGOs and CSOs, design working documents collaboratively, discuss concepts 
and ideas, and then implement them. Such collaboration could start as a pilot program 
and then be scaled up (interview, GIZ, 27 August 2015). Within civil society, top-down 
and bottom-up strategies could be put forth by community groups and research 
institutions. CSOs and NGOs should have a larger voice in governance for such 









When it comes to Ghana’s performance in both the mining and hydrocarbon sectors, 
the national government could improve efforts to turn natural resource revenues into 
sustainable economic growth, human development, and political stability through the 
management of resources and institutional processes; channel funds to regions and 
various actors; and transfer funds into other forms of capital that are measurable assets 
to help build human capacity. Moreover, Accra should create evaluation tools to assess 
the impacts and shortfalls of initiatives and efforts every year beyond looking at 
extractive revenues nationwide. Specifically, the government needs to evaluate the 
effectiveness of initiatives and analyse whether these are meeting national priorities in 
line with national strategies. This is especially crucial, as there is mounting evidence 
that initiatives have not been effective and priorities are not being met (for instance, see 
IMANI Center for Policy & Education, 2013b). At the moment, political parties introduce 
their own manifestos and objectives and use these to decide how to channel resources.  
 
An additional major problem in Ghana — one that negatively affects priority spending by 
government on established national issues — is that public-sector expenditures are very 
high. An unsustainable percentage of government revenue is spent on salaries in line 
with increased revenues from oil, while reform efforts have slowed down despite 
ongoing development challenges and high internal and external unpaid debts (IMANI 
Ghana, 2012). For example, the IMANI Center for Policy & Education (2010a) 
advocated unsuccessfully against the introduction of the Single Spine Pay Policy in 
2010, arguing that this policy ignores the economic situation and rewards employees 
depending on their level of education. Channelling money into salaries also facilitates 
consumption rather than investment in much-needed human capacity-building and 
infrastructure. On top of that, there is low capacity for revenue collection. While 
corruption and lack of transparency in contracts can be problematic, the government is 
failing to collect revenue and foreign-owned enterprises are taking advantage of 
loopholes and leakages in the revenue collection system, both of which are reducing 




Elias Ayuk, United Nations University Institute of Natural Resources in Africa, 24 
February 2014). The government’s contracts with foreign oil companies need to be 
publicized while Accra should prevent further secrecy in contracts, opaque revenue 
payments, and any increase in spending when it enters into negotiations with foreign 
partners (Asamoah, 2013b). 
 
Moving forward, drawing on examples elsewhere, research should be initiated to 
determine how effective decentralisation and CSOs have been in Ghana.13 
Decentralisation should be evaluated in terms of legal/political structure, expenditure 
responsibilities, and revenue access (Dafflon and Madiès, 2013). Given how much 
power the government has in policy enforcement, it may be difficult to measure the 
performance of CSOs in terms of policy implementation. However, CSO performance 
could be categorised into various levels, such as the contribution to knowledge 
generation and the contribution of relevant resources during the deliberative and 
analytical stages of policy formation. Looking at the process and outcomes of law and 
policy implementation with the findings in mind could be fruitful (interview with Mr. 
Christopher Agyekumhene, Kumasi Institute of Technology and Environment, 27 
February 2014). At the same time, some CSOs, such as the Wassa Association of 
Communities Affected by Mining, focus on how Indigenous populations relate to mining 
companies and promote human rights education and advocacy. Their contributions 
should also be noted and evaluated at the outset. 
 
Therefore, even in a politically stable country such as Ghana, foreign-owned enterprises 
initiate conflicts in the natural resource sector that could be addressed by including 
whole communities and the people who live in affected communities. Issues such as 
conducting EIAs and paying adequate compensation to community members when 
necessary will be important. The government needs to remain vigilant when it comes to 
holding private-sector actors to account with respect to adhering to existing governance 
structures and ensuring the quality of their interactions with communities. Issues around 
                                                             




Free Prior Informed Consent Protocols would need to be closely examined to assess 
the extent to which private-sector actors are continually and adequately informing and 
getting the consent of resource-rich local communities on their investments and 
extractive activities. Equally important, government needs to assess to what extent 
these actors support the goal of the Political Economy of Natural Resources 
Governance framework — namely, a sustainable economic growth in social, economic 
and environmental terms.  
 
Based on community size, NGO observers recommend establishing guidelines to 
regulate interactions between public and private sectors, and the communities, including 
which representatives are involved in these interactions. This is in order to ensure 
genuine exchange with a relevant sample size within each community (interview with 
Mr. Christopher Agyekumhene, Kumasi Institute of Technology and Environment, 27 
February 2014). This issue of participation, at the centre of the new concepts brought by 
the author, should then by strengthen by the Ghanaians authorities to provide a strong 
and positive impact of governance in the natural resources sphere.   
 
The funding of social projects and activities at the local community level, coupled with 
mechanisms to ensure that revenue is channelled to nationwide social and economic 
initiatives, are critically important to the establishment of a positive corporate reputation, 
the creation of opportunities to boost sales, and the elevation of brand recognition. To 
date, mining companies have failed to recognise that CSR essentially refers to their role 
as development partners rather than to profit-making strategies, or that their mining 
activities may positively or negatively affect the environment, the society, and the 
economy.  
 
The ideal role of the private sector in natural resource governance in a stable country 
such as Ghana is to support efforts to establish sustainable economic development and 
political stability. However, Ghana falls short on many aspects, including the provision of 
a strong Political Economy of Natural Resources Governance framework that promotes 









With a population of approximately 6 million, Sierra Leone remains one of the world’s 
poorest countries in the world, ranking 179/188 on the UNDP’s 2016 Human 
Development Index (UNDP, 2016). Decades of economic decline — massive inflation 
climbed dramatically from 1.9 in 1967 to 14.7 per cent in 1983 and annual GDP 
declining from 3.7 to 1.9 per cent by 1983 — along with more than 10 years of civil war 
have had a dramatic negative impact on the economy. More than half the population 
lives below the $1.90/day international poverty line, earning less than $1.25 per day 
(Luke and Riley, 1989, 141; UNICEF, 2013b; Davies, 2003).  
 
Following independence in 1961, Sierra Leone eventually fell under the authoritarian 
rule of Siaka Stevens. As its first president from 1971 to 1985, Stevens increased his 
authority after transferring parliamentary rule to the presidential republic (Chege, 2002).  
 
While the country experienced moderate per capita GDP growth of 2.5 per cent 
between 1961 and 1970, the global oil crisis, combined with a negative balance of 
payments and rising inflation, resulted in a reversal of fortunes. At the time of Stevens’ 
retirement, Sierra Leone’s economy was in unstoppable decline. The Sierra Leonean 
civil war would begin in 1991 when the RUF initiated its uprising against the ruling 




Under Stevens’ rule, mining rights were used as a strategic tool to ensure the loyalty of 
supporters and to form armed illicit diamond mining groups,  comprising mostly 
unemployed youths who served as ‘presidential forces’ and intimidated political 




most important economic driver, peaked between 1960 and 1970, a period when only 
about half of the country’s diamond output was exported legally (Smillie, Gberie, and 
Hazleton, 2000).  
 
The Stevens’ autocracy resulted in the emergence of the Revolutionary United Front 
(RUF). Led by Foday Sankoh, the RUF was a loosely organised rebel group supported 
by several external actors, including the former Liberian president Charles Taylor. In 
supporting the RUF, Taylor aimed to overthrow the APC government and gain control of 
the country’s diamond-producing regions (Lancaster, 2007). Throughout the 1980s, 
continued economic troubles, including a highly overvalued domestic currency, fueled 
illegality within the mineral sector. During this time, state licensing of private diamond 
exports generated a payoff system between Stevens’ government and traders with 
foreign connections (Chege, 2002). Indeed, widespread corruption and economic 
mismanagement, which reduced the government’s ability to deliver social services, 
provide access to basic necessities, and create jobs, were the key triggers for the onset 
of civil war (Gberie, 2005). Since 1985, the sale of mineral prospecting rights on a 
covert basis to supporters by the incoming Momoh government that same year has 
resulted in less regulation of the diamond industry, with government revenues 
consequently declining even more and a deepening of the economic crisis (Davies, 
2003).  
 
After heavy fighting in a particularly violent setting with the widespread use of child 
soldiers (Richards, 1996; Hoffman, 2011) and much political turbulence, the civil war 
resulted in the deaths of an estimated 70 000 people and the displacement of 
approximately 2.6 million people (approximately half of the population). Following the 
end of the civil war in January 2002, general elections were held (Kaldor and Vincent, 
2006), with the SLPP under Kabbah gaining a landslide victory with 83 of 112 seats in 
parliament (African Elections Database, 2012). While the SLPP government was 
credited for its efforts to end the country’s civil war, it was also blamed for widespread 
corruption and economic mismanagement, particularly in the mineral and mining sector. 




the viability of sustained peace. Ernest Bai Koroma of the APC, a businessman turned 
politician, narrowly won the 2007 general election; his party gained a slight majority in 
parliament, securing 59 of 112 seats compared to the SLPP’s 43 seats (African 
Elections Database, 2012). Despite the widespread remobilization of former combatants 
as political tools, security was maintained in the country during the elections 
(Christensen and Utas, 2008).  
 
The period of APC rule was characterised by a dynamic increase in economic growth 
and transformation marked by a reduction in poverty and a shift to a market economy, 
which brought widespread support for Koroma. These changes were made possible by 
restoring relations with the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and other international 
donors, which led to a resumption of development assistance and increased technical 
assistance. This occurred despite problems faced by the government in satisfying donor 
and IMF conditionalities, especially in terms of enacting governance and 
macroeconomic reforms based on free-market principles, including moving toward a 
strong investment climate and limiting the economic role of the government 
(Bertelsmann Stiftung, 2014). The government instituted a new FDI policy, particularly in 
the mineral, hydrocarbon, and agricultural sectors, which emphasised these sectors and 
promoted the country as a stable investment destination relative to other conflict-prone 
states in the region (Bertelsmann Stiftung, 2014). Sierra Leone’s economic reforms 
advanced despite the bitter rivalry between Koroma’s APC and the SLPP. Owing to his 
rising personal popularity and the Party’s standing among the electorate, Koroma 
consolidated his grip on power by gaining re-election in the 2012 general election, with 
the APC and the SLPP obtaining 69 and 42 seats, respectively (EU Election 
Observation Mission, 2012).  
 
Quest for Inclusive Economic Transformation from Mining Extraction 
 
Although post-conflict Sierra Leone has not yet been able to convert its natural 
resources into sustained economic growth and development, effective governance of its 




and lasting peace and stability. With respect to natural resource extraction, foreign-
owned enterprises can play an important role in facilitating and contributing to post-
conflict reconstruction, economic transformation, and socio-economic development and 
in enhancing governance capacity. 
 
Starting in 2003, the Government of Sierra Leone embarked on its first post-conflict 
development programme, Sierra Leone Vision 2025. It established an ambitious long-
term framework for post-conflict reconstruction efforts aimed at sustained economic 
growth and human development within the context of a peaceful political landscape and 
stable macroeconomic environment, establishing a link between economic growth and 
private-sector actors, as well as the need for a robust scope of action (UNIPSIL, 2003). 
From a consultation process, strategic areas of focus were developed in concert with all 
relevant stakeholders (including the private sector and foreign-owned enterprises); 
these were meant to constitute the building block for government policies moving 
forward. Building on the Poverty Reduction Strategy Papers (PRSPs) I (2003-07) and II 
(2008–12), which together with the 2002 National Recovery Strategy focused on the 
promotion of post-conflict economic resilience, human rights, and service provision, the 
government embarked on the next five-year economic transformation programme for 
the country in 2013.14 PRSP III (2013–18), referred to as the Agenda for Prosperity, 
established clear goals and targets for the period, as well as the overall goal of 
obtaining middle-income status by 2035.  
 
The Agenda consists of eight central pillars: 1) diversified economic growth; 2) 
managing natural resources; 3) accelerating human development; 4) international 
competitiveness; 5) labour and employment; 6) social protection; 7) governance and 
public-sector reform; and 8) gender and women’s empowerment (Government of Sierra 
Leone, 2013). Integral to achieving the Agenda’s goals is the need to rapidly grow 
                                                             
14 The National Recovery Strategy’s four priority areas were: transforming and promoting community development; 
rebuilding state authority and state organisations; initiating economic reconstruction; and engaging in peace-building 




mineral production and exports, led by the private sector, in order to meet high global 
demand and garner favourable prices for the country’s precious minerals.   
The National Minerals Agency (NMA), established in 2012, is expected to take the lead 
in applying strategies aimed at maximising the benefits accrued from mineral resource 
exploitation while minimising negative social, political, and environmental effects, in 
effect actualizing and operationalizing the Vision 2025 within the mining sector. 
 
In terms of promoting diversified economic growth, the government has acknowledged 
that while mining activities are vital to the country’s reconstruction efforts and poverty 
reduction strategies, as are commodity exports, these alone will not fuel economic 
growth indefinitely, particularly if governance efforts are unable to manage private-
sector activities. The country would need to diversify (EIF, 2014). Ergo, the government 
aims to promote small-scale, large-scale, subsistence, and cash crop agriculture, as 
well as develop the tourism and manufacturing sectors. Efforts to date have included 
providing wider financial services to small entrepreneurs, improving infrastructure, and 
promoting greater participation of women in the economy (EIF, 2014).  
 
Economic indicators for Sierra Leone are promising. Since the end of the civil war, 
Sierra Leone experienced one of the highest GDP growth rates in West Africa, including 
growth of more than 7 per cent between 2004 and 2007, stable growth of 5.5 and 4 per 
cent in 2008 and 2009, respectively, and growth of 15.2 per cent in 2012, 16.3 per cent 
the following year, and 13.8 per cent in 2014 (World Bank, 2010; AfDB, 2014). The 
country’s GDP increased from $635.9 million in 2000 to $4.1 billion in 2013 (World 
Bank, 2015b) and $3.6 billion in 2016 (World Bank 2016).Today, GDP growth is 
stabilized around 6 per cent (World Bank, 2016). Gross national savings as a 
percentage of GDP increased from -7.5 per cent in 1999 to 13 per cent in 2012, 
although it has yet to reach pre-war levels of over 15 per cent (World Bank, 2009a, 
2011, 2015). Gross national income per capita increased as well from $150 in 2000 to 





Yet, despite these successes, Sierra Leone’s Human Development Index value of 0.420 
in 2014 — a slight increase from 0.336 in 2011 — remained below the regional average 
of 0.502 for the rest of sub-Saharan Africa (UNDP, 2014a). Challenges include 
continued socio-economic marginalisation of youth, economic mismanagement, and 
stagnation of government performance in various areas, including control of corruption 
(Kaufmann, Kraay, and Mastruzzi, 2007). This suggests that relatively strong economic 
performance over the past decade has failed to meaningfully improve the livelihoods of 
Sierra Leoneans, at least in the context of sustainable development — a key factor 
outlined in the Political Economy of Natural Resource Governance (PENRG) 
framework. The country appears to be a victim of the resource curse — unable to 
develop adequate governance structures that would enable it to benefit from the wealth 
of its natural resources and having failed to restructure/manage the actions of the 
private sector with respect to natural resource extraction.  
 
Evidently, the capture of mineral rents have helped the Government of Sierra Leone 
operate over time, but the informalisation of the mining sector coupled with the civil war 
have hampered the expansion of the private sector (an engine of growth for the 
economy) in the extractive industries — and thus its ability to contribute to the country’s 
sustainable growth, economic transformation, and post-conflict reconstruction. Stalled 
development aside, socio-political relations in the form of free and fair democratic 
elections and new development programmes since 2002 have largely improved in 
Sierra Leone in spite of the sordid legacy of over a decade of armed conflict (Berghs, 
2012). The removal of administrative barriers is a further attempt by the government to 
attract foreign investment, particularly in the natural resource, agricultural, 
manufacturing, and tourism sectors (EIF, 2014). However, while attempts were made to 
make it easier to conduct business in the country — elevating Sierra Leone’s position 
on the Ease of Doing Business Index (out of 183 countries) to 141 in 2012 from 160 in 
2008 (World Bank, 2011; World Bank, 2012a), These have been short-lived, with the 





Overall, the political landscape continues to be a challenge for foreign-owned 
enterprises. Sierra Leon’s potential to develop socially and economically is inexorably 
tied to not only political stability but its ability to govern its natural resources in such a 
way as to encourage the involvement of foreign-owned enterprises in ongoing peace-
building and reconstruction efforts. 
 
Role of the Private Sector in Peace-Building and Reconstruction Efforts  
 
Since the end of the civil war, the Sierra Leone government has made progress in 
removing administrative obstacles in an attempt to attract foreign investment. This is 
reflected in the country making the 2010/11 Doing Business list of top 10 business 
reformers (World Bank, 2012a).  
 
Much work remains, however, in this post-conflict environment to eliminate the 
obstacles that seriously hamper both the level of investment that can be leveraged from 
foreign-owned enterprises and the country’s long-term economic stability.  
 
Obstacles that continue to deter foreign investors include the severe shortage of skilled 
workers and managers, rampant corruption, minimal infrastructure, cumbersome 
customs procedures, a weak judiciary, the absence of an effective land titling system, 
and an underdeveloped banking system (Collier and Duponchel, 2013), not to mention 
a nationwide lack of electricity and telecommunications infrastructure and a poor 
national water supply (United States Embassy, 2011). Another problem arises when 
corporations that operate and invest in Sierra Leone do not live up to their potential. 
According to civil society reports, many foreign-owned enterprises neither engage civil 
society nor contribute to ongoing conflict resolution efforts that would foster mutual trust 
and social capital among workers within the communities in which they operate 
(CIVICUS, 2006). Tax revenue from mining activities in particular has the potential to 
strengthen the government’s ability to provide services but could lead to dependency on 
the mining industry at the expense of growth in other sectors. On the domestic front, a 




reserves and access to credit, and a lack of capacity needed to tap into investment 
opportunities hamper private-sector investment.  
 
Efforts to improve the investment climate should focus on political stability, prudent 
fiscal discipline, greater personal security, and liberalisation of the economy. These 
should be pursued alongside macroeconomic reforms that impose greater transparency 
and accountability upon public servants and foreign-owned companies. Such reforms 
are needed to ensure proper governance procedures as well as post-conflict 
reconstruction — which, collectively, are integral to the successful management of 
Sierra Leone’s economy. In light of Sierra Leone’s politically fragile and economically 
vulnerable state, there is a need for external financial and technical support, including 
from private-sector actors, to sustain peace-building and reconstruction efforts. To 
answer the IMF conditionalities, the government of Koroma launched a national 
privatisation programme to privatise many state-owned enterprises; this measure may 
well serve to spur on the development of the private sector (Bertelsmann Stiftung, 
2018). The process represents a cornerstone of the government’s strategy for national 
development, which will lighten the burden on government finances while stimulating 
the economy and creating jobs. However, any effort at resource governance must link 
liberalisation and investor-friendly policies with corporate social responsibility, so as to 
encourage local beneficiation and value addition, domestic retention of revenues, 
localized development, and environmental sustainability (Campbell, 2012).  
 
Interviews with key policy-makers, donor community members, and private-sector 
actors, conducted between March and April 2014, highlight the current challenges the 
government faces in mobilising international and domestic private-sector resources in 
order to promote sustainable, broad-based growth and poverty reduction. These include 
the need to: 
• Strengthen domestic resources mobilisation and absorption capacity with regard 
to foreign direct investment (FDI), remittances, and development assistance. 
Specifically, the government needs to address issues pertaining to the capture, 




investment by foreign-owned enterprises in local economies, and higher tax 
revenues from the mining sector. 
• Boost capital inflows, especially from the mining sector, and ensure that revenue 
has economic transformation, post-conflict reconstruction, and developmental 
impacts, particularly in the areas of value addition, beneficiation, and the 
provision of decent work, which comprises safe working conditions and 
appropriate levels of payment. 
• Strengthen aid effectiveness and promote trade and market access for actors 
within the domestic private sector. 
• Institute steps to manage debt in an efficient and effective manner. 
 
These challenges are linked to Sierra Leone’s continued dependence on government 
and international institutional development assistance for its reconstruction agenda — 
and the reason behind the government’s emphasis on promoting FDI and private-sector 
development. In 2012, approximately 44 per cent of the estimated $1.92 billion for the 
implementation of the PRSP II was sourced from donors via budgetary support and 
other developmental assistance initiatives (PRSP, 2012). This continued reliance on 
development assistance for budgetary support constitutes a risk for Sierra Leone, as the 
country cannot depend on donors given the unpredictability associated with multilateral 
development cooperation, donor fatigue, and changes in donors’ bilateral policies and 
agendas (Sierra Leone UNDP, 2017; ActionAid, 2011; Kanyako, 2016). In this climate of 
uncertainty, there are opportunities for foreign-owned enterprises to play an active role 
as partners in sustainable development, economic transformation, and reconstruction. 
Using public-private partnerships, for example, the Government of Sierra Leone has 
been looking at setting up a public-sector mandated unit charged with vetting some $1.7 
billion in unsolicited private-sector proposals (iMC Worldwide, 2017).  
 
Opportunities to expand the role of foreign investors and the domestic private sector are 
largely hindered by weaknesses and inaction at the governmental level due to limited 
financial resources and slow implementation of policies aimed at stamping out 




the national privatisation programme are designed to promote private-sector 
involvement but don’t go far enough to address current challenges, such as skilled 
worker shortages, insufficiently developed institutions and infrastructure, inadequate 
capital reserves and access to credit, and continued dependence on development 
assistance (Kargbo and Adamu, 2009; Johnson, 2011). Concrete policy options would 
help to improve natural resource governance in a way that increases the ability of 
foreign-owned enterprises to drive broad-based sustainable development, peace, and 
stability. 
 
Sierra Leone’s Mining Sector 
 
Conflict and Security 
 
Diamonds helped perpetuate decades of turmoil, civil unrest, smuggling, conflict, 
corruption, and environmental degradation in Sierra Leone. Although Collier (2000) did 
not factor diamonds into his econometric analysis, which informed his ‘resource curse’ 
argument, other scholars such as Lujala, Gleditsch, and Gilmore (2005) content there is 
a direct link between diamonds and violent conflict. They also indicate that the mining of 
primary diamonds (particularly kimberlite, which is prevalent in South Africa and 
Botswana), has had a smaller impact on the onset and prevalence of violent conflict, as 
primary diamonds are usually linked to more stable state systems and institutional 
support from government and private-sector actors. In 2001, le Billon presented a 
typology on the political economy of natural resources and specific types of conflict, 
suggesting: 
“… a point resource may be more easily monopolised than a diffuse resource, but that 
its desirability usually makes it vulnerable to contestation and often depends on 
international recognition for mobilising investors, hence the likelihood of coup d’état or 
secession as a function of relative proximity. Rewards from resource control are 
maximised by insurgents when resources are easily accessible and marketable and 




warlordism. Finally, proximate diffuse resources involving large number of producers 
would be more likely to lead to rebellion or rioting in nearby centres of power.” (572–73).  
 
The author also suggested that resource rents in dependent countries are the ultimate 
prize for achieving political control, sparking violent attempts at overthrowing existing 
regimes, as was the case with Charles Taylor in Liberia. Undoubtedly, resources can 
equally exacerbate greed among political elites (le Billon, 2001, 574). Finally, le Billon 
argues that resources can promote secession conflicts, motivating regions rich with 
natural resources to split from the larger geopolitical entity (le Billon, 2001, 574). 
Secondary diamonds, such as alluvial diamonds, play a significant role in the 
occurrence of certain types of civil war, such as the one that beset Sierra Leone (Lujala, 
Gleditsch, and Gilmore, 2005). They are easy for ordinary people and militias to retrieve 
and sell for arms to fuel violent conflict.  
 
However, according to one interviewee, a lesser known cause of Sierra Leone’s war 
was the collapse of the central authority and its “inability to deliver development,” which 
alienated young people and led to them being used by those in power to extend conflict 
and promote destabilization. (interview with Mr. Alimany Bangura, Director, Economic 
Policy and Research Unit, Sierra Leone, 27 February 2014). Another respondent 
indicated that the government failed to meet the mounting expectations placed upon it 
by the country’s large youth population, which was engulfed in a vicious cycle of 
unemployment and economic insecurity without any prospects of escaping abject 
poverty (interview with Mr. Alimany Bangura, Director, Economic Policy and Research 
Unit, Sierra Leone, 27 February 2014).  
 
In the years following the war, various donor agencies flooded the country with 
development assistance and foreign-owned enterprises staked claims in the diamond 
sector — fuelling hope. However, the expected development did not materialise, an 
outcome often blamed on the government and donors’ loss of confidence in 
development. One interviewee argued that blame can be laid on donors, who displayed 




need to restore electricity production (interview with Mr. Sheka Bangura, M & E Officer, 
Development Assistant Coordination Office, Office of the Vice President of Sierra 
Leone, 27 February 2014). With respect to oil, little movement has been made on 
drilling and production contracts (interview with Mr. Yero Baldeh, Resident 
Representative, African Development Bank Sierra Leone, 25 February 2014; interview 
with Mr. Ibrahim Ansu Bangura, Senior Macro Economist, African Development Bank, 
Sierra Leone, 26 February 2016), and given the decline in oil prices, it is now doubtful 
whether extraction and export of these off-shore discoveries will be commercially viable 
or profitable to investors.  
 
The mining sector has historically held a central position in Sierra Leone’s economy 
since the discovery of diamonds in the 1930s. Prior to the civil war, the sector 
accounted for 25 per cent of the country’s GDP on average (Maconachie and Binns, 
2007), and constituted some 70 per cent of foreign exchange earnings and 15 per cent 
of fiscal revenue (RWI, 2011). Decades of poor natural resources governance, however, 
resulted in a broad-based failure to restructure private-sector activities — leading to lost 
government revenues, a decline in living standards, particularly in mining communities, 
and environmental degradation. During the 1990s, the illicit sale of diamonds was a key 
source of funding for several warring factions. The RUF relied on the diamond trade to 
sustain its war campaign, while both government forces and rebels battled over 
diamond-abundant areas (Keen, 2005). Rebel commanders are believed to have 
profited immensely from the illegal diamond trade, pocketing approximately $200 million 
per year over the course of the war (Alao, 2007, 144).  
 
Today, about 14 per cent of the total workforce (UNEP, 2009) — 250,000 are employed 
as artisanal miners alone (McMahon and the CEMMATS Group, 2007) — depends on 
the mining sector for their livelihood.  After subsistence farming, the mining sector is the 
second largest employer in the country and Sierra Leone’s largest source of foreign 





Following years of misappropriation, exploitation, and mismanagement in the extractive 
sector, the government, in conjunction with donors, multilateral institutions, and private-
sector actors, has begun to implement measures aimed at promoting improved 
governance, transparency, and accountability. These include the introduction of a scope 
of action, rules, regulations, and policies designed to eliminate those factors that have 
destabilised the economy and perpetuated conflict (Kwamoto, 2012). However, 
progress has been hampered by the government’s continued emphasis on increasing 
revenue generated by the mining sector — which has only served to promote policies 
and pass legislation that have increased unregulated investment and activities, 
including by those same private-sector actors. (In fact, a growing number of African 
countries have relinquished control over their mining industries in favour of policies 
beneficial to private investment, particularly foreign.)  
 
In this vein, Sierra Leone’s Ministry of Mines and Mineral Resources (MMMR) — 
previously called the Ministry of Mineral Resources and Political Affairs (MMRPA) — 
has been accused of issuing licences that carry few regulatory restrictions. It has also 
faced allegations that it has not held foreign actors suitably to account, despite knowing 
that some minerals were below the prerequisite marketable grade for exports (MMRPA, 
2009). Even with a strengthened scope of action, the MMMR has been unable to fully 
restructure the activities of private-sector actors in the mining sector, largely due to 
capacity constraints and infighting.  
 
Despite these challenges, diamonds will likely remain key to post-conflict reconstruction 
efforts currently under way in Sierra Leone, given their role in funding the civil war in the 
first place (Reno, 1997; Smillie, Gberie, and Hazelton, 2000; Hirsch, 2001; Maconachie 
and Binns, 2007). According to a report compiled by the World Bank (2009), the 
country’s post-conflict management framework was established on three major pillars: 
(1) the Kimberley Process Certification Scheme (KPCS), which is aimed at halting the 
trade in conflict diamonds and ensuring that diamond sales do not finance rebel groups 
that undermine the rule of law and legitimately elected governments; (2) the Diamond 




reallocating 0.7 per cent of the total export value of artisanal diamonds for distribution 
among chiefdoms across mining communities in the country; and (3) the surge in deep-
shaft kimberlite mining, which is encouraged by the government and expected to 
accelerate sustainable development. 
 
Recognizing that diamonds remain a conflict-sensitive resource, Sierra Leone has 
begun to encourage diversification in the mining sector, particularly in the production of 
iron ore, ilmenite, rutile, zircon, and gold, along with a shift from artisanal to large-scale 
mining. Currently, there are five large-scale mining companies in operation, two others 
at an advanced stage of commencing considerable gold mining operations, and there 
are 186 companies at the exploration phases, as well as 12 small-scale mining 
companies in operation. One major company is Tonkolili Iron Ore Ltd., formerly owned 
by London-based African Minerals Ltd. and now the property of the Chinese Shandong 
Iron and Steel Group Co Ltd., one of the world’s largest steel producers. Tonkolili is 
building a major 200-kilometre-long railway between the extractive site and Pepel Port, 
at an investment of US$ 1.5 billion (Cornish, 2013; The Guardian, 2018; Bloomberg, 
2018).  
 
As a result of increased investments by foreign enterprises in these other raw 
commodities, total diamonds exports dropped from 41 per cent in 2006 to 29 per cent in 
2011. In nominal terms, diamond exports dropped to $80 million in 2009, down from 
$125 million in 2006 and $140 million in 2007 (MMMR, 2015), before increasing to $221 
million in 2014 and $158 million in 2016 (Kimberley Process, 2018). This decline 
resulted in significantly reduced government revenues, with most earnings now coming 
from a 3 per cent export duty (MMMR, 2010). Meanwhile, total exports of titanium ore 
and concentrate rose to 29 per cent from 11 per cent over the same 2006–11 period 
(EIF, 2013).  
 
Increased global demand and favourable commodity prices have helped to promote the 
exploration and production of minerals other than diamonds, with the mineral sector 




2013). The short- and medium-term economic potential of the mining sector is greater 
than that of any other sector — and if the conduct and contribution by foreign-owned 
enterprises are governed appropriately, to the sector will undoubtedly have the most 
immediate and widespread impact on poverty reduction over the medium term.  
 
The government has made it a priority to revisit mining agreements and policies in order 
to generate more revenue — a key factor in  achieving sustainable economic growth, 
peace, and stability (State House, Republic of Sierra Leone, 2012; interview with Mr. 
Kawusu Kebbay, Director, Development Assistance Coordination Office, Office of the 
Vice President of Sierra Leone, 27 February 2014; interview with Dr. Osman Gbla, 
Dean of the Faculty of Social Sciences, Fourah Bay College, University of Sierra Leone, 
3 March 2014). The government established a task force in 2008 to examine the mining 
sector and generate recommendations, which included the revision of its Mining Law 
and the establishment of the National Mining Agency (NMA). The approval of a 
transformation plan to restructure institutional arrangements for the sector will result 
in better-organised institutions aimed at building capacity, improved governance, 
accountability and transparency, and greater facilitation of investment. In March 2018, 
Sierra Leone’s newly elected president, Julius Maada Bio, criticized the lack of 
transparency, by his predecessor, Ernest Bai Koroma, and called for an immediate 
review of both the 2009 Mines and Minerals Act and the individual licences of mining 
companies (Reuters, 2018).  
 
Legal and Regulatory Framework 
 
Currently, the Ministry of Trade and Industry provides policy direction, while the NMA 
implements and sets standards for the regulatory framework. One interviewee noted 
that the framework remains weak and is easily exploited (interview with Coordinator, 
Enhanced Integrated Framework National Implementation Unit, Sierra Leone Ministry of 
Trade and Industry, 25 February 2014). The same individual also asserted that bribery 
is common, given that low-paid officials handle large sums of money and are constantly 




view is supported by the World Bank in its 2013 report The Political Economy of 
Extractives Governance in Sierra Leone, which notes that the heads of Sierra Leone’s 
directorships of Mines and Geological Surveys are presently housed within the NMA 
and have seats on the country’s Minerals Advisory Board (MAB). Such a significant 
conflict of interest means that technical advice provided by NMA officials, who are 
charged with upholding and enforcing the regulatory framework, is subject to being 
overturned by political appointees to the MAB. Correspondingly, the report notes that 
even though one of the NMA’s functions is to promote the needs of communities, 
including the sound administration of Community Development Agreements (CDAs), the 
NMA does not have the resources or staff dedicated to delivering that portion of its 
mandate (Fanthorpe and Gabelle, 2013). 
 
Despite this, several interviewees perceived the NMA in a positive light (interview with 
Mr. Andrew Keilli, Director, CEMMATS Group, Sierra Leone, 25 February 2014). One 
official called for more ingenuity in policy-making that opens doors to other sectors and 
avenues for revenue (interview with Mr. Sahr Wonde, Director General, National Mineral 
Agency, 25 February 2014). Interviewees also claimed that in order to further improve 
policies and negotiation positions vis-à-vis mining companies, the government needs to 
perform detailed land surveys to confirm which resources are available, where they are 
located, and who owns the relevant land (interview with Hon Abdul Koroma, Deputy 
Minister, Sierra Leone Ministry of Mines and Mineral Resources, 26 February 2014; 
interview, 28 February 2014). This point plays into a wider analysis of what must be 
done to ensure sustainable and broadly beneficial economic development in Sierra 
Leone. Better land surveying by the government complements conditions identified in 
the African Development Bank Group’s 2013 report Green Growth Sierra Leone. This 
report notes that clarifying land tenure and land rights, strengthening public 
procurement, and providing improved, publicly available social, economic, geographic, 
and environmental data and information sources are essential to the implementation of 





Interviews with academics, civil society representatives, and policy-makers also  
highlight positive views of President Koroma, who, in light of his private-sector 
background,  promised to lead the country “like a business” (interview with Mr. 
Raymond Gbekie, Director, Investment Promotion, Sierra Leone Investment and Export 
Promotion Agency, 26 February 2014; interview with Mr. Samuel Braima, Senior Officer, 
Sierra Leone Port Authority, 27 February 2014). Interviewees pointed to several positive 
presidential projects, including the restoration of electricity to Freetown after a disruption 
caused by a broken shaft in the Bumbuna Dam, the introduction of solar-powered 
streetlights in provincial towns, and free health care to lactating and pregnant women 
and to children under five (interview with Mr. Claudi Ferrer, Economic, Trade and 
Regional Cooperation Section, European Union Delegation to Sierra Leone, 27 
February 2014).  
 
Working with donors and multilateral institutions such as the International Monetary 
Fund (IMF), the government formulated the Extractive Industries Revenue Bill, which is 
designed to establish a new taxation regime for extractive industries. Tax and non-tax 
rules have been combined into a single legal instrument and a resource rent tax on all 
windfall profits has been introduced. This Bill has generated positive results. In 2011, 
the government reported earnings of $27.6 million, amounting to approximately 11 per 
cent of total natural resource exports, compared to an annual average of 4.2 per cent 
between 2006 and 2010 (SLEITI, 2011). Revenues amounted to $7.2 million in 2006, 
and increased to $10.2 million the following year (EITI, 2010).  
 
Although this would seem to be a positive step toward maximising the potential of the 
mining sector and its contribution to the country’s economic reconstruction efforts, 
natural resource revenue is still well below that which mining communities and civil 
society groups have called for in light of the fact that the proportion of total government 
revenue from mining amounts to a mere 5 per cent. For a resource-rich country that 
requires significant revenue to finance post-conflict reconstruction, this is far from 





The private sector — foreign-owned enterprises in particular — continues to be blamed 
for not doing enough to advance the government’s socio-economic development plans 
and is viewed with suspicion by both civil society and some government officials. Part of 
this problem stems from continuing legislative and regulatory challenges associated 
with revenue generation from the natural resource sector. While the government 
attempts to introduce new transparent regulations for companies interested in investing 
in the country, original agreements need to be allowed to run their course (interview with 
Mr. Christian Hallum, Program Advisor, IBIS Sierra Leone, 26 February 2014). Having 
many different standards for companies operating in Sierra Leone has placed the 
country in a precarious situation. Consequently, the government is not only facing 
strong opposition from those same foreign-owned enterprises but also runs the risk of 
those companies migrating to other resource-rich countries.  
 
Another issue involves corporate income taxes. Tax losses are pegged as high as 
between $240 and $270 million (interview with Mr. Santiago Herrera, Lead Economist, 
World Bank Sierra Leone, 26 February 2014; interview with Mr. Alvin Hilaire, Resident 
Representative, IMF Sierra Leone, 27 February 2014) due to tax evasion and the 
informal market for artisanal mining (Steinweg and Römgens, 2015, 13; Sidi Bah et al., 
2010; interview with Mr. Fredline M'Cormark-Hale, Director, Policy and Research, 
Institute for Governance Reform, 25 February 2014). Since the beginning of 2015, 
companies have been required to pay the 30 per cent corporate income tax (interview 
with Mr. Richard Hogg, Head of Office, DFID Sierra Leone, 26 February 2014). Property 
tax evasion is also common, and misunderstandings are frequent when local councils, 
to which property taxes are owed, are not informed of companies’ property tax 
exemption agreements with the national government (interview with Ms. Grace 
Macauley, Program Officer, EIF-NIU, Sierra Leone Ministry of Trade and Industry, 26 
February 2014). 
 
Mining companies, mostly foreign, are further being accused of environmental 
degradation associated with large-scale, formal mining. They have been implicated in 




and in areas of resettlement, to loss of livelihoods among farmers who lose their land, 
and to increasing land and surface rents. Mining community members argue that 
surface rents have been disproportionately distributed among a select few stakeholders, 
including local councils, paramount chiefs, and national government agencies, with little 
filtered down to community members. Indeed, interviewees in mining communities 
complain about the misuse of these funds by these stakeholders in the form of 
kickbacks (interviews with mining communities in Kono, Tonkolili, and Port Loko 
Districts, 3–6 March 2014). Another argument is that the paramount chiefs’ share of 
surface rent is too large and exact amounts have often been either hidden or 
inaccurately reported.  
 
Meanwhile, other mining community members believe that local councils often receive 
the lion’s share of the surface rent paid by foreign-owned enterprises. This is particularly 
troubling, given that in the eyes of many community members, these local councils have 
little influence in their communities and are often not accountable to their constituencies. 
They are viewed with great suspicion by community members — which is troubling 
given the increased likelihood of dissatisfaction, instability, and reversal of post-conflict 
reconciliation among members of mining communities, where tensions have been rising 
and opportunities for increased violence are thought to be high. Although the distribution 
of surface rent takes place via a process that involves the national government, 
paramount chiefs, and local councils, community leaders do not appear to be involved 
in the distribution. Furthermore, no clear procedure could be determined that could 
explain how final decisions on the distribution of surface rent are made — giving rise to 
concerns about the opaque nature of the entire process.  
 
In light of the lack of social services and the poor quality of infrastructure, as well as the 
government’s inability to create sufficient employment opportunities for the thousands of 
youth entering the workforce (Enria, 2018). Calls for accountability in CSR were also 
frequent, with one respondent suggesting the need for an independent monitoring 
organisation. Community representatives noted that mining companies have destroyed 




children to school after a company created difficulties by rerouting roads, the company 
did not provide help (interview with mining community leaders in Lunsar, 26 February 
2014).  
 
This is particularly relevant given the foreign-owned private sector’s inability to meet 
these expectations due to the limitations of their operating requirements and their 
shareholder and legislative obligations. Before the enactment of the Mines and Minerals 
Act in 2009, there were no rules in place requiring foreign-owned enterprises to adhere 
to any CSR principles relating to social service delivery or infrastructure development 
projects in the communities in which they operate. Companies were often free to 
formulate their CSR commitments with little or no oversight and limit the amount of 
funding and technical support that could be funnelled directly toward sustainable 
economic transformation and post-conflict reconstruction and stabilization. Despite the 
fact that the legislation has terms obligating such companies to adhere to CSR and 
related initiatives, there appears to be no enforcement from the government when it 
comes to unfulfilled commitments or promises made by the private sector to mining 
communities.  
 
These limitations have been corroborated by Kaldor and Vincent (2006), Maconachie 
(2012), and Fanthorpe and Gabelle (2013). Furthermore, there is no monitoring by or 
coordination with donors and national government agencies such as the NMA, and CSR 
programmes are not necessarily linked to community development initiatives and local 
needs — in fact, they are often divorced from national development priorities. Moreover, 
many companies operating in Sierra Leone appear to be intending to reduce or remove 
the legally binding terms that compel them to adhere to CSR initiatives, and are 
increasingly demanding involvement in the creation of new legislation (interview with 
Ms. Aminata Kelly-Lamin, Regional Programme Director, Network Movement for Justice 
and Development [NMJD], 26 February 2014).  
 
When it comes to how mining revenue is managed, community development funds 




elites within the government and mining communities (interview with Mr. Alpha Sesay, 
Programme Director: Governance, IBIS West Africa, 25 February 2014). According to 
the UNDP, Sierra Leone has been mired in administrative mismanagement and 
corruption since the civil war, despite ambitious initiatives in mining governance. This 
has led to distrust of politics among the country’s citizenry, making the impetus to 
adhere to mining codes and legislation all the more imperative (Kaldor and Vincent, 
2007). Linked to the failure of CDFs, mining companies have recently been heavily 
criticized with regard to their local content (interview with Mr. Herbert M’Cleod, Senior 
Governance Specialist on Sierra Leone, 25 February 2014) and the fact that they have 
had too few positive impacts on communities (interview with Mr. Andrew Lavali, 
Executive Director, Institute for Governance Reform, Sierra Leone, 25 February 
2014).For any opportunities that have been created, the skills of the local people have 
not matched professional requirements due to education gaps (interview with Mr. 
Bernard Mokam, Head of Mission, UNDP, 25 February 2014).  
 
In an attempt to rectify this situation, the government recruited the services of the United 
Kingdom’s Department for International Development (DFID), along with those of GIZ 
and the International Finance Corporation (IFC), to study how the Local Content Policy 
is being applied. Although concrete figures were not provided, the government’s intent 
is  to significantly increase local content on an economy-wide basis by 2018 (DFID, 
2012). According to the representative of the Sierra Leone Chamber of Commerce, 
Industry and Agriculture, mining companies need to broaden CSR beyond philanthropic 
activities to include more tangible development initiatives identified by mining 
communities, including local content (Obalola, 2008). These initiatives should align with 
communities’ development, health, and education needs, and address government 
priorities as outlined in economic agendas. Despite the above, the potential and 
expected effects of the mining sector on the national economy remain a key subject of 
debate.  
 





The recent discovery of approximately 10.5 billion tonnes of high-grade iron ore 
deposits in the country’s Marampa, Tonkolili, and Bermbeye mines implies a significant 
increase in government revenue over the coming decades (GoSL, 2013). The expected 
economic impact of increased mining production and exports has spurred the 
government’s initiative to promote higher FDI and foreign-owned enterprise involvement 
in mining communities. Statistics indicate that by 2020, the country could be expected to 
export approximately $1.2 billion worth of mineral resources and retain approximately 7 
per cent of their value. If this money is used correctly, approximately 900,000 Sierra 
Leoneans could be lifted out of extreme poverty. Although this is an optimistic projection 
for the mining sector and a positive development with respect to mining companies’ 
contribution to economic growth and development, mining community leaders and civil 
society groups associated with the sector have been comparing Sierra Leone’s situation 
to those of other countries in Africa. For example, mining revenues in countries such as 
Tanzania and Ghana account for approximately 10 per cent of total government 
revenue (NACE, 2009). Revised assessments of revenue derived from minerals are 
needed in light of the recent collapse in world commodity prices, the suspension of iron 
ore mining following the Ebola outbreak in 2014, as well as the health care costs and 
economic losses associated with the outbreak. 
 
Sierra Leone’s mining sector has undergone significant changes since the civil war, with 
new minerals gaining ground on alluvial diamonds following the enactment of the Mines 
and Minerals Act in 2009. Yet these changes do not belie the ongoing development and 
security challenges that hinder sustainable development in the country. The mining 
sector still lags on key governance indicators despite improved socio-political relations 
in the country and the enactment of progressive legislation. Indeed, the challenges 
appear to dwarf the opportunities created by the expanding role of foreign-owned 
enterprises, with stakeholders providing insights into socio-economic dislocation, the 
failure of CSR to provide tangible development outcomes, and various interviewees 
revealing community resentment to the point of creating a potential for violence (Human 
Rights Watch, 2014). Given that sub-national governance and related CSR initiatives 




private sector plays a positive or negative role in driving sustainable economic growth, 
peace, and stability.  
 
There is clearly a need for more financing to support natural resources governance, but 
better oversight is a prerequisite for funding provision. It is also imperative the 
government address corruption at various levels of governance, as any changes in legal 
and regulatory frameworks have yet to meaningfully effect substantive change.   
 
Community Development Agreements in Mining Communities: An Entry Point for 
Restructuring Action 
 
Despite being deeply affected by mining operations, mining communities see very few 
dividends from extractive industries. As a result, these communities are increasingly 
putting pressure on the government to require the private foreign-owned sector to 
implement long-term local CSR initiatives as part of their business and sustainability 
strategies. 
 
Information gleaned from interviews with IBIS Sierra Leone, the CEMMATS Group, the 
Network Movement for Justice and Development, and the German Agency for 
International Cooperation (GIZ) suggests there is still much work to be done to address 
the concerns of mining communities, local councils, and civil society regarding the lack 
of direct economic impacts of CSR practices in Sierra Leone (interview with Mr. Allan 
Lassey, Senior Advisor, Extractive Resource Governance, GIZ, 4 March 2014). In its 
recent report on the Ebola response, the UNDP notes that foreign-owned enterprise 
assistance in developing sustainable economic opportunities in communities throughout 
Sierra Leone has been muted due to inadequate promotion of public-private 
partnerships and other CSR-related activities (UNDP, 2015b). However, it is important 
to note that this is not a uniform conclusion, as some businesses in Sierra Leone, 
including mining companies, have endeavoured to deliver direct, socio-economic 





Ultimately, critics associated with the problems of mining communities in Sierra Leone, 
including academics, development partners, civil society groups, local administrators in 
mining communities, mining communities, and government officials, complain of a lack 
of definition of CSR. They also note that CSR is typically practised when it is most 
convenient for a company to do so, which does not lead to sustainable progress 
(interview with Dr. Aisha Ibrahim, Senior Lecturer and  Director, Institute for Gender 
Research and Documentation, Fourah Bay College, University of Sierra Leone, 2 
March; interview with Mr. Yero Baldeh, Resident Representative, African Development 
Bank Sierra Leone; interview with Mr. Ibrahim Satti Kamara, Communications Manager, 
Sierra Leone National Minerals Agency). If CSR is poorly defined, does this indicate a 
wholesale failure of governance structures to determine the scope of action for the 
private sector, allowing the latter instead to dictate terms? Investigating the function of 
community development agreements (CDA) is a fruitful starting point to answer this 
question. 
 
CDAs are linked to the voluntary principles of CSR and function as a company-defined 
corporate responsibility arrangement for an area in which a company operates 
(O’Faircheallaigh, 2013; O’Faircheallaigh, 2015; Dupuy, 2014). They aim to promote 
greater transparency and accountability in the area of corporate practice, while allowing 
the private sector to develop a positive standing among its domestic and international 
stakeholders, maintain a social licence to operate within mining communities 
(Yakovelva, 2005; ICMM, 2012; World Bank, 2012c). They have two fundamental 
principles: (1) gradual strengthening of relationships between mining communities, 
mining companies, and civil society groups; and (2) support for and encouragement of 
mutually beneficial dividends from mining activities, including schemes designed to 
empower mining communities and provide them with alternate sources of income that 
may fall outside the immediate scope of a mining project (World Bank, 2012b).  
 
To date, CDAs represent the most ambitious attempt to hold mining companies 
accountable for their social responsibilities and for leveraging their technical and 




These agreements also facilitate foreign-owned enterprises’ contributions to Sierra 
Leone’s post-conflict peace-building and reconstruction efforts, particularly with respect 
to advancing pro-poor sustainable development initiatives in mining communities.  
 
There is an understanding on the part of the government that Sierra Leone’s fragile 
peace-building and reconstruction efforts could be jeopardized if adequate steps are not 
taken to address the grievances of mining communities. Indeed, at the community level, 
the promised benefits of natural resources exploitation have often failed to materialize, 
with governance systems being either unwilling or unable to require foreign-owned 
enterprises to meaningfully contribute to communities through CSR schemes or CDAs. 
Governance structures are only as effective as their implementation mechanisms. As 
such, the role of mining companies, particularly foreign-based, in the country’s current 
transformation process is paramount, given their fragile relationship with mining 
communities and the way these communities have become increasingly emboldened 
with the passing of new mining legislations. There remain, however, many shortcomings 
and challenges regarding the successful implementation of CDAs in Sierra Leone. For 
example, while the Mines and Minerals Act aims to empower mining communities 
entering into CDAs with mining companies, the legislation does not clearly indicate 
when and how such agreements should be constituted (Otto, 2017). As mining 
companies generate larger profits, citizens are increasingly demanding that the 
government legislates for “more equitable revenue-sharing codes and adopts a larger 
developmental role for the state” (Besada and Martin, 2013). 
 
The government has an interest in ensuring that mining revenue is shared and that 
mining companies provide social services and public goods — not only to retain power, 
but also to ensure peace and stability, all of which is cyclically reinforced through 
economic sustainability and growth (Hilson, 2012; Maconachie and Hilson, 2013; 
interview with Mr. Charles Mback, Project Manager, Local Governance & Economic 
Development, UNDP Sierra Leone, 4 March 2014). As an illustration of this trend, 
structured and unstructured interviews in 10 mineral-rich chiefdoms of the Kono, Port 




Area Community Development Fund (DACDF) to be the most important source of 
revenue.  
 
CDAs cover all minerals (including bauxite, gold, and iron ore), In contrast, DACDFs are 
restricted to diamond-producing areas. But most importantly, the DACDF structure 
dictates that all small- and large-scale mining companies must enter into agreements 
with mining communities to promote local development projects that community 
members have settled upon (Maconachie, 2012; Maconachie, 2011). Under this 
structure, of the 3 per cent in export taxes collected on artisanal diamonds each year by 
the state, 25 per cent is allocated to the fund to facilitate community-run development 
projects. Direct cash transfers to diamond mining communities are formally presented 
by local government officials and a representative of Sierra Leone’s Ministry of Mines to 
all those present at a chiefdom meeting.  
 
Specifically, DACDFs are disbursed to district and chiefdom councils as follows: 20 per 
cent collected in a given period is distributed among diamondiferous district councils; 20 
per cent to diamond mining chiefdoms with artisanal mining licences based on a flat 
rate, irrespective of the number of licenses held; remaining 60 per cent to chiefdom 
councils according to the number of artisanal mining licences they hold (World Bank, 
2009b). By 2007, the Sierra Leone government had received approximately $4.25 
million in diamond mining revenue, of which the DACDF distributed about $3.5 million to 
mining communities (Temple, 2008). 
 
According to the government’s DACDF operational guidelines, allocated monies are not 
automatically distributed to chiefdoms. Projects must be defined and approved prior to 
fund dispersal (Ministry of Mineral Resources, 2008, 3). For chiefdoms, the following 
requirements must be met: 
1. Each chiefdom must form a project committee with at least five residents elected 




2. The committee solicits project ideas from the community, with priority given to 
those that demonstrate effectiveness, impact, sustainability, feasibility, 
partnership with other funding sources, and a balanced portfolio. 
3. The project committee then completes and submits a project proposal to a 
chiefdom committee for consideration against broader appraisal criteria and 
specific development plans. 
4. The chiefdom committee sends selected project proposals to a district-based 
review committee for approval or rejection. 
5. Once summary reports from district committees have been received and vetted 
by relevant government departments, cheques are issued from the DACDF. 
6. Projects are monitored and audited (Ministry of Mineral Resources, 2008, 3–15).  
 
Although participants interviewed as part of this study credited some paramount chiefs 
and local councils with the sound management of funds and financing of important local 
development projects, the initiative has been hindered and somewhat compromised by 
reported incidents of cronyism, bribery, and fraud (Maconachie, 2012). Allegations of 
fund misspending and misappropriation and the refusal by national government officials 
to accept responsibility resulted in the suspension of the disbursement of funds in 
December 2006 (MMMR 2009; interview with Mr. Rashid Sesay, Regional Direcor, 
HEIFER, West Africa, 5 March 2014). A lack of citizen participation in the decision-
making process with regard to fund allocation, as well as a lack of community 
awareness about the nature of the fund and its intended use, could also explain in part 
the challenges that have accompanied the management of the DACDF.  
 
It is also important to note that mining companies operating in Sierra Leone have taken 
issue with what they see as unfair expectations levied upon them by mining 
communities and various levels of government. This is particularly true of small-scale 
mining firms, which believe that their obligations to local communities should consist of 
adhering to laws, paying lawfully authorised fees and taxes, providing employment 
opportunities alongside other indirect economic benefits (e.g., the rise of local 




Many of these companies believe they should not have to provide infrastructure and 
social services to communities, arguing that these are the purview of the government. 
Such differences in opinion can lead to enmity between these stakeholders, as well as 
longer-term instability. It can also create operational difficulties for small-scale mining 
companies that fail to engage in greater CSR activities. Moving forward, the government 
should distinguish between small- and large-scale mining companies in terms of its 
CDA expectations, so that it may better satisfy its national development priorities (World 
Bank, 2008). 
 
Interviews with both mining community leaders and the NMA reveal three major issues 
that have undermined the monitoring and evaluation process. First, communities do not 
have the necessary technical capacity and institutional structures to negotiate effectively 
with mining companies and especially foreign-owned enterprises for improved 
developmental programming. Second, the NMA does not have the resources to send 
field inspectors to mining communities across the country on a regular basis, since its 
budget is tightly controlled by the MMMR (Fanthorpe and Gabelle, 2013; interview with 
Mr. Kristian Lempa, Project Director, Regional Resource Governance in West Africa, 
GIZ, Sierra Leone, 5 March 2014). Third, the competition between these two 
government entities is intense, even though their mandates are different, albeit 
complementary (Fanthorpe and Gabelle, 2013; interview with Mr. Whitsun Ade-Cole, 
Head of Government Relations, London Mining, Sierra Leone, 5 March 2014).  
 
A further regulatory failing pointed out by respondents is the absence of a mutually 
agreed-upon reporting framework between foreign-owned mining companies and 
mining communities, as well as the lack of an oversight mechanism, particularly for the 
use of funds distributed under CDAs. Although the MMMR has overall responsibility for 
ensuring the implementation of CDFs in cooperation with the NMA, the demarcation of 
roles and responsibilities between these two entities is unclear, which effectively 
undermines the entire process and leaves mining communities feeling frustrated and, at 
times, helpless (Fanthorpe and Gabelle, 2013; interview with Ms. Daniele Arrobas, 




6, 2014). Ambiguity about CDAs in the Mines and Minerals Act of 2009 adds to the 
problem.  
 
Although the law provides discretionary power to the MMMR to make a final decision on 
the appropriate allocation of resources and implementation of development projects in 
instances of disputes between mining communities and mining companies, there 
appears to be a lack of clarity over the monetary value of the penalties that can be 
imposed on mining companies accused of reneging on their responsibilities to 
communities (Kanu, 2010; interviews with mining communities in Kono, Tonkolili, and 
Port Loko Districts 3-6 March 2014). To the detriment of mining communities, the ad 
hoc administration of CDFs between communities and mining companies means that 
communities are not given the support they need to drive sustainable growth (Kanu, 
2010; interviews with mining communities in Kono, Tonkolili, and Port Loko Districts, 3–
6 March 2014). 
 
According to reports from civic groups, many corporations — particularly those involved 
in resource extraction — still do not engage them in their operations, particularly with 
respect to development agreements, nor do they have a conflict resolution strategy that 
would help foster mutual trust among workers and develop social capital within the 
communities in which they operate (CIVICUS, 2006).  
 
London Mining Company 
 
In 2012, the London Mining Company flooded communities, destroying crops and 
pumping water in fishing areas, thus reducing the communities’ ability to sustain 
themselves. Exemplifying the lack of CSR policies, the company made the Manonkoh 
communities sign off agreements ensuring that London Mining would provide a few 
hundred machetes and hoes, leaving communities with very few resources. On October 
2014, the UK-based company’s shares dropped by more than 70 per cent while the 




London Mining appointed PricewaterhouseCooper (PwC) as administrator on October 
16, 2014 (MetalBulletin, 2015). 
 
While tax revenue has the potential to strengthen public services and moderate aid 
dependency, Sierra Leone has also sought to create new opportunities using the CDA 
mechanism. The development agreements are an improvement upon CSR initiatives, 
as they are formally engineered by donors with the participation and consent of the 
government, the private sector, and mining communities. To strengthen the 
management of CDAs and CDFs, interviewees suggested an array of policy options: 
evaluating and harmonising policies on mineral rents and allocated resources to mining 
communities; developing documentation on the calculation and distribution of mining 
revenue; publishing mining-related revenue and payments; promoting community 
participation at the local level; and fostering multi-stakeholder engagement on the 
administration, management, coordination, monitoring, and evaluation of CDAs. In this 
sense, global initiatives, such as the EITI, appear to be a productive start for countries 
like Sierra Leone to address the revenue repartition of extractive industries and to 
promote inclusive policies aimed at long-term development (Aaronson, 2011).  
 
Although CDAs represent a progressive step toward sustainable development via 
foreign-owned enterprises, if corruption issues linked to their administration are not 
addressed, sustainable development, stability, and post-conflict reconstruction 
expectations will not be met.  
 
Research Results: Hope and Unfulfilled Potential 
 
Impact of Governance and Regulation 
 
The government, specifically the MMMR, has taken major steps to establish legal, 
regulatory, and institutional capacities with a view to increase the effectiveness of the 
sector’s sustainable management and contributions to economic growth, peace, and 




with Hon Abdul Koroma, Deputy Minister, Sierra Leone Ministry of Mines and Mineral 
Resources, 4 March 2014). Civil society, donors, and local councils have all lauded the 
Act as a positive step forward in promoting the establishment of a regulatory framework 
to allow the private sector, in particular foreign-owned enterprises, to play a role in the 
country’s economic growth and development programmes — which are designed to 
contribute to ongoing peace, stability, and post-conflict reconstruction (Akiwumi, 2011). 
The Act does not adequately address environmental protection, health and safety, and 
community development, which could undermine such peace process efforts. However, 
to the government’s credit, the legislation allows the Minister of Mines and Mineral 
Resources to develop a framework for transparency in the reporting and disclosure of 
revenue that mining companies pay to the government. The Act makes EITI 
implementation compulsory for mining companies, allows for the resettlement of mining 
communities affected by mining, and articulates the responsibility of mining companies 
toward mining community members affected by mineral exploration and development. 
With regard to environmental protection, the legislation requires mining companies to 
undertake environmental impact assessments, apply for environmental impact 
assessment licenses, and to put environmental management plans in place (GoSL, 
2009). 
 
The second major step was to close the regulatory gaps related to the 
environmental, social, and operational management of the mining sector. How the 
sector would protect the economic and social-cultural interests of workers, communities, 
and the environment are now specified in new regulations covering workplace health 
and safety, waste disposal, the storage and transportation of minerals, explosives and 
blasting, dredging, underground mining, and mine closure — the first time in 70 years of 
mining operations in Sierra Leone (Mines and Minerals Act, 2009; interview with Mr. 
Ibrahim Satti Kamara, Communications Manager, Sierra Leone National Minerals 
Agency, 4 March 2014). New environmental and social regulations ensure that mining 
activities are carried out in a sustainable manner by minimising or eliminating negative 
impacts on the environment and communities. The regulations also specify how the 




achievement toward building goodwill and partnership between foreign-owned 
enterprises operating in the mineral sector, mining communities, and governments (both 
national, provincial, local, and traditional).  
 
The third major step involved the operationalisation of a world-class Mining Cadastre 
Office (MCO) to process, record, and monitor applications, licences, and revenues. In a 
significant step toward full transparency, the government launched the GoSL Online 
Repository in 2011 to share licensing and revenue information online (interview with Mr. 
Mohamed Bah, Chief Inspector of Mines & Head Of Monitoring & Compliance, Sierra 
Leone National Minerals Agency, 3 March 2014).15 The MCO is fully operational 
throughout the country and revenues from all fees and taxes is transparently calculated, 
collected, and reported. The geological maps held by the MCO allow a geographical 
view of mining and exploration concessions, as well as satellite imagery for detailed 
analysis. Other land uses can be visualised, for example to review potential disputes. 
The GoSL Online Repository lists by company all licences and applications; payments 
can also be viewed by licence, company, and year and downloaded for further 
analysis. The repository’s integration with the National Revenue Authority and Gold and 
Diamond Office covers most revenue streams that the EITI requires to be monitored 
(interview, 28 February 2014; interview, 5 March 2014). 
 
The fourth major step was institutional reform to deliver better-organised oversight 
institutions that have a mandate to manage and enforce legislative requirements for 
private-sector contributions to economic sustainability. Key to this was the 
establishment of the NMA, which is responsible for the day-to-day implementation of the 
Mines and Minerals Act and related regulations. The NMA is also responsible for 
managing mineral rights, collecting and disseminating geological information, and 
regulating the trading of precious minerals. The principles that underpin the new 
institutional model for the mining sector are founded upon best practices in natural 
resource governance and public-sector reform from around the world, including those 
                                                             




adopted in a number of African countries such as Namibia and Botswana. 
Specialisation has resulted in increased efficiency, while a well-managed professional 
agency gives the private sector the confidence to make long-term investment decisions. 
 
The government reached yet another milestone in its attempt to reform its natural 
resource governance entities. The suspension of the country from the EITI in February 
2013 was a result of the government’s inability to account for more than $1 million in 
mining licence fees paid by the African Minerals company in 2010. In April 2014, 
however, the EITI International Board recognised Sierra Leone as EITI-compliant, 
signifying that the country’s government sufficiently publishes the amount of revenue 
derived from its natural resources. As a result of renewed confidence generated by 
government reforms, the mining sector has attracted new investment and expanded 
existing operations.  
 
Despite these successes, the MMMR still faces a number of immediate, critical 
challenges that limit its capacity. These include budget uncertainty surrounding its ability 
to support the Act, the limited capacity of the Geological Survey Division to provide 
accurate data to encourage inward investment, and ineffective monitoring and 
compliance of precious mineral trading. Additional constraints include a weak 
investment climate, which hinders Sierra Leone’s abilities to compete in the highly 
competitive world of mineral exploration; a lack of exploration opportunities, since a 
small number of companies control the vast majority of the resource base, making it 
unattractive for reputable global mining companies; and the smuggling of precious 
minerals, which continues to be challenging given the prominence of artisanal mining. 
Similar issues have been raised in other African countries, where regulations suffered 
from the easiness to smuggle precious minerals.16 Gold and diamonds in particular are 
easy commodities to smuggle.   
 
                                                             
16 See the criticisms around Section 1502 of the Dodd-Frank Act and the smuggling of gold from the Democratic 




The Government of Sierra Leone views the private sector as a pillar of sustainable 
economic growth, stability, and a vehicle through which post-conflict recovery 
programmes can be implemented. During the last period of global austerity and 
decreasing donor support for developing countries, coupled with investments in the 
mining sector that have accounted for a substantial proportion of economic growth in 
recent years, the government has taken steps to improve the investment climate — a 
measure aimed at growing the private sector and strengthening the economy. Positive 
change can only occur from government interventions designed to improve the 
country’s investment climate and curb corruption, all while reducing the costs of doing 
business. The government needs to develop a strong partnership with foreign-owned 
enterprises if it is to generate employment and reduce poverty.  
 
In recent years, the government has taken various steps to attract FDI Through 
legislation such as the Investment Promotion Act (2004), the Investment Code (2005), 
the Business Registration Act (2007), the Investment Promotion Agency Act (2007), the 
Companies Act (2009), the Bankruptcy Act (2009), and the National Private Sector 
Development Plan, which came into effect in 2009 (United States Embassy, 2011). 
These reforms were enacted to provide greater protection for companies investing in 
Sierra Leone, to streamline the process of business engagement, and to create more 
opportunities for private ownership and control. After a decade-long decline in FDI 
during the civil war that saw the country receive on average less than $7 million 
annually between 1990 and 2000, FDI amounted to $97 million in 2007, dropped to $33 
million in 2009, then slowly increased to $36 million in 2011 with the help of Chinese 
investments (UNCTAD, 2011; United States Embassy, 2011). 
 
Investors can play a crucial role in providing economic opportunities and related stability 
via job creation, infrastructure development, and the provision of social services such as 
schools and health care, which would simultaneously support ongoing peace-building 
efforts. Given that foreign aid and debt relief — the traditional remedies offered to 
overcome Africa’s dependency and underdevelopment issues — have been ineffective, 




Sierra Leone’s competitiveness. As such, there is a need for an investment-friendly, 
enabling environment to attract FDI and encourage the growth of small- and medium-
sized domestic enterprises. Sierra Leonean legislators must nevertheless balance these 
considerations with the need to implement policies that prevent opportunistic, predatory 
rent-seeking while fostering effective forward and backward linkages between foreign 
private investors and the country’s domestic enterprises. 
 
Impact of the Private Sector and Local Community Development 
 
Community groups, non-governmental organisations (NGOs), and donors continue to 
express concerns that decisions are made arbitrarily, often in favour of the private 
sector and at the expense of local, sustainable development initiatives, which creates 
unhealthy animosity between potential development partners. Interviews with Mr. Jinnah 
Ibrahim, Director of Precious Minerals Trading, National Minerals Agency, Sierra Leone, 
27 February 2014 revealed a continued distrust of the private sector, with respondents 
accusing the corruption-plagued private sector, particularly foreign-owned companies, 
of backtracking on promises to provide leadership and promote developmental 
outcomes that benefit the broader population. Mining companies have themselves been 
hesitant to negotiate and consult with communities, with one interviewee noting that a 
manager from African Minerals who participated in a community-held meeting was later 
penalised by the company (interview with Mr. Patrick Tongu, Program Officer, NMJD, 
26 February 2014). The same informant observed that people living in areas where 
companies are just entering are becoming more vocal, as they feel that they are not 
being compensated appropriately, with some in the Chiefdom of Tonkolili even 
requesting to negotiate on their own. Where companies negotiate directly with 
community members, promises in the form of verbal agreements are often not kept, 
creating instability.  
 
The government has also failed to provide a detailed and holistic account of the total 
revenue it receives from the mining sector, instead producing irregular and incomplete 




scope of action for effecting restructuring cannot be appropriately implemented. In the 
past, Sierra Leoneans have complained that they have not received many benefits from 
the sale of diamonds, given that business remained in the hands of artisanal miners and 
illegal traders, while exporters and traders made purchases with hard currency (PAC, 
2004). Such trade was problematic for the government, which was eager for the 
proceeds to be used to help generate employment and kick-start secondary industries 
that are dependent on, or contribute to, the mining sector. Interviewees pointed out that 
export taxes of 3 per cent did little to generate revenue for poverty alleviation 
programmes and promote sustainable development projects (interview with Mr. Joseph 
Rahall, Executive Director, Green Scenery, 27 February 2014). In conjunction, foreign-
owned enterprises continue to be criticized for their unwillingness and inability, in some 
cases, to provide detailed accounts of taxes and payments made to the government 
and to the mining communities in which they operate. To the disappointment of mining 
communities, donors, and the civil society, Parliament does not have the technical, 
administrative, or financial capacity to examine and inspect government- company 
revenues, tax payments, and agreements (interview with Ms. Christine Sheckler, 
Country Program Manager, USAID, 3 March 2014).  
 
When the government fails in its role to provide meaningful transparency of its revenue 
from the natural resource sector, foreign-owned companies will often limit their 
contribution to socially responsible activities, particularly when governance systems and 
institutions are poorly enforced. Indeed, the World Bank (2008) notes that mining 
companies have contributed to the limited provision of social services in mining 
communities in Sierra Leone. In addition, there appears to be an absence of official 
figures corroborating how many positions have been added to the country’s mining 
sector since the end of the civil war and an International Labour Organization report 
from 2010 suggests that unskilled positions are relatively easy to come by, while 
surveyors and geologists are largely recruited from abroad. Local engineers are often 
overlooked for such positions on the grounds that they lack the practical experience or 
specialised knowledge required by mining companies. The document also notes that 




corporations consider employment in Sierra Leone to be a national problem, 
irrespective of age (Arai, Cissé, and Sock, 2010).  
 
Interviews with community members highlighted this “positive and negative view of the 
private sector” division present within the population. On the one hand, representatives 
of mining companies, diamond dealers, and local and paramount chiefs were pleased 
with the economic impacts of mining in affected communities, citing  employment 
opportunities and reduced crime rates. However, one town chief did note that expected 
employment numbers do not always materialise (interviews with mining communities, 
Kono, Tonkolili, and Port Loko Districts, 3–6 March 2014). On the other hand, the 
majority of women’s and youth group representatives expressed more negative 
opinions, with youth groups having a particularly negative view of mining companies. 
Concerns included destruction of lives and dwellings, displacement, lack of water and 
arable land, increasing drop-out rates in schools, and blasting as especially disruptive.  
 
Indeed, youth unemployment is an important issue in a country where young people 
comprise over 30 per cent of the population, but gains extra importance considering that 
youth unemployment in a context of state delinquency rates was one of the major 
factors in the recent civil war (Peters, 2011; Ferme, 2001). Youth employment remains 
a pressing issue in the West African state, with an estimated 60 per cent of men and 
women between the ages of 15 and 35 considered unemployed in Sierra Leone in 2012 
(GoSL, 2012). 
 
Interestingly, women’s groups were more balanced in mentioning both positive and 
negative impacts, noting challenges such as the resettlement of schools, deprivation of 
agricultural land that women use to provide for their families, and the dangers of 
blasting. Representatives from the clergy and education sector criticized the lack of 
prioritisation of children’s schooling, deforestation, uncovered pits, and displacement, 
although teachers who were interviewed acknowledged the benefits of increased taxes, 





A lack of institutional structure and coordination has meant that little effective progress 
has been made in decreasing youth unemployment (GoSL, 2012; interview with Prof. 
Ekundayo Thompson, Director of the Directorate of Planning, Research and 
Development & Coordinator of the Peace and Development Studies Programme, Njala 
University, 25 February 2014).  
 
Impact of Value Addition and Beneficiation 
 
Mineral beneficiation and value addition have great potential to advance Sierra Leone’s 
economic transformation, sustainable economic growth, and stability. As the authors of 
the Political Economy of Natural Resources Governance framework state, value 
addition and beneficiation play a crucial role in stabilising a post-conflict country like 
Sierra Leone. A comprehensive study examining and promoting backward linkages in 
Sierra Leone’s mining sector could improve local economic prospects for mining 
communities and the broader public. The goal for Sierra Leone should be to establish a 
systemic approach to identifying binding constraints on the country’s industries, thereby 
creating a direct portal for bottom-up information transfer between communities and 
government actors. The key to this is the ability to study the entire mineral value chains 
in order to identify the obstacles to beneficiation and value addition in the country. 
Awareness and understanding will help tailor actions and make policy adjustments over 
time to utilise mining revenue effectively and generate optimal sustainable development 
outcomes. 
 
A commissioned report by the Sierra Leone Ministry of Trade and Industry and the UK 
aid organisation DFID, entitled Local Content Assessment Report, presented startling 
revelations about the extent of local content in the country’s mining sector. It identified 
that the utilisation of local supply had reached a mere 5.8 per cent, which was mainly 
blamed on low capacity in the local market. One of the reasons behind the low 
utilisation rate is the lack of knowledge of the government’s Local Content Policy and its 
application with regard to foreign-owned, private-sector actors. Private companies have 




expertise and knowledge, and that distorted tax agreements favour foreign investors. 
Local enterprises are often part of the lower value chain and do not contribute to the 
strengthening of local secondary industries or beneficiation. The report highlighted the 
fact that respondents perceived the public procurement process as unfair, with most 
respondents stating that local firms do not receive preferential treatment. Respondents 
strongly argued for the country’s education system to be overhauled to include technical 
vocational training and courses catering to industry requirements. 
 
The mining sector is expected to account for nearly 30 per cent of governmental 
revenues by early 2016 (interview with Mr. Dominic Hope, Investor Relations Associate, 
Sierra Rutile Sierra Leone, 5 March 2014), and the state is grappling with how to ensure 
that the sector does not continue to serve the interests of the public and private elites 
over average citizens. Currently, local beneficiation and value addition in Sierra Leone’s 
mining sector are limited and forward-facing only, with the average Sierra Leonean not 
benefiting from mineral proceeds, increased investment, or economic growth. This 
situation has given rise to social instability, unrest, and sometimes violence — which 
could slow the government’s efforts to promote the private sector and foreign-owned 
enterprises as partners in generating sustainable economic growth, stability, and peace.  
 
Recent efforts have been made to address the potential risks associated with the mining 
sector’s inefficiencies, as well as to capitalise on increased investments to spur 
economic growth. The passage of the Local Content Policy in May 2012 aims to 
“promote strong linkages between multinational private sector actors and the local 
economy” (Adam Smith International, 2013) by encouraging the private sector and 
foreign-owned enterprises to play a more developmental role in the country’s 
transformation process. The Policy sets out expectations with regard to employment 
generation, beneficiation, value addition, the promotion of secondary industries reliant 
on the mining sector, and supply chain development. Similar to continental and regional 
efforts led by the African Union and the different regional organisations, the Policy is 
also designed to  increase the capacities and technical abilities of Sierra Leonean 




entities operating in the country;  training Sierra Leoneans,  stipulating that 50 per cent 
of intermediate positions and 20 per cent of managerial positions at foreign-owned 
companies must be held by Sierra Leoneans (Fanthorpe and Gabelle, 2013). Much 
hope has been placed in the Local Content Policy, although it has had little effect thus 
far (interview with Mr. Herbert M’Cleod, Senior Sierra Leone Governance Specialist, 27 
February 2014). 
 
Based on interviews conducted with government officials and representatives from the 
private sector in March 2014, the  local private sector’s weak productive capacity to 
meet local and external market demands is a major challenge. Even the larger foreign 
mining companies that operate in the country have complained that they are forced to 
import from markets outside the Economic Community of West African States 
(ECOWAS) due to weak manufacturing capacity in the country. DFID (2012) echoes 
these sentiments, noting that there is a limited number of domestic businesses capable 
of offering suitable goods and services to mining companies in Sierra Leone. The report 
also states that data on the supply and demand sides of the sector is limited, as local 
output figures are predominantly based on anecdotal accounts, while mining firms’ 
supply requirements are unknown. In addition, mining companies appear to lack 
comprehension or understanding of the local content requirements. 
 
The business-operating environment is expected to improve in the long term with the 
passage of the Finance Act of 2013, which is designed to help promote FDI, simplify tax 
administration, and boost mineral revenues. However, current and prospective investors 
are worried that the policy may undermine business operations and negatively impact 
on profits in the future, detrimentally hampering their ability to be partners in sustainable 
development, given the difficulties in sourcing skilled labour locally (interview with Mr. 
Claude Perras, Head of Sustainability, London Mining Plc, 25 February 2014).  
 
In an effort to address these concerns, the government agreed in November 2013 to a 
Local Content Compact with the private sector. A dialogue with foreign-owned 




development and governance. The planned consultative process will involve 
government members from the National Ministerial Committee who deal with local 
content, major foreign-owned private-sector actors, industry associations, civil society 
groups, and development partners such as GIZ, the World Bank, the EU, and DFID. 
Only time will tell if this compact will remedy the remaining endemic ills of this post-





Possible Approaches to an Effective Governance Framework 
 
Sierra Leone’s challenges are somewhat unique to its environment, resource deposits, 
governance systems, and context. The country’s Mines and Minerals Act stipulates a 
comprehensive overhaul of CSR activities with priority on the promotion of community 
development initiatives. First, mining companies are required to obtain a land lease for 
any mining activities (GoSL, 2009b). The terms of the lease include rent paid to 
landowners in mining communities. Second, mining companies are expected to 
compensate landowners or lawful occupiers in mining communities for any damage to 
their livelihoods, vegetation, crops, or infrastructure (GoSL, 2009b). Third, mining 
companies are required to implement community development agreements (CDAs) by 
using no less than 1 per cent of their gross revenue earnings from mining activities 
undertaken during the previous year.17 According to the Act, the primary host 
community expected to reap the benefits is a “single community of persons mutually 
agreed [upon] by the holder of the small-scale or large-scale mining license and the 
local council” (GoSL, 2009b). In the event that there are no existing communities within 
a 30-kilometre radius of any boundary encompassing a large-scale mining licensing 
area, CDA funds would be provided to the local council. The Minister of mines and 
                                                             
17 The Mines and Minerals Act states ‘one percent of one percent of gross revenue earned by the mining operations 
in the previous year,’ but this been repeatedly reported as a mistake by the director of mines, who is largely 




mineral resources is entrusted with the power to resolve disputes that may arise when 
identifying mining communities, while the director of mines has the legal authority to 
approve a CDA in any given mining community (Fanthorpe and Gabelle, 2013). 
 
Interviews with 75 community members from the Kono, Tonkolili, and Port Loko Districts 
point to a broad lack of knowledge about CDAs in general. After a brief explanation, 
respondents indicated that CDAs should be based upon community-wide consensus 
and previously agreed-upon objectives; the respective roles and responsibilities of 
mining companies and mining communities should be clarified, in consultation with the 
government; timelines for development projects should be timely and transparent; 
progress with regard to development outcomes in the community should be impartially 
assessed; and conflict and disputes between communities and mining companies 
should be resolved with the government acting as an impartial arbitrator. CDAs should 
be drafted with the mining companies by (in this order) local chiefs, paramount chiefs, 
artisanal miners, traders, women’s group leaders, youth leaders, civil society groups 
representing mining communities, local government officials, religious leaders, and 
farmers within the prescribed 30-kilometre radius.  
 
In an effort to strengthen the management of CDAs and CDFs, members of donor 
communities and mining communities presented the following recommendations  for 
leveraging foreign-owned enterprises as active contributors to sustainable economic 
growth, peace and, stability (interviews with mining communities in Kono, Tonkolili, and 
Port Loko Districts, 3–6 March 2014):  
• Evaluate and harmonise various policies related to mineral rents and resources 
allocated to mining communities. 
• Develop detailed and all-inclusive documentation on guidelines for calculating 
and distributing mining revenue locally and nationally.  
• Publish mining-related revenues and payments  and make available to mining 
communities.  




• Foster multi-stakeholder engagement between civil society, the government, and 
mining companies to improve the administration, management, coordination, 
monitoring, and evaluation of CDAs. 
 
Respondents also expressed interest in the creation of a CDA monitoring body 
comprising members of mining communities, civil society groups involved in community 
development programs, donors, government officials, and mining companies. This body 
would oversee budgets and fund disbursement, and evaluate impacts in communities. 
Funds should be deposited into a special, audited account, accessible only to 
designated signatories representing the national, district, and community-level 
governments, and  that audited financial statements from mining communities be made 
available. 
 
A call was made also to establish a Community Natural Resources Management 
Committee (CNRMC), District Natural Resources Management Committee (DNRMC), 
and a National Natural Resources Management Committee (NNRMC) to oversee CDA 
fund disbursement and project completion at the local level, and so on. The committees 
would be.  
• CNRMC (comprising eight local individuals, including chiefs, representing 
different community groups [i.e., women’s groups, youth groups, artisanal mining 
associations, farmers’ associations]) — manage CDA projects and processes at 
the local or community level; oversee the successful completion of CDA projects 
and submission of comprehensive reports to the DNRMC prior to submission to 
the NNRMC; organise meetings and engage in consultations with 
representatives of mining communities pertaining to the income and expenditure 
of funds earmarked for development projects; solicit input, ideas, and feedback 
from mining communities regarding development projects that could benefit from 
CDA funding.  
• DNRMC (comprising a district council chairperson, representatives of mining 
companies, members of civil society groups, donor community members, district 




implement, and evaluate CDA activities in communities within the 30-kilometre 
radius specified in the Mines and Minerals Act; register communities that are 
expected to benefit from a CDA and funding; review community applications and 
proposals submitted by the CNRMC and make recommendations to the NNRMC; 
ensure compliance with the provisions of a CDA and the Act. 
• NNRMC (comprising members of civil society groups representing mining 
communities, members of parliament, a representative of mining companies 
operating in the district, and director of mines) — review decisions on CDAs 
received by the DNRMC; make decisions on funding, distribution, deadlines, and 
criteria for implementation; monitor and evaluate projects; consult with and inform 
communities on outcomes of approved projects and the allocation of required 
resources. 
 
Interview results also indicate that many resource-rich communities view Diamond Area 
Community Development Funds (DACDFs) as a better alternative to CDAs, citing 
benefits such as road improvements, agricultural investment, the establishment of 
trading routes, road construction and maintenance, the construction of clinics, the 
provision of scholarships for secondary school students to study in Freetown, financial 
support for local and traditional administrations, vocational training, law enforcement, 
and the provision of basic services such as water and electricity (Kanu, 2010). However, 
reality indicates that DACDF projects in the three districts were badly constructed or 
abandoned halfway, with some failing to take into consideration the needs of special 
interest groups, particularly those of children, the disabled, and the elderly. With respect 
to CDAs, many mining communities in the three districts have yet to reap benefits, 
although a few chiefdoms, particularly in the diamond-rich Kono District, have recorded 
substantial gains in utilising ceded mining revenue from mining companies. The clear 
majority of these development projects were built with CDFs, In the three districts, 
concerns remain that ceded mining revenue allocated from CDAs and the DACDF is not 





In light of the continuing opportunities and challenges with both CDAs and DACDFs, a 
comprehensive study should be undertaken to examine and promote backward 
linkages, specifically with respect to the local impact and response (current and 
prospective) of downstream refining, transport, distribution, marketing and sales 
processes, as well as midstream/side-stream sector activities. Such a study would 
improve understanding of local content identification and inclusion, resource value 
chains, national procurement institutions, the influence of emerging technologies, and 
contemporary transnational business practices. 
 
Furthermore, backward and sideways linkages need to be enhanced, something that is 
a key objective of the African Mining Vision (AMV) of the African Union (AU). This 
proposed study would help establish a systemic framework, which could be used to help 
Sierra Leone identify constraints affecting its industries. It could also take specific action 
to improve and strengthen its industries, while becoming a direct portal for bottom-up 
information transfer between communities and government actors. A systems approach 
would also allow stakeholders to study the entire mineral value chains from exploration 
to extraction, processing, fabrication, and marketing, in order to identify the obstacles to 
beneficiation and value addition in Sierra Leone. A necessary starting-point would be to 
map AMV-compliant participatory policies and mechanisms with regard to both the 
public and private sector. The information could then be made available via online 
platforms. The proposed study should also consider the following documents: 
1. The UNDP’s multi-level Strategy for Supporting Sustainable and Equitable 
Management of the Extractive Sector for Human Development focuses on 
strengthening the capacities of sub-national governments and civil society by 
leveraging analytical and research capabilities, in order to develop participatory 
legislation, policy and planning, as well as people-centred extractive practices. 
2. The operationalization of the African Mining and Country Mining Visions would 
constitute a selection of specific guidelines related to leveraging natural 
resources for development and economic growth. 
3. The OECD Policy Dialogue on Natural Resources-based Development 




operational framework for public-private collaboration on resource-based value 
creation by building an empirical basis upon which decision-making can be 
made. It is aimed at inclusive participatory processes, the leveraging of 
opportunity areas for ‘quick-wins’ and long-term collaboration, the creation of an 
enabling environment for business while ensuring sustainable action and 
meaningful local engagement, and the establishment of a monitoring and 
evaluation process. 
4. The High-level Expert Group Meeting’s Towards the Post-2015 Development 
Agenda and the African Agenda 2063 provides, among other things, an 
assessment of the AMV implementation progress, the selection of best practices 
and lessons learned for local beneficiation and inclusivity, and recommendations 
that aim to contribute to the implementation of the AMV and the building of new 
partnerships among all key stakeholders.  
 
A holistic, locally driven, and upgraded Sierra Leonean mineral value chain also 
requires careful consideration of the following: 
1. The limited local beneficiation and value in the current mineral value chain should 
still be discussed within the political economy of resource generation and 
transfer. Such a political economy has implications for the transparency of the 
extractive industry (the mining sector included), particularly in combatting the 
high incidence of illicit financial flows from Africa that occur on several fronts, 
such as abusive transfer pricing; trade mispricing and unequal contracts, all for 
purposes of tax evasion; aggressive tax avoidance; and the illegal export of 
foreign exchange (Illicit Financial Flows, 2015). Bond considers these activities, 
as a whole, an output of Africa being tied to a system of global power, 
accumulation, and state-based class disputes that facilitate the looting of the 
continent as a whole, maintaining its levels of poverty so as to enrich the global 
north (Bond, 2006).  
2. Promoting natural resource-based industrialization (including minerals) requires 




which form the cornerstones of regional integration programs and proposed 
development corridors across the continent. 
3. An in-depth understanding of the interests and the relationships among relevant 
stakeholders will help considerably to align interests, build trust, establish 
transparency, determine the proper incentives for making the value chain work, 
and promote the fair distribution of benefits among stakeholders.  
 
Sierra Leone is in a unique position to take advantage of contemporary global economic 
patterns that have increased demand for its mineral resources, but a decline in the 
commodities super cycle, which have contributed to the country’s impressive recent 
economic growth rates, has affected the price of commodities. This means that 
diversification alternatives must be explored along the value chain and regional market 
opportunities must be considered. Minimizing the socio-economic and environmental 
impacts of mining requires that stakeholders outside the private sector accept 
responsibility for enforcing human rights and gender dimensions, as well as labour and 
environmental norms and standards. 
 
Collaborative governance, especially in the form of CDAs and DACDFs, has great 
potential to leverage private-sector actors and foreign-owned enterprises as partners in 
advancing Sierra Leone’s economic transformation, post-conflict reconstruction and, as 
a result, stability and peace. The country’s citizens would benefit from the Political 
Economy of Natural Resources Governance framework, where strong governance 
systems promote development and stability in the social, economic, and political 
spheres. It has proposed that a comprehensive study to examine and promote 
backward linkages in Sierra Leone’s mining sector, which could improve local economic 
prospects for mining communities and the broader public. The goal is to identify binding 
constraints on Sierra Leone’s industries and suggest specific actions to improve and 
strengthen them, thereby creating a direct portal for bottom-up information transfer 
between communities and government actors. The key is the ability to study the entire 
mineral value chains in order to identify the obstacles to beneficiation and value addition 




adjustments over time to utilise mining revenues effectively and generate optimal 
sustainable development outcomes. In line with CDAs, mineral beneficiation and value 
addition could unlock Sierra Leone’s social and economic potential if the infrastructure 
undergirding natural resources governance functions efficiently and is able to adapt to 






























Over the past decade, Ethiopia has achieved and sustained a relatively high economic 
growth, with the average annual GDP growth rate from 2004–3014 at around 9 per cent 
(World DataBank, 2016b). This is remarkable given the low-income status of the 102 
million people who live there, and where the guaranteed national income per capital is 
$1,719.4. Notable gains have also been made in human development (World DataBank, 
“Population,” 2016e, World Databank, “GNI Per Capita,” 2017), helping to elevate 
Ethiopia to among the top 10 countries globally that has attained the largest absolute 
gains in its human development index (HDI) in recent years. For example, from 1990 to 
2015, life expectancy rose from 47 to 65 years, infant mortality rates dropped from 121 
per 1,000 births to 41, and labour productivity grew from 1.7 to 5.5% (World Bank, 
“Indicators – Decent Work, 2016b; World Bank, “Indicators – Mortality,” 2016a).  
 
Despite this impressive economic performance over the past decade, not all Ethiopians 
appear to have benefited from this growth. Livelihoods of Ethiopian farmers and 
pastoralists, who account for over 80 per cent of the population (Ali et al., 2007), have 
remained precarious due to a lack of transformation in the smallholder agricultural 
sector.18 In 2016, droughts across the country caused 10.2 million Ethiopians to require 
emergency food relief (WFP, 2016), up roughly 65 per cent from the 6.2 million 
Ethiopians in need of food assistance in 2009 (Bues and Theesfeld, 2012; Rahmato, 
2011). The average wage for unskilled agricultural labour in Ethiopia was reported to be 
$0.80 per day in 2008 (Shepherd, 2013).  
 
                                                             
18 Smallholder agriculture is practised by families using only or mostly family labour. It includes crop raising, animal 




Food insecurity remains a perennial threat to the well-being of the majority of Ethiopians 
who live in poverty due to lack of access to productive resources, particularly arable 
land, and economic opportunities. The country’s economic growth has yet to be 
leveraged to deliver inclusive and sustained economic gains for all Ethiopians. 
This state of affairs, compounded by inherent inequitable outcomes of economic growth, 
underline a growing fragility in terms of brewing ethnic tensions, which in turn 
undermine political and social stability — prompting the characterisation of Ethiopia as a 
conflict-threatened country (Kefale, 2013). Since Ethiopia’s first national multi-party 
elections in 1995, the central government’s policies have become increasingly 
authoritarian and ethnically based or even divisive, which has created dissatisfaction 
among several of the country’s different ethnic groups in recent years (Erk, 2017). 
Human Rights Watch reported that in 2015 and 2016 Ethiopia experienced widespread 
ethnic-based protests against the existing political order, which allegedly resulted in the 
killing of some 500 people by internal security forces (HRW, “Ethiopia - Events of 2016). 
Indeed, the House of People’s Representatives’ 547 is largely controlled by the ruling 
party, which currently occupies 502 seats. This situation creates a de facto one-party 
state and tendency toward a dictatorship type of government, which has been facilitated 
by persistent crackdowns on independent media and civil liberties (HRW, “Ethiopia - 
Events of 2016).  
 
Clashes between Ethiopian Somalis and Oromians in mid-2017 followed serious anti-
government protests across the country in the year prior (Burke, 2016; bbc.co.uk, 2017; 
Gaffey, 2017). The Oromia region has been the site of large-scale anti-government 
marches, clashes and the like for many years since the Ethiopian People’s 
Revolutionary Democratic Front (EPRDF) came into power (Africannews.com, 2017). In 
October 2017, the Ethiopian Human Rights Commission, which also characterised the 
country as conflict-threatened while studying violence in Oromia, Somali, Gambella, and 
the Southern Nations and Nationalities and Peoples regions, concluded that security 
forces and traditional leadership have been unable to stem the growing tide of crisis and 






 At the same time, opposition parties have argued that “people are fed up with what the 
regime has been doing for a quarter of a century, hence, they’re protesting against land 
grabs, reparations, stolen elections, and the rising cost of living (Hayden, “Ethiopia’s 
Battle,” 2016). Some argue that if the government continues to repress while the people 
are demanding their rights in the millions, civil war is one of the likely scenarios 
(Hayden, “Ethiopia’s Battle,” 2016). Anti-government protests have revolved around 
access to and the use of land, stemming from what protesters perceive as unabashed 
land grabs, repatriations of wealth, and the reduction of land rights for average 
Ethiopians — a precursor to civil war (Hayden, 2016). This situation is further 
exacerbated by what is becoming popularly known as a quintessential exemplification of 
climate-induced conflict, with violence along border regions with Egypt, particularly in 
the Nile River region, becoming increasingly likely (Aton, 2017). Using the metrics 
defined by the OECD’s States of Fragility report noted in the Methodology chapter of 
this dissertation, Ethiopia’s current situation demonstrates a number of relevant 
features: prospects for violence; absence of the rule of law especially in regard to 
security forces; limited institutions; and limited capacity to adapt in the face of unrest or 
challenge to existing government structures. Collectively, these features indicate an 
appropriate usage of the designation as conflict-threatened.  
 
Land Administration and Tenure in Ethiopia  
 
Agriculture has long been a central pillar of the Ethiopian economy, with more than 80 
per cent of the Ethiopian population still living in rural areas  (Ali et al., 2007). The sector 
contributes about 45 per cent to the country’s GDP, and accounts for 90 per cent of 
export earnings and 85 per cent of foreign currency earnings. Consequently, much of 
Ethiopia’s current politics and political history revolve around the access to and control 
of arable land (Ensene, 2018). 
 
Unlike most African countries, however, Ethiopia never experienced colonial rule, 




ownership was governed by a quasi-feudal structure. In 1974, following a popular 
uprising that overthrew the last emperor, Haile Selassie, a new left-wing military regime 
called the Derg took power and reconfigured the country’s agricultural and land 
frameworks. In view of the uprising’s premise — to eliminate the landholding elite — the 
new government redistributed land to smallholder farmers through newly created local 
peasant associations. With enactment of the Public Ownership of Rural Lands 
Proclamation in 1975, all land was nationalised and redistributed. Peasant associations 
— each of which had an area of at least 800 hectares — were granted the power to 
redistribute land on the principle that peasants could access land parcels of up to 10 
hectares per household (Government of Ethiopia, 1975). Land was then redistributed at 
various points afterward in order to appease new claimants as the country’s population 
increased (Holden and Yohannes, 2002). Within this new arrangement, Ethiopians were 
given individualised and usufruct rights, meaning land was granted from the government 
on a household basis, although it could not be legally transferred by sale, lease, rental, 
or mortgage (Government of Ethiopia, 1975). 
 
The intent of this policy reform was to create a land system that would empower 
Ethiopian smallholder producers. This did, in fact, happen in large part for those in the 
southern peripheries where land ownership had previously been concentrated among 
an elite minority. In practice, however, it also served to create widespread tenure 
insecurity due to the requirement for regular redistributions of landholdings as the 
population increased. In turn, this insecurity discouraged private smallholder agricultural 
investments as peasants had no guarantee that their land, and any improvements within 
it, would not be reallocated to others in the future. Additionally, due to its individualistic 
nature whereby land was granted on a household basis, this policy reform alienated 
peasants in the northern highlands from their customary, quasi-communal land 
arrangements. In summary, the 1975 Proclamation, in combination with later agricultural 
directives such as the failed promotion of producers’ cooperatives, increased public 
investments in state farms, a process that led to the forced resettlement of Ethiopian 





During the 15 years that followed the 1975 Proclamation, the prevailing Derg regime — 
later to be known as the People’s Democratic Republic of Ethiopia — failed to stay true 
to the political underpinnings of the social movement that had brought it to power. The 
central demand embedded within the 1970s uprisings had been the call to redistribute 
land and power from the imperial elites to the peasantry (Makki, 2012). While 
subsequent policy reforms facilitated this redistribution, the Derg’s rule in Ethiopia 
became progressively dictatorial, creating another oppressive form of centralist 
governance. As a result, during the decade and a half following the 1975 Proclamation, 
Ethiopia experienced a 70 per cent decline in agricultural output (Makki, 2012). In light 
of the country’s sliding into authoritarianism, the regime’s leader, Mengistu, was ousted 
in 1991 by a coalition of rebel forces led by the Tigrayan People’s Liberation Front 
(TPLF). Once in power, this new group established the Transitional Government of 
Ethiopia (TGE), which eventually adopted the constitution of the Federal Democratic 
Republic of Ethiopia in 1994. It was later elected as the Ethiopian People’s 
Revolutionary Democratic Front (EPRDF) in the country’s first national elections in 
1995. Two of the major policies enacted during this state-building process were the 
continued state ownership of land and the establishment of a new ethno-federal system 
that devolved land administration to ethnically delineated regional governments 
(Donham, 1999).19  
 
Although other African countries actively avoided accommodating ethnicity as a formal 
political element due to its tendency to provoke inter-ethnic conflicts and state fragility, 
in the case of Ethiopia this nation-building strategy was essential to the formation of an 
initially stable government given the process through which the TPLF came to power 
(Abbink, 2011). Namely, the TPLF was able to mobilise a significant amount of support 
and eventually take power by building a sense of unity through the various ethnic group 
grievances against the Amharic-centric Derg regime (Soule, 2016). Some ethnic 
groups, such as the Oromo Liberation Front, members of the Southern Ethiopia 
                                                             
19 The decision to maintain Ethiopian land as public property meant Ethiopians retained usufruct rights to their land, 
with the sale, transfer, and mortgage of land still strictly prohibited. With that said, Ethiopians can now inherit and rent 




Peoples’ Democratic Coalition, and the Eritrean People’s Liberation Front, which had 
been sidelined at the hands of the largely Amharic Imperial regime, were further 
marginalised during the Derg’s rule. Given this history, the EPRDF, once in power, 
faced a critical need to impose a governance structure that would empower aggrieved 
ethnic groups and unite them under a shared political agenda. 
 
As a result, the new government hailed the creation of an ethnic-based federalist model, 
whereby nine regional territories and governments were assigned based along ethnic 
lines, as a means of allowing ethnic self-determination (Abbink, 2011). By creating 
ethnically delineated regional governments, especially those governing more 
marginalised populations, the government argued there was room for greater ethnic 
equality in terms of government representation and, perhaps more importantly, access 
to resources (Aalen, 2006). One of the most notable responsibilities of these new 
regional governments was the administration of land within their territories. While land 
legislation was still under the mandate of the federal government, corresponding laws 
and detailed guidelines on how federal laws, proclamations, regulations, and directives 
would be implemented were now under the purview of its regional counterparts (Benin 
and Pender, 2001). 
 
In contrast to this significant political evolution in land administration, land tenure 
remained unchanged. The new regime proceeded to implement and codify two major 
land-related policies in Ethiopia’s 1995 constitution (Government of Ethiopia, 1995). In 
addition to implementing an ethno-federalist framework and upholding an individual 
usufruct tenure system, the constitution also upheld and increased the focus on land 
rights for vulnerable agricultural groups. Article 40 (5) entitled Ethiopian pastoralists to 
“the right to free land for grazing and cultivation as well as the right not to be displaced 
from their own lands,” while Article 35 (7) granted women “equal rights with men with 
respect to use, transfer, administration and control of land” and “equal treatment in the 
inheritance of property.” The decision to maintain the Derg’s land tenure model of state 
control over the allocation and use of land was likely made with the legacy of the 




previous emperors, when Emperor Haile Selassie returned from exile in 1942, he 
established rules that led to the privatisation of land — a tenure system that only 
increased the power of the landholding elite and further deprived the peasantry of 
resources. From an economic perspective, there have also been ongoing debates over 
whether the lack of privatisation in Ethiopia’s land system has prevented a rise in 
inequality, instability, and economic decline. Many argue that smallholders would have 
been vulnerable to land speculation and inequitable land accumulation had they been 
entitled to sell their land (USAID, 2016). 
 
Years after the establishment of the 1995 constitution, the Ethiopian government also 
sought to introduce a land certification program with the aim of reducing tenure 
insecurity and its negative impact on smallholder private investment. Thus, starting in 
2003 and over the course of five years, the Ethiopian government was able to register 
approximately 25 million rural parcels in four of its main regions: Amhara, Tigray, 
Oromia, and the non-remote parts of Southern Nations Nationalities and Peoples 
Region (SNNPR). According to the World Bank, this participatory, pro-poor, and gender-
sensitive certification programme was “one of the largest, fastest, and most low-cost 
processes globally” (Deininger et al., 2011, 6). 
 
Meanwhile, the new government also pursued complementary agricultural development 
policies, which were highly supportive of smallholder producers. Its Agricultural 
Development-Led Industrialisation (ADLI) strategy asserted that since Ethiopia was a 
labour-rich and capital-poor country, the government should cater to and support 
smallholders (Lavers, 2012a). By strengthening its most labour-intensive industry — 
through inputs such as irrigation, fertilizer, improved seeds, credit services, and capacity 
development programs — the government posited that it could generate sustainable 
economic growth while improving national food security and stimulating downstream 
and upstream agricultural linkages. One of the key pillars of this strategy was the 
aforementioned continued guarantee of usufruct land rights for smallholders. As 
previously mentioned, this strategy arguably prevented distressed land sales and the re-




Given that Ethiopia is home to over 80 ethnic groups, some of which are not recognised 
or do not live in their designated ethnic territories, many smaller groups were also 
marginalised under the new ethno-regional framework. For example, although the 
government gave Tigrayans, Amharas, Oromos, Afars, Somalis, and Hararis dominant 
ethnic status with their own regional state, it denied that right to other groups with 
similar claims, such the Gurage, Sidama, and Woleyta. The territorialisation of ethnicity 
was also illogical and detrimental in most towns and cities, which often contained a mix 
of ethnicities. Similar challenges were created in the countryside where whole rural 
districts ran counter to the ethnic group that the state had prescribed to that territory. 
Many ethnic minorities were marginalised, as they often did not speak the language of 
the new regional administration or were discriminated against by the dominant group. 
Ethnic tensions also increased in many areas as various groups vied for exclusive rights 
over a territory’s administration, which provided access to central government resources 
(Keller, 2002).  
 
The 2005 elections signalled to the EPRDF that significant changes needed to be made 
in order to stay in power. From an economic perspective, given that significant growth in 
the agricultural sector had yet to be realised but remained essential to the country’s 
overall economic growth and poverty reduction strategy, the central government 
expanded its focus from smallholder production to large-scale commercial agriculture, 
trade, and foreign investment, an encouragement for foreign-owned enterprises to 
invest in Ethiopia’s agriculture and other natural resources sectors. The ADLI strategy 
previously hailed by the government was thus subsumed within this new strategy and 
the significant economic growth it was predicted to produce (interview with Mr. 
Getachew Regassa, Secretary General, Addis Ababa Chamber of Commerce, 16 April 
2014). Emphasis on FDI-driven commercial farming at the expense of household-based 
smallholder-led agriculture was the EPRDF’s effort to focus on sustained high economic 






Growing Threat of Ethnic-Based Conflict and State Fragility  
 
The run-up to the 2005 elections demonstrated promise in terms of democratic process; 
the opposition parties at the time had gained significant popularity and were allowed to 
campaign and appear in state-televised debates (Abbink, 2011). However, critics claim 
that after the realisation dawned on the ruling party that the opposition would be able to 
form a coalition government, votes disappeared during a non-transparent vote count 
(Abbink, 2011). This, they argue, allowed a drastic turnaround and a narrow win for the 
EPRDF. Subsequent attempts to challenge the outcome of the election in Ethiopian 
courts offered little recourse to a recount, as the “partisanship, lack of independence 
and integrity, and subservience of the electoral body and the judicial system to the 
EPRDF” (Berhanu, 2012, 11) were clearly apparent. 
 
Given that ‘foreign’ CSOs are prohibited from conducting any form of awareness-raising 
or advocacy initiatives with regard to agricultural and land policies, the Ethiopian 
government entertains very few suggestions of alternative governance models in its 
natural resources sector. And yet, it is in this political context that the Ethiopian 
government has implemented significant changes to the country’s agricultural policy 
framework. This is embodied by its new strategy prioritising large-scale, commercial 
agriculture. 
 
In pursuing the objective of facilitating economic growth and stability through large-
scale, commercial agriculture by foreign-owned enterprises, the government has been 
accused of denying pastoralists and shifting cultivators “their right not to be displaced 
from their own land” (Government of Ethiopia, 1995: Article 40 (5). It creates an 
interesting scenario whereby efforts to “govern” foreign-owned, private-sector actors 
contributes to, rather than reduces, the inherent tension and instability the country 
faces. Many critics have pointed to the central government’s indiscriminate 
expropriation of their land under the guise of it being ‘unused,’ despite the crucial role of 
land for the nomadic nature of pastoralism and shifting cultivation (interview with Dr. 




such investments have the potential to offer much in the way of knowledge and 
technology transfer, there is also evidence to suggest that land acquisitions in Ethiopia 
have displaced smallholder agriculturalists and prohibited pastoralists to access their 
ancestral lands without providing them with compensatory employment opportunities 
(Moreda, 2015). If persons displaced by large-scale land leases are offered 
employment, it is typically on a casual basis with little in the way of job security 
(Rahmato, 2011). Moreover, despite receiving the legally mandated financial 
compensation from the Ethiopian government, Lavers (2012b) and Shepherd (2013) 
note that displaced smallholders have struggled to preserve their prosperity following 
the appropriation of their lands, as the compensation they receive is often thought to be 
insufficient. 
 
While these changes were made without consultation at the local level, they were 
undeniably influenced by foreign stakeholders, as the changes became an important 
part of retaining state legitimacy in the eyes of international donors — a situation that 
alludes to private-sector driven governance. The repressive tactics the Ethiopian 
government had been accused of using during the 2005 elections — including torture, 
arbitrary imprisonment, and the sustained harassment of critics (Human Rights Watch 
[HRW], 2015) — triggered a backlash from donors and activists alike, and soured 
Ethiopia’s relationship with the international community.20 Many human rights groups 
called on donors to revisit and reduce their aid flows to Ethiopia, as they felt they would 
be used to uphold an increasingly authoritarian regime (Human Rights Watch, 2005). 
Thus, in the years following the 2005 elections, the Ethiopian government actively 
sought to rebuild its reputation in order to re-establish its legitimacy as a worthy 
destination for development aid and foreign investments. 
 
The government has allowed for an increased share of foreign investments (from both 
public and private actors) in Ethiopian land since 2005, with foreign investments 
accounting for 74.4 per cent of the total land requested for large-scale agricultural 
                                                             





production as of 2012 (Baumgartner, 2012). The largest investors in Ethiopia are now 
companies from the Middle East (21.5 per cent), Western Europe (22.4 per cent), South 
Asia (13.2 per cent), and North America (8.4 per cent) (Baumgartner, 2012), with 
investment dollars flowing mostly to Ethiopia’s floriculture, food, meat, vegetable, and 
biofuel sectors.21 The result has been drastic changes in Ethiopia’s land market. 
According to the Ethiopian Investment Agency (interview with Mr. Aklilu Mariam, 
Director for Information and Investment, Ethiopia Investment Agency, 17 April 2014), 
three and a half million hectares of land had been allocated for large-scale lease 
investments between 1996 and 2008, with much of this land made available in the 
remote, lowland areas in the west and south of the country and an increasing portion of 
land allocated specifically in the Benishangul-Gumuz, Gambella, and SNNPR regions 
(see Figure 2).  
 
Figure 2. Land leased to investors in Ethiopia by village (thousands of hectares) 
 
                                                             
21 According to Lavers (2012b), the largest investors in Ethiopia to date are companies from India, Germany, Israel, 




Source: Lavers (2012b). 
 
Lack of Positive Change in Ethiopia’s Agricultural Sector 
 
In view of the government’s argument that a shift to commercial agriculture would 
ultimately benefit small landholders, it is important to consider the nuanced weaknesses 
of the commercial agriculture model in the development context, which is often glossed 
over in the literature. For instance, running counter to employment creation 
expectations, commercial agriculture tends to replace labour-intensive smallholder 
farming techniques with capital-intensive technology. It has been claimed that large-
scale commercial farming is also likely to degrade the surrounding environment and 
decrease the sustainability of nearby smallholder production, due to its more intensive 
use of fresh waterways, fertilisers, pesticides, and fossil fuels for machinery (Vermeulen 
and Cotula, 2010; Anseeuw, 2013). The United Nations Special Rapporteur on the 
Right to Food also noted that a significant loss of agrobiodiversity is typically associated 
with large-scale monocultures (Ozden, 2013), which weaken the stability, sustainability, 
and resilience of agricultural systems in the face of weather- and pest-related shocks. 
According to Altieri and Nicholls (2008: 474), polyculture agriculture yields advantages 
of 20 to 60 per cent because they “reduce losses due to weeds, insects and diseases 
and make a more efficient use of the available resources of water, light and nutrient.” 
There is therefore a growing recognition that more balance is needed within the 
Western ‘modernized’ approach to agriculture, as the current one may be worsening the 
potential for ecological shocks, damaging the environment, and further marginalising the 
majority of the world’s agricultural population (Weis, 2010). 
 
In contrast, smallholder farming in Ethiopia emphasises ecological diversity, systems 
integration and synergies, and the inclusion and development of poor smallholders. This 
type of farming, in fact, generates more jobs than large-scale farming due to its low 
mechanisation (Herren et al., 2012) and allows for higher aggregate production levels 
per unit of land due to its crop diversification. Furthermore, it delivers greater returns, 




Similarly, nomadic livestock or shifting agricultural production offers the spatial flexibility 
needed for arid or semi-arid climates, typical of the Ethiopian highlands. In allowing 
herds of livestock to move over great distances, or cultivation activities to rotate over 
time through different plots of land, pastoralism and shifting cultivation offer important 
benefits to populations in areas where rainfall, and hence the availability of water and 
fodder, is variable (van den Brink, 2006).  
 
Governments must do better to create effective monitoring and review processes for 
large-scale, foreign-owned investments, and have structures in place to establish 
impactful scopes of action for foreign-, private-sector actors. In the case of Ethiopia, a 
failure to closely review contracts in favour of quick financial returns exacerbates these 
challenges. Ethiopians are regularly faced with national agreements that fail to address 
issues of accountability among all parties, ensure the protection of traditional and 
subsistence-based livelihoods, defend against the displacement of farmers and 
pastoralists, and encourage environmental sustainability and the like. In addition, 
reports and interviews indicate that agriculture agreements made between the Ethiopian 
government and multinational corporations have largely failed to include robust 
frameworks that define responsibilities and outline adequate corporate social 
responsibility (CSR) measures, with the government placing emphasis instead on rapid 
industrialization and attraction of FDIs into the country (Besada, 2017).  
 
There are also concerns regarding the potential impacts of foreign investments that 
have little understanding of or concern for the socio-economic and political context of 
the host community, especially if there is an expectation that those foreign-owned 
enterprises are to contribute more broadly to peace, stability, and sustainable growth. 
Many of these negative impacts are already occurring in Ethiopia, thereby undermining 
the government’s argument that its encouragement and proper governance of large-
scale, foreign investments will ultimately benefit smallholder producers (Taffesse, 
Brown, and Minten, 2018). For example, in the case of knowledge spillovers, foreign 
investors are often expected to provide appropriate market services and the technical 




requirements. Yet, “when related to the total number of smallholders, only a minority 
has actually been able to participate in such schemes” (Bosc et al., 2013: 13). The most 
common opportunities instead are unskilled jobs, and even these are not necessarily 
offered to local communities.22 Furthermore, as unskilled jobs, these positions do little to 
teach smallholders about the operational requirements of large-scale farming. 
Meanwhile, many of the mechanised and energy-intensive farming techniques used by 
large-scale investors are unlikely to be viable for smallholder use given these small-
scale farmers often lack the necessary resources to develop and maintain the 
infrastructure (Lavers, 2012a).  
 
There has been anecdotal evidence to suggest a casual disregard, at times, for 
enforcing regulations requiring foreign investors to hire local labour, thereby inhibiting 
the former’s contribution to this aspect of sustainable economic growth (interview with 
Mr. Aklilu Mariam, Director for Information and Investment, Ethiopia Investment Agency, 
17 April 2014). As such, not all projects provide employment opportunities and many of 
those who are employed are offered casual contracts, meaning they have little 
employment security and thus contribute little to local economic growth (Rahmato, 
2011). According to data collected at the Embassy of India in Ethiopia, for example, 
more than 90 per cent of the 110,000 Ethiopian workers employed in 2008 by Indian 
companies were seasonal workers (Shepherd, 2013). One project in the lowlands also 
demonstrated the tension between Indigenous lowland labour and that of a growing 
group of highland seasonal migrant farmers who were willing to move for agricultural 
work (Moreda, 2015). In this case, the Indigenous community was displaced from its 
ancestral lands for the benefit of a foreign investor, yet were then marginalised in the 
subsequent hiring of local labour.23  
                                                             
22 In some cases, labour is imported entirely from the foreign investor’s country of origin, thereby undermining any 
employment benefit to local populations. Alternatively, if sourced from the country of investment, jobs are not 
necessarily offered to affected populations in the communities where the investment is based, as more skilled 
populations from around the country are willing to relocate. 
23 According to one local resident, “they [private investors] don’t want to employ our people” (Moreda, 2015, 530). The 





This was confirmed separately by an EU delegation to Ethiopia, which noted that most 
commercial farms hired foreign workers or workers from outside the local community, 
causing tensions between the local and migrant groups (interview with Mr. David 
Mogollon, Head for Rural Development & Food Security, EU Delegation to Ethiopia, 11 
April 2014). That said, the decision made by commercial farms to hire foreign workers 
or workers outside the local community was not necessarily related to cost-
effectiveness or productivity. Often, foreign investors that  transplant expatriates to 
investment sites do so out of ignorance of local context and needs; being new to 
Ethiopia, they may have acted based on experience gained elsewhere. Moreover, there 
were occasions that workers were hired based on recommendations by national or local 
government officials. 
 
Looking beyond skills and knowledge transfer and employment opportunities, the 
construction of rural infrastructure, such as new roads and irrigation networks (a 
transactional obligation in many land deals), often caters to company, rather than local 
population, needs — or remains privatised. The lack of expected returns for affected 
communities can have serious consequences, as many farmers sell their land or 
relocate to make way for large-scale agricultural investments on the promise that they 
will experience direct benefits. When this promise is only partially met or even ignored, 
smallholders and pastoralists typically find themselves without land or are left to till less 
arable land. In these cases, they often have no recourse to secure the compensatory 
investments promised to them.  
 
This creates a situation in which foreign-owned enterprises have contributed to conflict 
and instability. This can profoundly destabilize a conflict-threatened country like 
Ethiopia, which performs economically well and has operated solid institutions, but 
ethnic tensions due to land access and other developmental resource issues threaten 
                                                             
perception is supported by an interview in a separate case study in which it was discovered that pastoralists were 




political and social stability. In contrast to such a developmental state model, a 
functioning governance system that leverages the private sector for economic growth, 
peace, and political stability. Indeed, the manifestation of this was seen in 2016, when 
protestors attacked foreign-owned businesses in the Oromia and Amhara regions, with 
opposition political parties citing the absence of broad-based development for the 
poorest populations of the country, despite large-scale foreign agriculture investment, 
as the source of discontent and conflict (Al-Jazeera, “Foreign Firms,” 2016). The people 
of the Oromia region argue that the government has repeatedly tried to forcibly evict 
them from fertile farmland, including using the expansion of regional capital to take 
control of arable fields for multinationals (Al-Jazeera, “Foreign Firms,” 2016; Dixon, 
2016). Rural farmers point to the decades-long process of villagization and land 
grabbing as the cause of the forcible relocation of tens of thousands of individuals so as 
to allow agriculture investments from foreign-owned companies (Smith, “Ethiopians 
Talk,” 2015). 
 
In contrast to other countries, Ethiopia’s infrastructure requirements for investors are 
minimal. According to a private investor in one case study, the Ethiopian government 
had noted that the government was responsible for all public infrastructure — roads, 
telecommunications, and electricity — while the investing company was to provide 
private infrastructure, such as roads and irrigation systems internal to the investment 
area, and accommodation for employees (Shepherd, 2013). Another study reported that 
the foreign investing company’s only obligations were to repair and widen a dirt track 
leading to the project site and provide some plastic sheeting to a community school 
(Rahmato, 2011). Yet even then, there were few benefits to the community: the investor 
cut down fruit trees to widen the road — eliminating an essential source of food security 
and income — and refused to compensate affected smallholders. In sum, a lack of 
investment regulations regarding contribution requirements to Ethiopia’s infrastructure 
has significantly diminished the potential returns of these investments for affected 
smallholders, thereby failing to encourage foreign-owned enterprises to contribute to 
conflict-containment strategies by ensuring participation and return for smallholders as 





It also appears that the Government of Ethiopia has been using its own normative and 
security sector (hard and soft power) resources to support a push toward large-scale 
commercialization of the agricultural and natural resources sector. According to its 2012 
World Report, Human Rights Watch (HRW) reported that at least 3.6 million hectares in 
the Gambella region have been leased to multinational and local firms since 2008, 
much of which has been orchestrated with the help of armed security forces driving 
people away from their land (Horne and Bader, 2012). According to the report, tens of 
thousands of Indigenous people have been forcibly removed from their homes in 
Gambella to join new villages with no meaningful consultation or free, prior and 
informed consent (FPIC) (Horne and Bader, 2012). Although the stated goals of what 
should be a voluntary villagization programme are to provide better access to basic 
infrastructure and agricultural assistance, the program has mostly taken place in areas 
where significant land investments have already been or will be made in the future 
(Horne and Bader, 2012). After interviewing more than 100 residents in Gambella who 
had been impacted by the villagization programme, HRW stated that it found 
“widespread human rights violations at all stages” (Horne and Bader, 2012). This 
situation creates animosity between foreign-owned enterprises and local populations as 
opposed to supporting a governance and regulatory system that fundamentally works to 
benefit the latter. The Ethiopian population would benefit from broad-based, inclusive 
development based on the creation of strong governance frameworks in the 
agribusiness and land industries. The Political Economy of Natural Resources 
Governance’s concept provides major avenues for advancing such a governance 
framework.  
 
The Ethiopian government’s preference for and encouragement of large-scale, foreign 
agricultural investments has had a negative effect on smallholder producers. Limitations 
on the freedom of Ethiopian civil society and academics to speak out have diminished 
awareness regarding the  negative impacts of large-scale land leases on Ethiopian 




Socio-Economic Researcher, Forum for Social Studies, 17 April 2014).24 Moreover, 
foreign investments in large-scale agricultural projects have yet to provide any 
significant benefits to smallholder producers, as existing governance systems do not 
require private-sector actors to contribute to sustainable development in any meaningful 
way. Alternative governance models can offer more inclusive and politically 
decentralised growth, which is necessary to regain smallholders’ support, decrease 





This case study broadly demonstrates that governance models which prioritise the 
production of labour-intensive smallholder crops, meaningful consultations with local 
communities, and due respect for local knowledge of agricultural production processes 
could facilitate inclusive and sustainable growth in Ethiopia. However, instead of being 
allies in the achievement of stability and sustainable growth, foreign-owned enterprises 
have become vehicles for further ethnic polarisation, as the current policy framework in 
which they operate reinforces distrust in the state’s ability or willingness to overcome 
the oppressive and ethnically repressive behaviour of previous regimes. Ultimately, the 
role of foreign investors in natural resources governance in a fragile state such as 
Ethiopia is to support sustainable economic development efforts and contribute to 
conflict-containment strategies through positive and fair involvement in land transactions 
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Regulation and Governance 
 
Despite expectations, five to 10 years after the enactment of the 1995 Constitution and 
the implementation of policies, agricultural growth, poverty, and food security did not 
improve significantly. Forward and backward production linkages were limited, in part 
due to extra income in Ethiopian households being directed to food rather than 
agricultural inputs. On the supply side, a lack of both public funds and capital 
accumulation in the private sector limited the larger investments needed to facilitate 
these linkages. Consequently, doubts concerning the economic arguments outlined in 
the ADLI strategy, which focused solely on smallholder agriculture as the engine for 
growth, subsequently convinced senior Ethiopian policy-makers that an expanded 
agricultural approach was required (interview with Mr. Getachew Regassa, Secretary 
General, Addis Ababa Chamber of Commerce, 16 April 2014). 
 
In addition to limited economic impacts, the land and agricultural polices had also failed 
to protect vulnerable groups. For instance, despite the legal recognition of ethnic 
equality through federalism, the lowland regions and the ethnic groups within them 
remained politically marginalised. A limited degree of autonomy was also conferred on 
them (Lavers, 2012a): after a long history of inequality under imperial rule, during which 
the “lowland periphery was characterised by inequality, exploitation and extraction of 
resources through collection of tribute and taxes, and the slave and ivory trades” 
(Lavers, 2012a, 125), the ethnic groups native to these regions, such as the Anuak, 
Afar, and Somali peoples, were left with few skills or experience to administer their 
territories under the new ethno-federalist model. As a result, the central government 
continued to act on their behalf in governing their territories, thereby undermining the 
idea of ethnic equality and empowerment in these areas. 
 
It can be argued that Ethiopia’s previous policy framework for agricultural growth 
delivered poor economic outcomes. However, the current focus on encouraging large-




political opposition due to increasingly oppressive and authoritarian measures (Alemu et 
al., 2003; Lavers, 2012c) — means that domestic stakeholders were unable to 
contribute to the policy framework, which was developed and tightly controlled by the 
TPLF under the influence of foreign stakeholders (e.g., development banks). The 
current agricultural strategy has effectively recentralised the ruling party’s power over 
agricultural land, and the policy change has created a complex link between the 
agricultural foreign-owned private sector and the growing fragility and instability of the 
Ethiopian state (Berhanu and Poulton, 2014).  
 
In an effort to expand the number of large-scale, commercial agricultural projects across 
the country, the Ethiopian government produced a number of development plans. In 
light of a lack of public funds and capital accumulation in the domestic private sector, 
these plans have favoured the foreign private sector at the expense of smallholders. For 
example, Ethiopia’s Plan for Accelerated and Sustained Development to End Poverty 
(PASDEP) for the 2005 to 2010 period emphasised the importance of commercial 
agriculture. This emphasis was then expanded to highlight foreign investment in 
Ethiopia’s Growth and Transformation Plan (GTP) for the 2010 to 2015 period. 
Specifically, the GTP noted the crucial role of large-scale investors in transforming the 
agricultural sector and the need to “attract and support strong foreign investments that 
play [an] important role in the country’s economic development, for those sectors given 
special attention by the government” (Ministry of Finance and Economic Development, 
2010a, 29). Although foreign investors are prohibited from leasing land for more than 50 
years, in light of these new plans and new legislation, foreign land investors are now 
largely exempt from paying taxes on imports of capital goods and repatriated profits 
(Bossio et al., 2012).  
 
Additionally, Ethiopian land is leased for very low rents, with the lowest rents available 
in the remote and sparsely populated lowland regions — which does act as an incentive 
for investments in more disadvantaged areas. As the Ministry of Agriculture (formerly 
the Ministry of Agriculture and Rural Development) stated in 2009, Ethiopia offers 




focus toward foreign investments in large-scale, commercial agricultural projects, the 
Ethiopian government also re-established the central government’s authority over land 
transfers of 5,000 hectares or more through the enactment of the Council of Ministers’ 
Regulation of 2008 (Baumgartner et al., 2015). This shift in land governance was 
significant, as it ran counter to the 1995 Constitution and central government’s 
reassurances that it would allow for ethnic self-determination through the empowerment 
of regional governments. This regulation has added to tension and instability (interview 
with Dr. Meheret Ayenew, Executive Director, Forum for Social Studies, 17 April 2014). 
 
Mainstream Western and African regional development institutions, such as the World 
Bank and the Alliance for a Green Revolution in Africa (AGRA), hailed the shift in focus 
from small- to large-scale agriculture as an essential step in improving agricultural 
productivity (Sharp et al., 2007, 46), as well as  a crucial pillar to increasing food 
production and economic growth. The view is that the stagnation of the agricultural 
sector is attributable to the persistence of smallholder farms, and that the only solution 
is through increased mechanisation of agricultural operations and the economies of 
scale offered by large-scale farming — known as agriculture development-led 
industrialization (Lavers, 2011). Given the lack of public funds and capital in Ethiopia’s 
private sector, foreign investment presented itself as an apparent avenue for agricultural 
modernisation, food security, and economic growth.  
 
Ethiopia’s most recent economic policies in the agricultural sector, which have focused 
increasingly on external foreign-owned enterprises, has coincided with diminished 
internal political legitimacy due to a complete lack of space for opposition and the 
recentralisation of significant agricultural land decisions. This diminished legitimacy is 
demonstrated by the fact that Ethiopia has ranked consistently in the top 20 fragile 
states since 2007 (Fragile State Index, 2018). When faced with significant popular 
opposition to policy and legislative changes, the EPRDF has typically responded by 
becoming more insular and making agricultural policy changes in a political environment 
devoid of opposition/critical opinion, using the justification of a statist approach for 




the behest of mainstream Western and African development institutions, was a shift in 
government support toward large-scale, commercial agriculture, which effectively 
placed an entirely new emphasis on the role of foreign-owned enterprises in delivering 
growth. It also recentralized control within the country’s land management structure, 
thereby undermining previous claims that the government supported ethnic equality. As 
a result, the private sector, which now mainly consists of foreign investors, is reinforcing 
the EPRDF’s repressive tactics and therefore contributing to the country’s growing 
fragility (Aalen, 2009). As such, this case study provides unique insights into how 
lacklustre regulation of foreign-owned enterprises can contribute to a country’s 
instability at the expense of economic growth and peace. 
 
Beneficiation and Value Addition 
 
In shifting its focus to large-scale, commercial agricultural projects, the Ethiopian 
government argued — as did various mainstream and African development institutions 
— that this new agricultural model would ultimately benefit smallholder producers. The 
purported benefits included the creation of employment opportunities, development and 
improvement of rural infrastructure, new sources of knowledge transfer, and lucrative 
sale opportunities for African farmers looking to invest capital in other industries 
(Vermulen and Cotula, 2010).  
 
Measures that would facilitate inclusive and sustainable growth in Ethiopia include: 
labour-intensive agricultural crops and labour-intensive investment models; meaningful 
consultations and renewed value placed on local agricultural knowledge; an inclusive 
and participatory biofuel and industrial crop production allocation framework; and 
broader support for developing the growth of domestic companies involved in 
agriculture. Consultation with central and local governments, as well as individual 
smallholders, that encourages large-scale farming companies to position projects in 
ways that have less of an impact on smallholder and pastoral populations or vulnerable 
ecologies is also necessary. Local farmers and herders typically have an excellent 




well as extensive expertise regarding the soil, climate, and ecological issues in their 
region. Integrating traditional agricultural knowledge offers a means to mitigate a large-
scale project’s social and environmental impact, while opening up higher-paid jobs for 
local experts and increasing production within a specific agricultural context.  
 
Local consultation and FPIC are also essential to the security of investments, as 
discontent and unrest within communities surrounding new large-scale land acquisitions 
can jeopardise the sustainability of these types of projects (Baumgartner et al., 2015). 
Using FPIC as a basis for investment projects is not only essential from a human rights 
perspective, but is also beneficial in terms of local community support. Peasant forms of 
resistance, although more covert and disorganised in nature, can severely undermine 
large-scale agricultural land investments, as demonstrated by land encroachments by 
surrounding smallholders or intentional crop damage by local agricultural labourers. 
Since foreign-owned enterprises typically enter local arenas where land relations are 
dynamic or contested, consultation is crucial to understanding the local context and 
ensuring there is local support of incoming investments. 
 
Violence in Oromo 
 
Violence erupted in 2015 in the Oromo region due to the threat of the government 
expanding the boundaries of Addis Ababa. One act of protest was to burn the 
warehouses of a Dutch agricultural company, Solagrow PLC, which had taken over 
communal grazing lands in the region. Protesters had become increasingly concerned 
that the government is trying to take away their land (Schemm, 2016).  
 
Large-scale land acquisitions exacerbate food insecurity when smallholders’ and 
pastoralists’ access to land is revoked without adequate provision for alternative 
sources of food and water. Despite this, the Ethiopian government’s incentives for 
foreign investors are extremely liberal, if not counterproductive, with regard to the 
country’s food security. For example, investments are given higher priority through 




(Lavers, 2012b). According to Article 4 of the Council of Ministers Regulation No. 
84/2003, which stipulated new investment incentives, investors engaged in 
manufacturing or agro-industrial activities or the production of agricultural products are 
exempt from income tax for at least five years if they export more than half their 
production or provide 75 per cent to exporters. In contrast, those exporting less than 75 
per cent of their production are only exempt for a minimum of two years. 
 
In addition to these generous tax incentives, there has been a massive shift of land and 
water rights from customary to foreign users, a process that often occurs informally as a 
result of ambiguous land rights and water regulations.25 In one case study in Oromia, for 
example, newly arrived foreign investors from the Netherlands, Russia, Israel, 
Palestine, and China caused changes to the community’s previously informal communal 
rights to canal infrastructure (Bues and Theesfeld, 2012). Smallholder needs were 
neglected in the face of these more powerful investors, unfettered by the Ethiopian 
government, as they were able to divert water from this and other traditional communal 
sources. Communal land in another project, in which Saudi Star was given land and 
water rights to develop a large-scale project on Annuak land in the Gambella region, 
was similarly expropriated due to the perception that it was unused (Rahmato, 2011). 
This land was far from unused, as the Annuak people supplement their smallholder 
farming incomes with fishing, hunting, and honey production, thereby relying on their 
surrounding ecosystem for wild food sources in times of hardship. As a result, Saudi 
Star’s deforestation of this previously communal land has worsened the local 
community’s food security (Rahmato, 2011). As well, the rates of pay for Ethiopians 
working on land that has been privately invested in have also fallen below the level 
required to replace the value of smallholders’ lost farmland. With $0.80 per day as the 
Ethiopian norm for unskilled agricultural labour in 2008 and one press report quoting a 
                                                             
25 Although the Ethiopian government enacted the 2005 Water Resources Management Proclamation, which states 
that “domestic [municipal] use shall have priority over and above any other water uses,” the implementation of these 
laws is very limited (Bossio et al., 2011). Furthermore, large-scale lease agreements permit the development and use 




female worker earning $0.47 per day (Shepherd, 2013), agricultural wage labour 




Saudi Star Agricultural Development Plc. is the agricultural arm of MIDROC Africa Ltd., 
a Saudi company that is investing heavily in Ethiopia (Sheikh Mohammed Hussein Al 
Amoudi’s official website, 2018). Currently managing 140,000 hectares of land in the 
Gambella region, the company plans to increase its investments to cover 500,000 
hectares (Environmental Justice Atlas, 2018) as part of the King Abdullah Food Security 
Program (KAFSP). Saudi Star owner Mohammed Hussein Al Amoudi intends to invest 
an additional $5 billion in Ethiopia’s land between 2016 and 2021, which will have an 
increased impact on traditional land systems (farmlandgrab.org, 2018).  
 
Looking at the impact of large-scale land investments from a political perspective, many 
national laws overlook the need for FPIC or compensation for local populations in these 
types of transactions. Consequently, there is typically a lack of engagement and support 
from community stakeholders who have been displaced from their land. Ethiopia is no 
exception and smallholders and pastoralists alike have exhibited overt resistance 
through peasant protests in several parts of the country as a result.26 They have also 
exhibited covert forms of resistance, such as slow encroachments on land given out to 
investment projects and the quiet destruction of field crops and machinery (Rahmato, 
2011). The people of the Godere woreda in the Gambella region, for example, 
organised a series of meetings when they heard that an Indian agricultural company 
called Lucky Exports had acquired a lease of 5,000 hectares of forest to establish a tea 
plantation near their community (Rahmato, 2011). The Godere woreda people prepared 
an alternative land use plan that would preserve the forest and provide youth 
employment, and presented it to the federal government — an example of a successful 
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lobbying effort that halted the plantation project. However, resistance has become the 
exception to the rule in the Gambella region (Horne and Bader, 2012). 
 
With regard to the Ethiopian government’s provision of compensation for expropriated 
land, Lavers (2012b, 907) noted that displaced smallholders on the whole “seem to 
receive the legally required compensation of ten times the average annual income over 
the previous five years.” However, he also noted that it is questionable whether this 
amount is sufficient. Some farmers do not have the financial capacity to handle a 
significant amount of money, having never done so before. According to one Ethiopian 
farmer interviewed in 2011, “the Birr lasted a few months, but the land has been lost for 
generations” (Shepherd, 2013, 9). In addition, multiple projects have demonstrated the 
potential divisive effects of compensation when given without adequate consideration of 
the local context (Shepherd, 2013). For example, one largely Amharic village in the 
predominantly Oromo region of Bishoftu did not receive the intended compensation 
from an investor because local Oromo authorities denied the payment (Shepherd, 
2013.). In cases like this, large-scale land leases were used by dominant ethnic groups 
to exert power over other groups through disproportionate allocations of land or 




Considerations in Developing an Effective Governance Framework 
 
Although Ethiopia remains heavily reliant on its agriculture for export revenue and GDP 
growth, the share of manufacturing in the country’s GDP has been trending upward over 
the past decade, with some of this manufacture output attributed to exports. This is a 
transformation that should not be overlooked. Ethiopia has increasing created 
manufacturing jobs — moving labour from smallholder agriculture sector to processing 
and manufacturing (UNDP, 2017). The World Bank and other informed observers 




end of global manufacturing that China is ‘exporting’ to low-wage developing economies  
Should the country explore alternative foreign-owned enterprise investment models for 
this sector, particularly those that include collaborative governance institutions and 
components, manufacturing could be the sector that drives sustainable development, 
peace, and stability.  
 
Although growth in smallholder agriculture and pastoralism can positively affect food 
security due to the linkage between production, household consumption and domestic 
markets, it can be equally detrimental if negatively affected by climate change and other 
risks such as price shocks, which are becoming more prevalent. Farmers and herders 
currently have no mechanisms with which to deal with impacts from climate change 
patterns. Smallholder producers are equally vulnerable to the growing prevalence of 
economic shocks in the international agricultural sector, as demonstrated by the 
devastating effects of multiple food price spikes over the past 10 years. 
 
The Government of Ethiopia implemented the Productive Safety Net Programme 
(PSNP), a social protection scheme, in 2005. One of the largest social safety net 
programmes in the world, the PSNP aims to improve Ethiopia’s food security by 
providing direct support to the country’s most vulnerable populations and through 
income diversification via small public work projects for other citizens. The PSNP is 
complemented by the country’s larger Food Security Programme, which seeks to raise 
household incomes through resettlement grants, household income generating 
packages, and water harvesting.  
 
Although social safety net programmes offer one avenue to address food insecurity, 
income diversification through private-sector opportunities offers another path for 
mitigating agricultural risks. In other countries, this diversification has typically occurred 
through the creation of non-agricultural income sources (FAO et al., 2015). However, 
given the lack of secure job opportunities in most industrial and service sectors in Africa, 
it is worth exploring the agricultural sector for potential alternatives. Given Ethiopia’s 




explored at greater length as a potential source of creating alternative sources of 
secured income for smallholder farmers and pastoralists. Various investment models 
could counteract the impact of large-scale commercial farms — such as diminishing 
returns on labour, land and water quality, and biodiversity — thus meeting both the 
immediate needs of smallholder populations as well as the longer-term need of income 
diversification opportunities and sustainable land use. 
 
It is also important to consider Ethiopia’s macro-economic environment. As of 2015, 
roughly 90 per cent of Ethiopia’s export portfolio consisted of agricultural commodities 
— typically sold at declining global prices — while manufactured goods constituted 71 
per cent of its import portfolio (Terfassa, 2009; World DataBank, 2016a). The same 
sources show that although crop prices have increased in recent years, Ethiopia’s net 
trade of goods and services has been caught in a downward spiral since 2003, largely 
due to rising inflation. This has negatively affected the country’s foreign exchange 
currency reserves, which are required for the import of capital goods. At the request of 
the International Monetary Fund (IMF), the government devalued the Ethiopian Birr by 
close to 20 per cent in 2010 in an attempt to spur export growth and import substitution 
development (Lavers, 2012a).  
 
Following this move, the Ethiopian government must now strike a balance between the 
competing interests of its new export-oriented strategy and the food security needs of its 
smallholder farmers. This balance is particularly crucial given that Ethiopia’s main 
commodity exports are mostly agricultural in nature. More specifically, coffee, sesame 
seeds, and edible vegetables (see Figure 3) constitute a large proportion of exports; 
cereal crops have largely remained within the domestic market despite dominating 
Ethiopia’s crop production (Spielman et al., 2010). The lack of cereal exports is 
attributable to a 2006 directive that banned exports of cereal crops when food shortages 
were imminent (Lavers, 2012a).27 While the government hopes eventually to export 
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grain in health and upscale markets. The Ethiopian government is closely monitoring its production, though, in order 




cereals, Ethiopia’s major cereal crops, including teff, wheat, maize, sorghum, and 
barley, currently afford few surpluses as they continue to constitute the core of 
Ethiopia’s food economy — accounting for 64 per cent of the population’s calorie 
consumption.  
 
Figure 3. Composition of merchandise exports for 2014–2015 
 
Source: IMF (2015). 
 
In light of the difficulties in exporting food crops, the Ethiopian government has instead 
demonstrated increased interest in agricultural investments destined for biofuel crop 
production. In 2007, the government created a Biofuel Development and Utilization 
Strategy (BDUS), followed by a Biofuel Unit within the Ministry of Water and Energy 
when it was established in 2010. The BDUS states that as of 2007, 23.3 million 
hectares of suitable land were available in Ethiopia for biofuel production. Today, one-
third of poor farmers allocate around 15 per cent of their land to productions under 
contract with biofuel companies (Negash and Swinnen, 2013). According to the 
manager of the Unit, the government is aiming to have the country’s biodiesel 
production reach 450 million litres per year by 2020, despite a lack of any substantial 





Despite the possible economic benefits, the rise of biofuel crops has put pressure on 
land, as well as food and water security, with farmland being increasingly converted 
from the production of food crops to that of biofuel crops. According to a 2010 World 
Bank inventory of large-scale land acquisitions, 35 per cent of projects in Ethiopia were 
intended to produce biofuel crops, in comparison to 37 per cent set aside for food (De 
Schutter, 2010).28 As of 2012, biofuel crop production represented up to 50 per cent of 
FDI (Bossio et al., 2012). Although some biofuel crops, such as some oilseeds, offer the 
flexibility of being equally useful for food consumption — which empowers smallholders 
in their ability to negotiate between different markets — the increased emphasis on 
growing biofuel crops can threaten the price of food on a global scale. When biofuel 
production increases at an exponential rate, as it did just before the Global Food Price 
Crisis, the impact on food-insecure populations can be detrimental.29  
 
The jatropha crop, which can grow in relatively infertile soil and arid climates, offers an 
important biofuel crop alternative, as it is grown in areas where food crops are less likely 
to be sustained (Wendimu, 2016). However, in Ethiopia, the livelihoods of many 
pastoralists and cultivators are derived from similar ecological environments. Although 
Ethiopia’s national biofuel strategy has relegated biofuel production to ‘marginal’ land,30 
the issue remains problematic. As discussed earlier, the government’s determination of 
what constitutes marginal land has been highly contentious, mainly as a result of the 
government’s ongoing disregard for the livelihoods of lowland nomadic producers.  
 
While it is important to ensure the growth of Ethiopia’s export revenue, the country’s 
current trade and exchange rates mean that it is equally crucial to alleviate the cost of 
imported agricultural inputs (i.e., seeds and fertilizer) through the creation of domestic 
input markets. Since the late 1990s, a number of donors have encouraged the Ethiopian 
                                                             
28 With the more recent downward trend of oil and gas prices, however, non-environmentally driven investors have 
likely stepped back from biofuel projects and therefore slowed the race for biofuel production. 
29 As the demand for biofuel crops increases, so too do the prices for these crops. If they increase beyond the prices 
paid by the food industry, then food prices for these same crops rise to the point of inaccessibility. 




government to work with the private sector to develop more competitive agricultural 
input markets (Berhanu, 2012). Thus far, however, the government has only supported 
private-sector engagement for EPRDF member organisations. The government’s 
control of the pricing and distribution of agricultural inputs, with little meaningful 
engagement with the private sector, has resulted in “high cost of inputs, insufficient 
credit services and rationing, and a lack of varieties that are appropriate to farmers’ 
needs” (Berhanu, 2012, 15). Additional studies and informants have highlighted that 
state-run input markets, coupled with a credit-based supply framework for these inputs, 
has compelled farmers to be overly dependent on and vulnerable to ruling party 
pressures. Berhanu (2012) therefore argues that a state monopoly in Ethiopia’s 
agricultural input markets not only inflates costs for producers, but also allows for their 
political control through the threat of sanctions in the case of credit defaults. 
 
In developing an inclusive, participatory, and food-secure private-sector governance 
framework and scope of action for the agricultural sector, it is important to consider 
Ethiopia’s need for additional employment opportunities generated by foreign-owned 
enterprises, sustainable and biodiverse land use, foreign currency earnings, and 
competitive domestic input markets. There are indeed opportunities to leverage the 
macro-economic environment in Ethiopia for driving sustainable growth in a conflict-
fragile environment vis-à-vis private-sector actors. Improved economic outcomes, 
including tangential economic growth derived from subsidiary and adjacent sectors, 
such as manufacturing, will provide a formidable opportunity for Ethiopians to live a 
sustainable, peaceful, and stable future. Foreign-owned enterprises are key in this 
regard, especially as the country continues to push further towards the industrialization 
of subsistence farmers and smallholders.  Other needs may equally be addressed 
through this process: sustainable and biodiverse land use; foreign currency earnings; 
competitive domestic market inputs; beneficiation and value addition for communities, 
among others.   
 





As per the Political Economy of Natural Resources Governance framework posited in 
this dissertatioj, possible private-sector changes that would facilitate inclusive and 
sustainable growth in Ethiopia include: investment models that focus on labour-intensive 
agricultural crops; promote meaningful consultations and the use of local agricultural 
knowledge; an inclusive and participatory biofuel and industrial crop production 
allocation framework; and broader support for domestic companies producing 
agricultural inputs.  Given that the harvest of certain crops, such as cotton, rice and 
vegetables, are more labour-intensive than others, focusing production on these crops 
would help large-scale farms soak up the excess of agricultural labour. Additionally, 
certain investment models, such as contract farming,31 enable the labour-intensive 
smallholder farming model to continue unhindered, while expanding smallholder access 
to relevant markets. Floriculture, contract farming, and coffee cooperatives offer 
important lessons in this regard. One of Ethiopia’s more successful crops, fresh-cut 
flowers,32 is highly labour-intensive, meaning that in most cases this crop creates 
enough additional demand for labour to overcome the income lost from other types of 
smallholder production (Lavers, 2012b). Flower projects also take up less land, which in 
turn displaces fewer smallholder farmers. Although the short lifespan of fresh flowers 
requires that these large-scale farms be close to the Addis Ababa airport for quick 
export, and the advanced production technologies and controlled conditions required for 
flower farming make it difficult to contract out this type of farming to smallholders, this 
type of farm production does offer a unique advantage in terms of its off-farm 
employment creation potential for smallholders living close to the country’s capital 
(Mano et al., 2011; Melese and Helmsing, 2010).33  
 
With that said, peasant-created cooperatives, and the negotiating power they typically 
provide, have also allowed for a more successful investment model in Ethiopia’s coffee 
                                                             
31 Contract farming is the sourcing of agricultural production from smallholders. 
32 This sector was introduced to Ethiopia through foreign investments due to growing demand in European markets. 
33 Although concern has been expressed over the environmental impacts of the flower industry due to the widespread 
use of chemical fertilisers and pesticides (Getu, 2009), Ethiopian regulations, international partnerships, and market 
certification and labelling programmes have the potential to improve the economic, social, and environmental 




sector. According to multiple respondents in Becker and Wittmeyer’s study, these new 
cooperatives allow Ethiopian farmers to “intervene in the markets to increase the price 
of coffee by approximately 50%” (2013, 770). Given the important role coffee plays in 
Ethiopia’s export market, such bottom-up adaptations underscore another way of 
promoting smallholder-supportive investments. 
 
In terms of boosting Ethiopia’s exports, if biofuel and industrial crop production were to 
be carefully considered in an inclusive, participatory, and food-secure allocation 
framework, biofuel crops combined with the technology to convert them to energy could 
offer greater energy security and accelerate the development of rural areas (Escobar et 
al., 2009). They could also offer another lucrative non-food export crop, as 
demonstrated by the increasing demand for airline biofuels or the European Union’s 
goal to draw 10 per cent of the region’s transport fuel from renewable sources, such as 
biodiesel, by 2020 (European Commission, 2016). Some of the most crucial issues in 
creating this allocation framework nevertheless extend beyond agricultural policies and 
would require the Ethiopian government to re-evaluate its consideration of traditionally 
nomadic ethnic groups, as well as its modes of engagement with ethno-regional 
governments. In the interests of mitigating the detrimental impacts of disadvantaging 
certain ethnic groups over others, the Ethiopian government should seriously re-
evaluate the Council of Ministers Regulation of 2008 that recentralised land 
administration functions from its regional counterparts, as well as its general approach 
to pastoral and shifting cultivator groups (Hodbod, 2013). 
 
Similarly, given the overwhelming demand for agricultural inputs from its main 
constituency and the historical sensitivities to authoritarian approaches, the Ethiopian 
government needs to reconsider how it engages with and supports its domestic input 
market. In light of the current monopoly of EPRDF-aligned companies in these sectors, 
there is a need to actively encourage and incentivise private-sector actors to enter these 
markets.34 Increased competition should drive down prices, make smallholder 
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producers less vulnerable to exploitative relationships with input companies, and offer a 
better impression with regards to the government’s equal support of all ethnic groups. 
Expansion of these backward linkages to a point where prices elicit stronger smallholder 
demand not only offers the potential for greater agricultural yields but also the possibility 
for additional employment opportunities in other sectors. Likewise, forward linkages 
should be encouraged within the domestic private sector given its potential to spur 
industrialisation. Adding value to agricultural projects through agro-processing and other 
businesses would allow Ethiopian smallholders to create and expand export industries 
that are not beholden to commodity prices and create jobs in the process (Mulatu and 
Grando, 2011).  
 
A variety of options, as well as innovative combinations of these options, would enable 
a greater and more positive contribution by foreign-owned enterprises in Ethiopia’s 
natural resource sectors, specifically agriculture. Although some foreign investment 
would be helpful in providing employment through larger, labour-intensive production 
models, the Ethiopian government should, wherever possible, provide similar, if not 
better, incentives for domestic actors through international-domestic partnerships or 
stand-alone domestic enterprises. This is not to say that the government should curtail 
large-scale foreign investments altogether, but should instead be framing these 
partnerships both legally — in terms of oversight — and normatively, so as to produce 
better economic outcomes that positively impact a broader section of Ethiopia’s 
population. Incentives such as income tax exemptions or duty-free capital goods 
imports could support this objective.  
 
Given the government’s ultimate goal of state legitimacy, these considerations and 
suggestions should offer some insight into how to build an inclusive, empowering, and 
sustainable agricultural policy framework that caters to some of Ethiopia’s 







Conclusion: Research Findings, Knowledge Implications, Policy 
Recommendations, and Future Directions for Research 
 
The role and contribution of foreign-owned enterprises operating in natural resource 
sectors in sub-Saharan Africa as development agents largely depends on the type of 
governance structure in place at the national level and the approach to governance 
adopted by the state. For the purpose of this study, three types of state governance 
structures were identified and analysed: politically stable, post-conflict, and conflict-
threatened. A proposed new theoretical approach defined as the Political Economy of 
Natural Resource Governance was used to investigate how governance structures 
influence the nature and involvement of foreign-owned companies and 
investors operating in the extractive and land resource sectors, both in the wider 
development process and specifically through their contribution to economic growth, 
peace and political stability, and sustainable development.  
 
Analysis into three sub-Saharan countries exemplified by these three political/economic 
states indicates that foreign actors impact governance structures in ways that either 
strengthen or weaken such structures through their activities. The findings form the 
basis for the policy conclusions concerning the role and ideal involvement of foreign-
owned enterprises in the enhancement of natural resource. 
 
As impactful actors, foreign-owned enterprises involved in natural resource extraction in 
the three country case studies are bound to profoundly impact the governance 
structures and, in the process, create mutually beneficial frameworks that enhance 
broad-based development and promote a business-prone environment. In this sense, 
both the foreign actors and the states are involved in a strategy to transform the socio-
economic landscapes in these countries — one that takes into consideration the 
communities’ need for stable and sufficient income sources and access to opportunities, 
and the investors’ need to generate profits. Consequently, the notion of transformation 




entails a mutually beneficial impact of governance systems on the host state and 
population and the business actors, particularly foreign-owned.  
 
Conclusions from the case study findings are grouped as follows: relevance to the main 
research questions ; notion of “collaborative governance” as the ideal approach to 
governance; good  governance and management of natural resources in stable, post-
conflict, and conflict-threatened fragile countries; recommendations for  an appropriate 
analytical framework for investigating  governance of natural resource governance; way 
forward and future research considerations; and contribution of this research project to 
current knowledge. 
 
The ideal role of the private sector in natural resource governance in a stable country 
such as Ghana, a post-conflict country like Sierra Leone, and a conflict-threatened 
Ethiopia is to support efforts to establish sustainable long-term economic development 
and political stability. In the context of each country’s situation, the Political Economy of 
Natural Resources Governance framework provides evidence-based tools for tackling 
Africa’s ‘resource curse’ and moving each country forward towards long-term, broad-
based economic and social development.  
 
In the case of Ghana, the absence of a regulatory framework coupled with a heavy 
bureaucratic system impedes value addition and beneficiation processes while 
promoting corruption at every layer of the system. Both Sierra Leone and Ethiopia are 
profoundly impacted by a lack or mismanagement of their governance systems in the 
realm of natural resources. In the case of Ethiopia, the Political Economy of Natural 
Resources Governance’s framework provides tools to tackle the widespread 
mismanagement of land resources, where the knowledge of locally based practices is 
negated by the development of large agribusiness-oriented farms. These limitations to 
the development of adequate measures promoting stable, sustainable and 
development-oriented systems of governance of natural resources toward foreign-





Main Research Questions  
 
In exploring the answers to the research questions posed in Chapters 1 and 2, it has 
been argued that appropriate systems of governance of natural resources can influence 
the contribution made by private-sector actors and foreign-owned enterprises to socio-
economic and political development of these countries within a politically stable, post-
conflict, or conflict-threatened context. For each case study, considerable effort has 
been spent in identifying how governance systems in each of these contexts can be 
created, bolstered, supported, and ultimately repaired so as to achieve these ideal 
involvements.  
 
Each chapter provides details on how conditions can impact foreign-owned, private-
sector actors to contribute to positive economic, social, and development outcomes; 
how a scope of action can be embedded in governance and operationalized through 
policy and programming; and which entry points and junctures can be used in each 
case to effect change. In politically stable countries, the role of foreign-owned, private-
sector actors are to contribute to economic growth and sustainable development 
through additional revenues, to reliable corporate social responsibility programmes, and 
to capacity building. In post-conflict countries, the ideal contribution was deemed to be 
aiding post-conflict reconstruction, economic transformation, and development while 
working to enhance natural resource governance frameworks, institutions, and 
regulations. Finally, in conflict-threatened countries, foreign-owned enterprises should 
contribute to a conflict-containment strategy through the judicious involvement in 
equitable and sustainable resource transactions and investment. Each case study 
determined how governance structures enable or constrain foreign-owned, private-








Case Study 1: Ghana  
 
In Ghana, natural resources governance presents an opportunity for truly positive 
contribution to sustainable economic growth. In order to achieve the ideal contribution, 
the private sector’s success hinges on effective natural resource governance at both the 
national and local levels. Historically, the role of mining helped catalyse economic 
growth, while the recent discovery of oil presents an opportunity to accelerate 
sustainable change and stability. Foreign-owned enterprises have contributed 
significantly to economic growth, but the benefits of such expanded output have not 
been shared with local communities in mining and oil-producing areas, owing to 
weakness in existing governance structures. Moreover, the role of foreign-owned 
enterprises in contributing to overall stability has been largely supportive, with only a 
few — if any — initiatives, having led to indirect or tangential impacts via CSR or 
capacity-building programs.  
 
The private sector’s positive record is not surprising in a country where stability has 
been established, something the Ghanaian government has largely been responsible 
for maintaining. Activities pursued by mining and oil companies were also investigated 
in the research; while creating some economic and employment opportunities for local 
communities in areas where they operate, there is still room for improvement and more 
needs to be done in terms of mandatory legislation and governance systems 
requirements for local content, beneficiation, value addition, and CSR. The chapter 
recommended a collaborative governance approach to increase participation by all 
stakeholders in natural resource governance and to strengthen linkages between 
foreign, national, and local actors. This collaboration should be based on 
communication, consent, and consensus. 
 
The relationship between the government, the private sector, and local communities 
remains a core concern for many oil and mining communities, which are intent on 
benefiting directly from economic growth that is directly linked to local resource 




government, in concert with civil society, in improving natural resource governance 
(Debrah and Graham, 2015) has led to much progress, especially in terms of policy-
making and scientific research on off-shore drilling (Chalfin, 2015). However, 
improvement can still be made with regard to redistributing natural resource revenues, 
tackling corruption, and realising sustainable development. Increasingly, workable 
partnerships appear to be evolving in the face of increased private investment, with the 
government, private sector, and oil and mining communities gaining a better knowledge 
of issues related to natural resource governance. 
 
Case Study 2: Sierra Leone  
 
In Sierra Leone, natural resource governance presents an opportunity for significant 
positive growth in sustainable development, peace, and stability, as well as a means by 
which to encourage private-sector participation in achieving these goals. The role of 
foreign-owned enterprises in a post-conflict country such as Sierra Leone is to support 
peace-building and reconstruction efforts. The argument has also been made that the 
private sector’s success hinges on efficient and resilient governance at both the national 
and local levels — as was the case in Ghana — including an operationalized scope of 
action. It is alleged that illicit mining operations helped fuel the country’s civil war 
between 1991 and 2002. Since the end of the war, the private sector — namely, foreign 
investors and particularly mining companies — has contributed to the resumption of 
economic growth, but the benefits of such expanded output have not been shared with 
local communities in mining areas, nor have they necessarily translated into sustainable 
stability. Moreover, the contribution of foreign-owned enterprises to post-conflict stability 
has produced mixed results, with the prospect of violence looming in areas where some 
of these private-sector actors operate, due to growing grievances by local communities 
about lack of benefits.   
 
This state of affairs is inherently tied to misperceptions surrounding the roles to be 
played by various government bodies, including Mineral Advisory Boards, the Ministry of 




weak governance and corruption at the national and local levels. These misperceptions 
have hindered opportunities created by legislation and progressive policies and 
arrangements, such as CDAs. The lack of coordination is not confined to the 
Government of Sierra Leone’s relationships with private companies, as the government 
is also said to suffer from insufficient internal coordination between the National 
Revenue Authority, the MMMR, other departments and agencies, and local councils 
(World Bank, 2008; Fanthorpe and Gabelle, 2013). As in the case of Ghana, the 
research found evidence to suggest that some companies are engaged in practices that 
pay little heed to the needs and interests of mining communities, fuelling animosity and 
thus instability. An increase in financial and capacity-building support for natural 
resource governance is evidently a priority for the government, but a prerequisite to 
accessing these finances must be better oversight of initiatives such as CDFs and 
scrutiny of mining companies’ activities. 
 
Interviews undertaken during the field work have shed light on the modus operandi that 
has prevailed since the end of the civil war. These observations largely outline the 
challenges related to the political conditions that have shaped the environment for the 
private sector and influenced the governance of the country’s natural resources. Sierra 
Leone appears to have moved beyond the legacies of armed conflict, though socio-
political relations between government entities, the private sector, and community 
representatives remain a core concern for many mining communities (Reno, 2003). 
Natural resources management by the government, paramount and local chiefs, and 
councils are characterised by corrupt practices and the misappropriation of mining 
revenue. Nevertheless, workable partnerships appear to be evolving in the face of 
increased private investment, with better knowledge of issues related to natural 
resource governance now evident among the government and private-sector actors, as 
well as in mining communities.  
 
While interviews revealed conditions and examples that could be interpreted with 
cynicism, the recommendations for policy options to boost sustainable development 




resilient society that believes in the possibility of transformational change despite 
unending poverty and missed opportunities. Interviewees’ suggestions regarding CDAs 
and the proposal for a comprehensive study on backward linkages in Sierra Leone’s 
mining sector, with the objective of developing a systemic approach framework, could 
be a new point of departure for all stakeholders in Sierra Leone’s future. 
 
Case Study 3: Ethiopia 
 
In conflict-threatened Ethiopia, natural resource governance also presents an 
opportunity to leverage foreign-owned enterprises to drive sustainable economic 
growth, peace, and stability. Although foreign investments have become a vehicle for 
ethnic polarisation, an argument is made that these could be leveraged to support 
efforts to drive inclusive economic growth and reduce the country’s fragility by 
remedying the broken system that facilitates inequitable land transactions and 
investments. The findings also support the argument that foreign-owned enterprises’ 
success in this role hinges on efficient and resilient governance. Ethiopia’s underlying 
fragility, driven by threat of ethnic conflict, has worsened over the past decade, due to 
factionalised elites, limited recognition of human rights and the rule of law, and group 
grievance pressures, among other issues. Indeed, inclusive national discourse has 
declined in favour of an economy-driven narrative that lacks a broader consideration for 
democratic performance, human rights, and human development indicators. In addition 
to aggravating historical sensitivities and grievances among ethnic groups, the 
government’s authoritarian approach has had negative effects on economic 
governance, as highlighted in the agricultural sector, since there are few avenues for 
the government to receive input on the impact and effectiveness of regulatory 
frameworks. 
 
Despite the lack of critical feedback from field investigations undertaken in Ethiopia, the 
recent growing interest in existing and emerging international and African governance 
guidelines for land-based foreign investments does provide some indication that greater 




transnational demand for agricultural land. For example, sub-Saharan African countries 
have placed a stronger emphasis on the need for land policies that adequately consider 
the land pressures created by an increasingly liberalised and globalised land market.  
 
Land pressures include a disregard for smallholder protections in international law and 
mainstream development directives. While international law has been effective in 
strengthening the protection of foreign investment, it has offered little protection to 
smallholders. Donors and development institutions have also increased their pressure 
on African countries, and particularly on Addis Ababa, to facilitate private investment in 
large-scale commercial agriculture. Consequently, there has been growing momentum 
to tackle this issue at the global level through governance frameworks that offer 
voluntary guidelines to countries where vulnerable landholders are at risk. The issue 
has also been broached at the continental level through the Land Policy Initiative (LPI) 
— composed of the AU, UNECA, and the AfDB — which works to strengthen land rights 
and secure livelihoods for African populations. In 2010, the LPI published the 
Framework and Guidelines on Land Policy in Africa (AUC-ECA-AfDB Consortium, 
2010), which encourages African countries to develop policies and legislation that 
protect vulnerable groups in the face of both foreign and domestic large-scale 
agricultural investments. In accordance with its African counterparts, the Ethiopian 
government would be prudent to reconsider and be open to further debate on how to 
incentivise and regulate both foreign and domestic private-sector actors — including 
smallholder producers — in order to leverage the latent opportunities for inclusive and 
sustainable growth that Ethiopia’s agricultural sector has always offered. 
 
Good Governance and Management of Natural Resources: Diverging Economic 
and Security Outcomes in Politically Stable, Post-Conflict, and Conflict-
Threatened Countries  
 
Different country categorisations, whether politically stable, post-conflict, or conflict-




in sustainable development, stability, and peace. This is due to the nature of each type 
of governance system and the associated state institutions. 
 
Category 1: Politically Stable 
 
More than most of other African states, Ghana has achieved diverse results and 
tremendous progress in leveraging foreign-owned enterprises through the passage of 
legislation and the implementation of governance structures. As an indication of 
Ghana’s recent economic progress, driven primarily by the mining and hydrocarbon 
sectors, poverty levels have decreased over the last decade and the unemployment 
rate is notably lower than the average for sub-Saharan Africa.  
 
Despite these successes, there is a pervasive sense that the Ghanaian government 
could do better. The country has not struck a mutually reinforcing and equitable balance 
between attracting investment and stimulating economic diversification and sustainable 
development. More importantly, although the national government in Accra has tried to 
use mining and energy taxation revenues and royalties to promote development 
activities, only some of these efforts have produced the expected outcomes, and few 
have contributed more broadly to general stability. Accordingly, governance of the 
country’s natural resource sector does not function effectively, meaning that Ghana 
does not benefit as it should from its natural endowment.  
 
Natural resources, especially gold, have been a bedrock of economic progress in 
Ghana for almost 40 years. However, the mining sector could play a greater role in 
helping the country achieve sustainable economic growth, peace, and stability by 
facilitating poverty reduction, social development, economic transformation, and 
environmental protection. For this to happen, the 40-Year National Development Plan, 
published in 2017, must give the sector the attention it deserves, placing it at the core of 
Ghana’s future and putting in place the necessary regulatory systems for its 
development. These would address corruption and infrastructure issues and facilitate 




issues seriously and should be commended for its progress in terms of implementing 
certain good governance structures, particularly the local content requirements for the 
mining sector.  
 
But, despite these positive steps, policies that translate natural resource revenues into 
poverty alleviation and sustainable development could be introduced. By passing 
legislation and imposing regulations, the government has already demonstrated that it 
can align benefits accrued by the natural resource sector with national social priorities. 
Policy implementation gaps do remain, stemming from the practices and philosophies of 
private-sector actors, which have realised only a fraction of their responsibility to uplift 
the Ghanaian society and, more specifically, the communities directly affected by their 
operations. Together with the government, foreign-owned enterprises could be a key 
driver of transformational change if governance at the national and local levels were 
more effective. 
 
Category 2: Post-Conflict 
 
In practical terms, Sierra Leone’s economic reconstruction efforts would need to be 
sustained and enforced via the export of natural resources, primarily diamonds and iron 
ore. While the management of the mining sector remains a daunting task for the current 
government, other initiatives have begun to bear fruit. In recent years, the Government 
of Sierra Leone has taken several more steps to attract FDI. This includes introducing 
legislation such as the Investment Code (2005), the Business Registration Act (2007), 
the Investment Promotion Agency Act (2007), the Companies Act (2009), and the 
Bankruptcy Act (2009). Furthermore, a national Private Sector Development Plan came 
into effect in 2009 (United States Embassy in Freetown, 2011). These reforms are 
aimed at providing greater protection for companies investing in Sierra Leone, 
streamlining the process of business engagement, and opening up more opportunities 





Despite these achievements, Sierra Leone’s post-conflict environment continues to 
seriously hamper the level of investment in the country and the degree to which it can 
diversify its economy. Indeed, the country’s long-term stability and the consolidation of 
its democracy requires that it move away from resource extraction as the dominant 
source of revenue. The after-effects of the conflict include a severe shortage of skilled 
workers and managers, rampant corruption, a lack of infrastructure (roads and 
technology), cumbersome customs procedures, a weak judiciary, the absence of an 
effective land-titling system, and an underdeveloped banking system. Each of these 
issues continues to deter investors. In addition to these structural challenges, once 
companies arrive in Sierra Leone, they face both governance roadblocks and 
community pressures related to corporate social responsibility duties, often seen as a 
contribution to post-conflict reconstruction (interviewees with Mr. Molla Alemu March, 
Programme Manager, Youth Employment & Empowerment Program, UNDP Sierra 
Leone, 28 March 4, 2014).  
 
The concern was raised that large mining corporations had not earned the social 
licences to operate in mining communities. The perception among interviewees was that 
these corporations need to do more with regard to addressing social issues — in 
particular, health, skills development, employment generation, and education — while 
refraining from using corporate social activities as a promotional mechanism designed 
to gain support and praise from the government and multilateral institutions. In stark 
contrast, representatives of mining companies noted that the corporations have done 
their best to provide for people living in communities affected by their operations.  
 
While CDAs and diamond area community development funds (DACFs) have been 
earmarked by some as potential remedies to endemic difficulties with leveraging 
resource wealth in Sierra Leone for long-term economic growth and development, 
challenges and weaknesses pertaining to their implementation remain. The often 
chaotic, fragmented, and uncoordinated nature of policies is regarded as the biggest 
obstacle in doing business in Sierra Leone and an excuse, while implementing CSR 




and the DACDF (interviews with Mr. Yero Baldeh, Resident Representative, African 
Development Bank Sierra Leone, 3 March 2014).  
 
Cuts in corporate contributions to the government, which have arisen due to differential 
investor treatment, uncoordinated government mineral policies, and ineffective 
implementation of legislation by various agencies and departments, have translated into 
a reduction in government revenues at both the national and local levels. This 
fundamentally limits the government’s material ability to spearhead post-conflict 
reconstruction and the enhancement of governance. Weak regulatory mechanisms 
have resulted in the irregular disbursement of CDFs, which impacts on local 
development programmes agreed upon with mining communities. Such inefficiencies, 
coupled with allegations of theft and corruption by local councils and paramount chiefs, 
have resulted in mining companies opting not to participate in CDAs and instead 
establishing company-specific CSR programmes. 
 
Because of perceived political instability in the sub-region, and given existing 
infrastructure deficits and poor governance, Sierra Leone does not have the favourable 
image needed to attract international investments. While on the one hand low 
investment levels hinder democratic development and peace-building efforts, problems 
also arise when corporations that are already operating and investing in Sierra Leone 
do not meet their potential to contribute to post-conflict reconstruction, sustainable 
economic growth, peace, and stability. That said, this case study concludes with the 
argument that foreign-owned enterprises have the transformational potential to play a 
crucial role in fostering post-conflict recovery and providing economic opportunities 
through job creation and the provision of social services such as schools and health 








Category 3: Conflict-Threatened 
 
When one considers that Ethiopia and the East Africa region are disproportionately 
affected by hunger and other food security concerns, it is problematic to learn that 
although foreign investments in Ethiopia’s agricultural sector have culminated in 
improved infrastructure, new roads and irrigation networks are frequently the result of 
the needs of companies being catered to rather than local populations. Despite minimal 
government requirements for broad social and economic contributions by mining 
companies for the regions in which they operate, large-scale land acquisitions 
exacerbate this issue in instances where the land access rights of smallholder 
agriculturalists and pastoralists is revoked without reasonable provision for other 
sources of sustenance, whether that be alternative land or employment opportunities. 
Over the long term, if current trends continue and Ethiopia experiences increasing 
temperatures and more sporadic precipitation, the country will be at greater risk of 
droughts and floods. This may culminate in declines in agricultural productivity, which 
could have a substantial impact on its food and water security as well as its ecological 
systems. 
 
Foreign investment incentives offered by the Ethiopian government appear to be 
relatively liberal; they fail to encourage and leverage private-sector contributions to 
conflict containment strategies and equitable distribution of revenues and returns from 
land transactions, especially considering the need that exists to protect the country’s 
food security. Additional tax exemptions are offered to foreign investors if they export 
the crops they produce. Moreover, there has been a substantive shift in property rights 
over land and water from smallholder agriculturalists, pastoralists, and other customary 
users to foreign investors — mainly due to the ambiguity surrounding the property rights 
regime governing these resources. The problems caused by these developments are 
exacerbated by the low wages paid to agricultural workers in the face of rising food 
prices, and many Ethiopian laws do not sufficiently consider the notion of free, prior and 
informed consent (FPIC) in transactions involving the acquisition of large land holdings 




from community stakeholders who have been displaced from their land, which has led 
to peasant protests in several parts of the country. In many instances, large-scale 
leases of agricultural land to foreign investors have had a negative impact on Ethiopia’s 
smallholder agriculturalists and pastoralists, including displacement without 
compensation. The foregoing developments have given rise to tension, strife, and 
conflict in recent years. Nevertheless, the adoption of alternative governance models, 
including the referenced collaborative governance approach, may be a workable 
solution.  
 
A re-evaluation of the legislation that has recentralised land administration functions, as 
well as a reconsideration of the government’s general approach to pastoral and shifting 
cultivator groups, could also prove to be broadly beneficial to the citizens. Despite the 
presence of highly factionalised elites, weak recognition of human rights, limited rule of 
law, and marginalised ethnic groups, Ethiopia’s agricultural sector offers development 
opportunities for well-regulated foreign-owned enterprises and constitutes a complex 
linkage between foreign investment and the country’s inter-ethnic fragility. 
 
The Way Forward: Policy Issues, Development Implications, and Directions for 
Future Research 
 
The Responsibility of Resource Companies 
 
Governments have a commitment to their citizens to hold foreign-owned enterprises 
accountable to good corporate practices. As natural resources do have the ability to 
promote sustainable development, peace, and stability for a broader segment of the 
population and lead to political stability if resources are shared in a transparent and 
sustainable manner, meaningful collaboration in resources governance is key in this 
regard. The resource curse does not need to be the norm. Rather, as the Ghanian case 
study shows, resource extraction can lead to economic growth and contribute to 
achieving a country’s economic priorities — there are resource blessings. Of course, 




hinder further positive contributions linked to natural resource exploitation. Whether it is 
land (in Ethiopia's case), mining (in the cases of Sierra Leone and Ghana), or 
hydrocarbon (in Ghana's case), natural resource exploitation has the ability to transform 
economies. When operating under a functional and effective natural resource 
governance system, foreign-owned enterprises can generate a sense of obligation to 
promote sustainable economic development and growth, relevant to their specific 
contexts.  
 
This is insufficient, however, to completely transform economies and pull people out of 
poverty. This can only happen when there is a critical effort to promote secondary 
industries that rely on or feed into the mining/hydrocarbon sectors that generate local 
employment opportunities and revenues for communities and national government. 
These foreign-owned enterprises have a responsibility to contribute to the national 
wellbeing of resource-rich countries. Indeed, emergent literature argues that private-
sector actors, especially mining companies, are becoming key partners and leaders in 
promoting and facilitating development, often taking the responsibility from ill-equipped 
government and traditional donors (Black and O’Bright, 2016; Ite, 2016).  
 
Promoting Accountable Business Practices Through Stronger Structures 
 
A number of important steps can be taken to promote sustainable broad-based 
development, peace, and stability in local communities in the areas of local content, 
beneficiation, and value addition, some of which have been explored in the three case 
studies. First, to promote accountable business practices at both the national and local 
levels and maintain stable relations between community members and the private 
sector, government must begin to draw up better contracts and hold strong negotiations 
that ensure social and human security and compliance with progressive environmental 
laws that protect communities from unforeseen circumstances. It must also demonstrate 
to communities that the government will stand up for them when either foreign or local 
corporations break laws, and promote a long-term vision in which extraction is not an 





The private sector has the potential to be the engine of growth in stable resource-rich 
democracies in Africa. However, this can only be made possible by imposing strong, 
coherent, and strategic national and local governance structures that clearly define the 
role of foreign-owned enterprises in facilitating sustainable economic growth, peace, 
and stability. Not surprisingly, an ongoing issue is how to remedy policy implementation 
gaps: there are many ideas, institutions, laws, and regulations, but implementation of 
these overlapping frameworks is sometimes very difficult and often incomplete. Much 
more time should be spent determining whether policies have been implemented, and 
where they haven’t to identify the reasons behind the failures and find solutions. Lack of 
capacity is likely one reason, but lack of political will is an even greater problem 
(interview with Dr. Kwesi Aning, Director for Academic Affairs and Research, Kofi Annan 
International Peacekeeping Centre, 24 February 2014; Interview with Dr. Elias Ayuk, 
Director, UN University Institute for Natural Resources in Africa, 24 February 2014). 
 
Local Consultation and Bottom-Up Ideas 
 
It is critical that effective local consultation occurs, allowing new ideas to travel from the 
bottom up. Ideas from on-the-ground experts deserve attention, specifically regarding 
advocacy, community participation in decision-making, and monitoring frameworks 
(Owusu-Koranteng and Owusu-Koranteng, 2010; Kuyole, 2013; Owusu-Koranteng, 
2013). Importantly, Community services organisations (CSOs) lack support, specifically 
in terms of resources and technical knowledge, to effectively participate in natural 
resource governance. One promising avenue is that donors identify credible local NGOs 
and CSOs, design working documents together, discuss their concepts, and then 
implement them together. Such collaboration could be scaled up as a pilot programme 
open to extension for additional years (interview with Dr. Allan Lassey, Senior Advisor, 
Extractive Resource Governance, GIZ, 27 August 2015). Within civil society, top-down 
and bottom-up strategies could be put forth by community groups and research 
institutions. CSOs and NGOs should have a larger voice in governance in order for such 





Consultation with central and local governments, as well as individual smallholders, 
enables large-scale companies to position projects in ways that have less of an impact 
on smallholder, artisanal, and pastoral populations or vulnerable ecologies. Local 
farmers, miners, and herders typically have an excellent understanding of how 
livelihoods and food security are derived in their communities, as well as extensive 
expertise regarding the soil, climate, and ecological issues in their region. Integrating 
traditional agricultural and extractives knowledge offers a means to mitigate a large-
scale project’s social and environmental impact, while opening up higher-paid jobs for 
local experts and increasing production within a specific agricultural context.35  
 
Local consultation and FPIC are also essential to the security of investments, as 
discontent and unrest within communities surrounding new large-scale land acquisitions 
can jeopardise the sustainability of these types of projects (Baumgartner et al., 2015). 
Using FPIC as a basis for investment projects is not only essential from a human rights 
perspective, but is also beneficial in terms of local community support. Populous-led 
forms of resistance, although more covert and disorganised in nature, can severely 
undermine large-scale investments, as demonstrated by land encroachments by 
surrounding smallholders or intentional crop damage by local agricultural labourers in 
Ethiopia. Since foreign-owned enterprises typically enter local arenas where land 
relations are dynamic or contested, consultation is crucial to understanding the local 




                                                             
35 Ways in which local knowledge could reduce negative environmental effects include resource conservation 
technologies, improved techniques for organic and low-input systems, reducing water pollution, biological substitutes 







In all cases, possible transformation to reach an ideal involvement of private-sector 
actors in natural resource governance systems that would facilitate inclusive and 
sustainable growth include: labour-intensive agricultural crops and labour-intensive 
investment models; meaningful consultations and a renewed value placed on local 
agricultural knowledge; an inclusive and participatory biofuel and industrial crop 
production allocation framework; and broader support for the growth of domestic 
companies producing agricultural inputs.  
 
Beyond labour-intensive approaches, it would be important for the governments in each 
country to emphasise and take steps to integrate local content, beneficiation, and value 
addition in business practices and operations. These changes would primarily result in a 
move away from a reliance on natural resources and the establishment of economies 
that are more dependent on human resources and technological innovation. These 
changes would also be more conducive to the markets where they operate. For foreign 
mining corporations, engaging in efforts to grow local businesses and technological 
innovation by promoting local content, beneficiation, and value addition will inevitably 
result in better relationships with local communities and increased revenues, as they will 
spend less money on security, pay-outs, and court cases arising from disputes. In the 
long term, increased goodwill between local communities and foreign investors would 
promote political stability, social cohesion, and peace in resource-rich countries. As 
such, governments need to strengthen the implementation of laws and regulations, 
under a broad governance framework, where investors are charged with having to 
support and contribute to local content, beneficiation, and value addition of minerals, 
agricultural, and hydrocarbon products.  
 
Development outcomes largely depend on how national and local government actors in 
resource-rich countries manage their relations with the private sector, especially foreign-




within the governance structures set up by these countries to manage resource 
revenues and investments and understand local systems of governance.  
 
Concluding Observations  
 
An important distinguishing feature of this research from an academic perspective lies in 
the use of in-depth interviews in three types of African countries in an effort to analyse 
governance concepts and practices, arrive at theory-guided conclusions that could be 
applied in various contexts, and develop an improved analytical framework, the Political 
Economy of Natural Resource Governance (PENRG). Together these contribute to 
knowledge of (and how to undertake critical analysis of) the role and impact of foreign 
actors in the management and governance of natural resources in Africa. Evidently, 
foreign-owned enterprises are affected by existing governance structures and their 
interactions with governments, which establish roles and responsibilities for these 
foreign actors and enable outcomes that subsequently influence changes in the 
governance structures themselves. The mutually enforcing relationship that exists is 
captured by the dissertation’s analytical framework. The merit of this knowledge 
contribution is contained in the improved ability to construct detailed systemic 
explanations of the management and governance of natural resources in Africa; 
perceptions on the role, impact, and responsibility of foreign-owned and private-sector 
actors in diverse developing contexts; and an in-depth understanding of how their 
relationships with governments in the region evolve over time.  
 
The extent to which foreign-owned enterprises in resource-rich countries such as 
Ghana, Sierra Leone, and Ethiopia would continue to be viewed with continued 
suspicion, hope, praise, or widespread discontent will largely depend on how local and 
national government actors manage their relations with the private sector. It will also 
depend on how collaborative, cooperative, consulted, and engaged the foreign private-
sector actors are within the governance structures set up by these countries to manage 
resource rents and investments within the broader framework and commitments they 




to bring about transformation and changes for the better in the economies and social 
fabrics of conflict and post-conflict countries — to be the engine of growth in stable 
resource-rich democracies in Africa.  However, this can only be made possible with 
strong, coherent, and strategic national and local governance structures in place that 
not only clearly define the role and responsibilities of the private sector to all 
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